Daniel Everette Hale of Nashville, Tennesssee has been charged by the USG for whistleblowing classified information to a reporter after serving in the US Airforce where he was trained as a "Language Case Analyst" and working at a US intelligence contractor for the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Hale leaked US intelligence materials to a reporter he happened to meet at an event in a DC area bookstore. Pantsuitist sources are claiming Hale's whistleblowing fed reports on US drone strikes around the world in Omidyar's rag "The Intercept" (archived). Hale is far from the first leaker to Omidyar's operation to face USG captivity. Reality Winner was captured by the USG after the Intercept published scans of her leaks with "anti-counterfeiting" patterns intact.

Omidyar's operation has managed to waste its contacts with leakers, with the leakers getting arrested while publishing material nearly a half decade behind TMSR intelligence reporting. Hale was encourage to use the USG owned "Tor" network and the controlled opposition "Tails" linux distro by his handlers. The USG's indictment is presented in full below:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DANIEL EVERETTE HALE,
Defendant.
Criminal No. l:19-CR-59
Count 1:18 U.S.C,§ 793(c)
Obtaining National Defense
Information
Count 2: IS U.S.C, § 793(e)
Retention and Transmission
of National Defense Information
Count 3: 18 U.S.C. § 793(e)
Causing the Communication of
National Defense Information
Count 4: 18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(3)
Disclosure of Classified
Communications Intelligence
Information
Count 5: 18 U.S.C. §641
Theft of Government Property
INDICTMENT
March 2019 Term – At Alexandria
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
A. The Defendant and His Access to Classified National Defense Information
L Defendant DANIEL EVERETTE HALE, age 31, is a resident of Nashville,
Temiessee.
2. From July 2009 through in or about July 2013, HALE was enlisted in the United
States Air Force, where after receiving language and intelligence training, he became a Language
Case 1:19-cr-00059-LO Document 1 Filed 03/07/19 Page 1 of 17 PageID# 1
Analyst. While serving on active duty, HALE was assigned to work at the National Security
Agency (NSA) from December 2011 to May 2013. HALE deployed in support of a Department
of Defense Joint Special Operations Task Force from March 2012 to August 2012, at Bagram
Airfield, Afghanistan, working for most of that time as an Intelligence Analyst responsible for
identifying, tracking, and targeting threat networks and targets. In connection with his active
duty service and work for NSA, HALE held a TOP SECRET//SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (TS//SCI) security clearance, and had access to
classified national defense information.
3. From December 2013 until August 2014, HALE was employed by a defense
contractor known as Leidos. While working for Leidos, HALE was assigned to the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), in Springfield, Virginia, where he worked as a Political
Geography Analyst. HALE was required to receive and maintain a TOP SECRET//SCI security
clearance in order to work at NGA.
4. Over his many years holding a security clearance, HALE received training
regarding classified information, including the definitions of classified information, the levels of
classification, and SCI, as well as the proper handling, marking, transportation, and storage of
classified materials. HALE received training on his duty to protect classified materials from
unauthorized disclosure, which included complying with handling, transportation, and storage
requirements. HALE knew that unauthorized removal and retention of classified materials and
transportation and storage of those materials in unauthorized locations risked disclosure and
transmission of those materials, and therefore could cause injury to the United States or be used
to the advantage of a foreign nation. In particular, HALE had been advised that the unauthorized
disclosure of TOP SECRET information reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally
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grave damage to the national security of the United States, and unauthorized disclosure of
SECRET information reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national
security of the United States, and that violation of the rules governing the handling of classified
information could result in criminal prosecution.
5. HALE's work at NGA required the use of classified government computer
systems and networks that provided access to classified national defense information. HALE
was notified that these computers were monitored for "personnel misconduct (PM), law
enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations" by a banner that HALE had to
acknowledge by clicking on the "OK" button every time he logged on to his computer.
6. Because HALE held a security clearance and was assigned to NGA as a cleared
defense contractor, the United States government entrusted HALE with access to closely held
classified national defense information.
B. Background on Classified Information
7. Classified information is defined by Executive Order 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707
(Jan. 5, 2010) as information in any form that (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or under the
control of the United States government; (2) falls within one of more of the categories of
information set forth in the order; and (3) is classified by an original classification authority who
determines that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage to
the national security that the original classification authority can identify and describe.
