Back in 2002 the Met Police in London engaged in "Operation Tiberius" investigating the extent to which organized crime groups affected their operations. The document leaked online, the full text is below:

Operation
Tiberius
Strategic
Intelligence Report
Main Report
DRAFT COPY
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Contents
Page No:
Opening Statement 2
Introduction 3
Background 4 5
The Scope of the Problem 6 7
Context 8 — 11
Organised Crime Syndicate Synopses 12 — 18
The Internal Investigations Command Response 19 — 22
Conclusion 23
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Opening Statement
`The Metropolitan Police Service is currently
under serious threat from infiltration by identified
organised crime syndicates in North East and
East London'
Operation Tiberius
March 2002
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Introduction
The following report will provide the reader with a detailed analysis of the threat
posed to the Metropolitan Police Service from infiltration by identified organised
crime groups within North East and East London .
The report will deal with:
• The background to the original request for the production of a strategic
analysis report
• The terms of reference to which the research team has worked
• The scope of the problem faced by the MPS
• The context in which the report has been formulated
• Synopses of the eight main criminal syndicates and their links to corrupt MPS
staff
• The Internal Investigation Command's response to the threat, and a
• Conclusion
The report is supported by extensive research material contained within the
`Supporting Material' document. Where a subject is expanded upon in the
`Supporting Material' document the relevant page numbers are shown in red italic
text.
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Background
In early October 2001, concerns were expressed by senior management within SO 11
and SO 1(3), that proactive and reactive operations, carried out within the SO 1(3)
area, were consistently being compromised. The assertion made, was that these
compromises were occurring due to endemic police corruption linked to major
organised crime.
After consultation with the Internal Investigations Command (IIC) a decision was
made by SO 11 and IIC that a secret strategic intelligence scoping exercise should be
commenced, to determine the extent of police corruption and its links with organised
crime within East and North East London. This decision was ratified by the most
senior management within the MPS and authority was given for Operation Tiberius to
commence on 15th October 2001.
The first two weeks of the operation were taken up with staff selection and induction,
obtaining covert premises and equipping those premises with furniture and IT
equipment. The staff were selected from IIC and SO 11 Special Intelligence Section
in the following ratio :
Internal Investigations Command Detective Sergeant x 2
Detective Constable x 3
Special Intelligence Section Detective Constable x 2
EO Analyst x 1
Detective Superintendent Taylor (IIC) was appointed as SIO and a Gold Group
chaired by DAC Hayman was formed to consider the progress of the operation and
any strategic and ethical issues raised.
Operation Tiberius has operated under the following terms of reference:
• To scope the degree of police corruption linked with organised crime in East
and North East London.
• Devise strategies to eradicate or disrupt police corruption and the organised
crime organisations it assists in East and North East London.
• Identify suitable core crime nominals in East and North East London for the
partnership agencies to target, in order to identify police corruption.
• Assess the damage caused to the judicial system as a whole, and the MPS in
particular, by police corruption linked to organised crime in East and North
East London.
Operation Tiberius became operationally effective on 31 st October 2001, when the
initial tranche of IT equipment became available, giving the team access to the IIC
and SIS intelligence databases. The first task was to allocate to each member of the
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team, a broad area of concern for them to thoroughly research. Detailed below are the
initial areas of concern:
• The five linked SO 1(3) murder investigations
• Operation Zloty and the operations preceding and leading to it
• The Greek criminal networks and their links to corruption
• The Turkish criminal networks and their links to corruption
• Operations Deenside and Franica and their links to corruption
• Update of the Operation Zloty network and their associations
It should be noted that at this stage the Operation Tiberius team has not yet had access
to the following relevant databases:
• Holmes I and Holmes II Accounts for any of the linked murders
• Trident Databases
• Essex PSU
• Hertfordshire PSU
• NCS PSU
• NCIS PSU
• HMC&E PSU
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The Scope of the Problem
• Organised crime is currently able to infiltrate the MPS at will in North East
and East London
• Existing murder investigations have been compromised
• Sensitive intelligence has leaked from other organised crime investigations
• The organised crime syndicates continue to flourish and gain confidence in
their ability to evade prosecution
From the intelligence available to them, the Operation Tiberius team has initially
identified eight organised crime syndicates with associations to corrupt serving and
former MPS staff:
• The Adams Family
• The Bowers Syndicate
• The Hunt Syndicate
• The Palmer Syndicate
• The Kean Syndicate
• The Camp Syndicate
• The Chrysostoinou/Panayiotou Syndicate
• The Kaan Syndicate
Derived from these eight organised crime syndicates are the following figures
detailing the categories of persons involved in the corrupt networks:
• 34 serving MPS officers
• 22 former MPS officers
• 30 career criminals
These figures are approximate and may rise or fall with further, more detailed
research.
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The Depth of Infiltration
The Tiberius team believes that organised crime is currently able to infiltrate the MPS
at will, within North East and East London. A number of factors contribute to this
assertion:
• Clustering of corrupt networks of officers within SO 1(3) and other organised
crime investigative units
• Networks of former MPS officers, who still network among serving officers in
North East and East London
• Long standing relationships between these networks and organised criminals
• Lack of proactive intelligence gathering against organised crime corruption
The ease with which existing murder investigations have been compromised and
sensitive intelligence regarding other organised crime investigations has been leaked
are both examples of this infiltration. Operation Tiberius has identified at least three
SO 1(3) murder investigations where corrupt networks have sought and obtained
sensitive intelligence to help them evade