8. Under Executive Order 13526, the designation SECRET (S) shall be applied to
information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause serious
damage to the national security. The designation TOP SECRET (TS) shall be applied to
information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause
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exceptionally grave damage to national security. NOFORN stands for "No Foreign
Dissemination" and denotes that dissemination of that information is limited to United States
persons. ORCON stands for "Originator Controlled," which denotes that the information should
not be further disseminated to any third party without the concurrence of the original
classification authority.
9. Executive Order No. 13526 also provides that specified officials may create
special access programs upon a finding that the vulnerability of, or threat to, specific information
is exceptional, and the normal criteria for determining eligibility for access applicable to
information classified at the same level are not sufficient to protect the information from
unauthorized disclosure. Special access programs pertaining to intelligence sources, methods, or
analytical processes are called SCI programs. One such SCI control system is SI information,
which refers to "Special Intelligence." SI protects information relating to technical and
intelligence information derived from the monitoring of foreign communication signals by
someone other than the intended recipients. The term COMINT describes communications
intelligence.
10. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 13526, classified information can generally only
be disclosed to those persons who have been granted an appropriate level United States
government security clearance and who possess a valid need to know to perform a lawful and
authorized government function. Additionally, classified information only may be processed and
retained in and on facilities approved for processing and storage at the appropriate classification
level. Classified information may not be removed from official premises without proper
authorization.
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C. HALE's Communications with an Online News Outlet
11. In April 2013, HALE used his unclassified NSA work computer to search the
internet for information on a reporter (the Reporter). Among the results of his search was
information pertaining to a scheduled appearance of the Reporter on or about April 29, 2013 at a
Washington, D.C. restaurant/bookstore (Bookstore).
12. On or about April 29,2013, HALE attended a book tour event at the Bookstore,
where he met with the Reporter. The next day, on or about April 30,2013, HALE used his TOP
SECRET NSA computer to search for classified information concerning individuals and issues
about which the Reporter wrote.
13. In May 2013, HALE sent a text to a close fiiend and confidant (Confidant) stating
"[the Reporter] wants me to tell my story about working with drones at the opening screening of
his documentary about the war and the use of drones."
14. On or about June 8,2013, HALE sat next to the Reporter at a public event at the
Bookstore to promote the Reporter's book (Book 1). After the event, HALE texted a fiiend that
he was then with the Reporter and headed to a restaurant.
15. On or about June 9, 2013, the Reporter sent HALE an email with a link to an
article about Edward Snowden in an online publication. That same day. Hale texted a fiiend that
the previous night he had been hanging out with journalists who were focused on his story. Hale
wrote that the evening's events might provide him with "life long connections with people who
publish work like this,"
16. On or about July 14,2013, HALE called the Reporter. Three days later, the
Reporter sent HALE an email with the subject line, "did you try calling me?" The body of the
email consisted of "I'm aroimd." A few hours later, HALE called the Reporter again.
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17. On or about July 19, 2013, HALE sent a text message to the Confidant stating that
he was going to New York to meet with the Reporter and two other journalists. The next day,
the same day HALE separated from the Air Force, HALE sent an email to the Reporter stating he
would take a train to New York City the following week, HALE told the Reporter he would text
him when he arrived so they could determine where to meet. Later the same day, HALE emailed
the Reporter about watching a "plug" about the Reporter's book on television. Attached to the
email was a link to a news article entitled, "Court rules journalists can't keep their sources
secret," about the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that a "New York Times
journalist… must testify in the trial of a former Central Intelligence Agency officer accused of
leaking classified national defense information to the media."
18. On or about July 23 and 24, 2013, HALE was in New York City.
19. On or about July 25, 2013, HALE sent the Reporter an email with a copy of his
resume attached and subject line, "Hale – unclass resume." The resume stated that HALE was
looking for positions "within the Intelligence Community… [and was] [ejspecially interested in
Counter Terrorism, Counter Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, or stand up and maintenance of
SIGINT oriented missions." HALE listed his "Active TS/SCI clearance & counter intelligence
(CI) polygraph" and "4 years active duty Air Force" where he "[pjrocessed numerous documents
critical to National Defense." As part of his duties as an Intelligence Analyst, HALE highlighted
his experience operating "payloads on remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) used to support real-time
kill/capture operations – over 1540 hours, over 200 specific mission" and his experience as a
"[b]ack-up Intelligence De-confliction Officer for Operation Enduring Freedom's (OEF)
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms – 80 hours, monitored 750 onCase
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going missions." Finally, HALE listed his experience working with original classification
authorities to declassify information to be used against detainees in trial.
20. On or about August 18, 2013, the Reporter called HALE. The call lasted
approximately 35 minutes.
21. On or about September 20,2013, the Reporter asked HALE to "[j]ust set up a
[Jabber] account [so] we can chat on encrypted." Jabber is a free instant messaging program that
uses encryption to protect the content of the messages.
22. In November 2013, HALE texted the Reporter to ask whether he would "be in
D.C. this weekend for the anti drone summit."
23. Between in and about September 20, 2013, and February 27, 2014, HALE and the
Reporter had at least three encrypted conversations via Jabber.
D. HALE Prints Multiple Classified Documents Unrelated to His Assigned Work at
NGA That Are Published by the Reporter's News Outlet
24. On or about February 27, 2014, HALE sent a text message to the Reporter asking,
"Are you able to get on chat?"
25. On or about February 28,2014, HALE used a classified work computer assigned
to him by NGA to print five documents marked as SECRET and one document marked as TOP
SECRET, which were unrelated to his work at NGA.
26. Approximately four hours after printing the six documents, HALE and the
Reporter had the following conversation via text message:
HALE: Can you be here Monday?
The Reporter: Where?
The Reporter: I am out in LA for oscars. Back Tuesday.
HALE: Right, I understand, do you have time to stop by DC?
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The Reporter: Let me see if I can change flight.
HALE: Please do and lemme know.
27. Each of the six classified documents that HALE printed on February 28, 2014,
was later published by the Reporter's Online News Outlet.
28. HALE continued to print documents from his TOP SECRET computer unrelated
to his work as an NGA contractor that were later published by the Reporter's Online News
Outlet.
29. While employed as a cleared defense contractor for NGA, HALE printed from his
TOP SECRET computer 36 documents, including four duplicates. Nine documents related to
HALE's work at NGA, but 23 did not.
30. Of the 23 documents unrelated to his work that he printed at NGA, HALE
provided at least 17 to the Reporter and/or the Reporter's Online News Outlet, which published
the documents in whole or in part.
31. Eleven of the published documents were marked as SECRET or TOP SECRET
(the Classified Documents). Relevant original classification authorities have since determined
that the documents were correctly marked at the appropriate classification level at the time they
were printed, and that they remain classified at the same level today.
32. The table displayed on the next page lists the 23 printed documents, unrelated to
HALE's work at NGA, with the print job numbers assigned by NGA, the dates of printing, initial
publication dates, and classifications:
Case 1:19-cr-00059-LO Document 1 Filed 03/07/19 Page 8 of 17 PageID# 8
Document NGA Print Job# Date Printed Date of Initial Publication Classification
A lO&ll February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
B 12 February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
C 13 February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
D 14&15 February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
E 16 February 28,2014 October 2015 TOP SECRET
F 17 February 28,2014 October 2015 SECRET
G 18 April 3,2014 April 2015 TOP SECRET
H 19 April 19,2014 N/A TOP SECRET
I 20 April 20,2014 August 2014 SECRET
J 21 April 20,2014 December 2015 SECRET
K 22 April 20,2014 April 2015 TOP SECRET
L 23&24 April 30,2014 July 2014 UNCLASSIFIED
M 25 May 14,2014 August 2014 SECRET
N 26 May 14,2014 August 2014 UNCLASSIFIED
0 27 May 15,2014 December 2016 UNCLASSIFIED
P 28 May 15,2014 December 2016 UNCLASSIFIED
Q 29 May 15,2014 December 2016 UNCLASSIFIED
R 30 May 15,2014 December 2016 UNCLASSIFIED
S 31 June 20,2014 N/A SECRET
T 32 June 27,2014 N/A UNCLASSIFIED
U 33 July 31, 2014 N/A SECRET
V 34 August 5, 2014 N/A SECRET
w 35«fe36 August 5,2014 N/A UNCLASSIFIED
33. The 11 Classified Documents that were published by the Reporter's Online News
Outlet, and later in a book authored by the Reporter, are described in further detail below:
• DOCUMENT A – A PowerPoint presentation on
counterterrorism operations classified SECRBT//SCI
• DOCUMENT B – A document describing a military
campaign targeting Al-Qaeda overseas classified SECRET
• DOCUMENT C – A March 2013 PowerPoint on military
operations classified SECRET
• DOCUMENT D – A PowerPoint presentation on
counterterrorism operations classified SECRET
Case 1:19-cr-00059-LO Document 1 Filed 03/07/19 Page 9 of 17 PageID# 9
• DOCUMENT E – Information gathered by NSA on
specific named targets classified TOP SECRET
• DOCUMENT F – A PowerPoint slide outlining the effects
of the military campaign targeting Al-Qaeda overseas
classified SECRET
• DOCUMENT G – PowerPoint presentation outlining U.S.
military technical capabilities classified TOP SECRET
• DOCUMENT I – A report listing the accomplishments of
an intelligence agency tasked with preventing terrorist
attacks classified SECRET
• DOCUMENT J – A PowerPoint presentation classified
SECRET
• DOCUMENT K – An intelligence report on an Al-Qaeda
operative classified TOP SECRET
• DOCUMENT M – Information on the Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment classified SECRET
34. HALE did not have a "need to know" the classified information contained in the
11 Classified Documents he printed.
35. All of the Classified Documents HALE printed bore standard markings indicating
they contained highly classified information of the United States, including SECRET, and TOP
SECRET, as well as SCI, information.
36. At the time HALE obtained the documents, he knew that they had been or would
be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of unlawfully.
37. HALE was never authorized to remove the Classified Documents from NGA and
retain or transmit them, and neither the Reporter nor any of the employees at the Reporter's
Online News Outlet were entitled to receive or possess them.
10
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38. The documents provided to the Reporter by HALE and published by the
Reporter's Online News Outlet were compiled and published in a book authored by the Reporter
(Book 2).
E. Evidence Stored in HALE's Home
39. On August 8,2014, HALE possessed Document T on his home computer. HALE
also possessed two thumb drives. The first thumb drive contained one page of Document A that
HALE had attempted to delete. This page was marked "SECRET." The second thumb drive
contained the "Tor" software and "Tails" operating system.
40. Tor and Tails were recommended by the Reporter's Online News Outlet in an
article published on the Reporter's Online News Outlet's website, which provided readers with
instructions on how to anonymously "leak" documents to the Reporter's Online News Outlet.
The article published by the Reporter's Online News Outlet explained that the Tor browser
allows users to anonymously surf the web by "hiding your real IP address from the websites that
you visit. If your network is being monitored, the eavesdroppers will only know that you are
using Tor but not what you're doing." The article went on to explain that the Tails operating
system, which can be installed via a USB stick, will prevent someone who has hacked into your
computer from "spy[ing] on everything you do." It "strip [s] metadata from a variety of types of
documents… [and] leaves no traces that it was ever run on your computer."
41. On or about August 8, 2014, HALE's cell phone contact list included the contact
information for the Reporter.
11
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COUNT 1
(18 U.S.C. § 793(c)—Obtaining National Defense Information)
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:
42. The General Allegations within Paragraph 1 through 41 of this Indictment are realleged
and incorporated by reference.
43. Beginning on or about February 28,2014, and continuing to on or about May 14,
2014, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, the defendant, DANIEL EVERETTE
HALE, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, unlawfully
obtained documents coimected with the national defense, namely:
Document Date Printed Date of Initial Publication Classification
A February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
B February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
C February 28,2014 October 2015 SECRET
D February 28,2014 October 2015 SECRET
E February 28, 2014 October 2015 TOP SECRET
F February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
G April 3,2014 April 2015 TOP SECRET
I April 20,2014 August 2014 SECRET
J April 20,2014 December 2015 SECRET
K April 20, 2014 April 2015 TOP SECRET
M May 14,2014 August 2014 SECRET
knowing and having reason to believe at the time he obtained Documents A-G, I-K, and M that
they had been or would be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any person contrary to the
provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Chapter 37.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(c).)
12
Case 1:19-cr-00059-LO Document 1 Filed 03/07/19 Page 12 of 17 PageID# 12
COUNT2
(18 U.S.C. § 793(e)—^Retention and Transmission of National Defense Information)
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:
44. The General Allegations within Paragraph 1 through 41 of this Indictment are
incorporated by reference.
45. Beginning on or about February 28,2014, and continuing to on or about
December 17, 2015, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, the defendant, DANIEL
EVERETTE HALE, having unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over the
following documents related to the national defense, willfully: (a) retained the documents and
failed to deliver them to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive them;
and (b) communicated, delivered, and transmitted such documents to a person not entitled to
receive them. Specifically, HALE retained the following documents relating to the national
defense, and transmitted them to the Reporter and/or the Reporter's Online News Outlet:
Document Date Printed Date of Initial Publication Classification
A February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
B February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
C February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
D February 28,2014 October 2015 SECRET
E February 28, 2014 October 2015 TOP SECRET
F February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
G April 3, 2014 April 2015 TOP SECRET
I April 20, 2014 August 2014 SECRET
J April 20, 2014 December 2015 SECRET
K April 20, 2014 April 2015 TOP SECRET
M May 14,2014 August 2014 SECRET
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(e).)
13
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COUNT3
(18 U.S.C. § 793(e)—Causing the Communication of National Defense Information)
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:
46. The General Allegations within Paragraph 1 through 41 of this Indictment are
incorporated by reference.
47. Beginning on or about February 28, 2014, and continuing to on or about
December 17, 2015, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, the defendant, DANIEL
EVERETTE HALE, having unauthorized possession of, access to, and control over documents
related to the national defense of the United States, namely:
Document Date Printed Date of Initial Publication Classification
A February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
B February 28,2014 October 2015 SECRET
C February 28,2014 October 2015 SECRET
D February 28,2014 October 2015 SECRET
E February 28, 2014 October 2015 TOP SECRET
F February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
G April 3, 2014 April 2015 TOP SECRET
I April 20,2014 August 2014 SECRET
J April 20,2014 December 2015 SECRET
K April 20,2014 April 2015 TOP SECRET
M May 14,2014 August 2014 SECRET
did willfully communicate, deliver, transmit and cause to be communicated, delivered, and
transmitted, and attempt to communicate, deliver and transmit and cause to be communicated,
delivered, and transmitted the same to persons not entitled to receive them, through the
publication, dissemination, and distribution to the general public of articles and books
concerning Classified Documents A-G, I-K, and M.
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(e).)
14
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COUNT 4
(18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(3)—^Disclosure of Classified Communication Intelligence Information)
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:
48. The General Allegations within Paragraph 1 through 41 of this Indictment are
incorporated by reference.
49. Beginning on or about February 28, 2014, and continuing to in or about October
2015, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, the defendant, DANIEL EVERETTE
HALE, did willfully communicate, furnish, transmit, and otherwise make available to an
unauthorized person any classified information concerning the communication intelligence
activities of the United States, namely:
Document Date Printed Date of Initial Publication Classification
A February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
D February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
E February 28,2014 October 2015 TOP SECRET
K February 28,2014 April 2015 TOP SECRET
(In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 798(a)(3).)
15
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COUNT 5
(18 U.S.C. § 641—^Theft of Government Property)
THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT:
50. The General Allegations within Paragraph 1 through 41 of this Indictment are
incorporated by reference.
51. Between on or about February 28,2014, and continuing to in or about December
2016, in the Eastern District of Virginia, and elsewhere, the defendant, DANIEL EVERETTE
HALE, did knowingly and unlawfully steal and convert to his own use or the use of another, and
without authority, conveyed and disposed of records and things of value of the United States,
namely:
Document Date Printed Date of Initial Publication Classification
A February 28,2014 October 2015 SECRET
B February 28,2014 October 2015 SECRET
C February 28,2014 October 2015 SECRET
D February 28,2014 October 2015 SECRET
E February 28, 2014 October 2015 TOP SECRET
F February 28, 2014 October 2015 SECRET
G April 3,2014 April 2015 TOP SECRET
I April 20,2014 August 2014 SECRET
J April 20,2014 December 2015 SECRET
K April 20,2014 April 2015 TOP SECRET
L April 30,2014 July 2014 UNCLASSIFIED
M May 14,2014 August 2014 SECRET
N May 14,2014 August 2014 UNCLASSIFIED
0 May 15,2014 December 2016 UNCLASSIFIED
P May 15,2014 December 2016 UNCLASSIFIED
0 May 15,2014 December 2016 UNCLASSIFIED
R May 15,2014 December 2016 UNCLASSIFIED
T June 27,2014 N/A UNCLASSIFIED
The aggregate value of said records and things of value being more than $1,000.
(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 641.)
16
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A TRUE BILL:
FOREPERSON OF THE GRAND JURY
G. Zachary TerwiUiger
United States Attorney
Eastern District of Virginia
John C. Demers
Assistant Attorney General
National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Gordon D. Kromberg
Alexander P. Berrang
Assistant United States Attorneys
7
Heather M. Schmidt
Senior Trial Attorney
Counterintelligence-Export Control Section
National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice
17
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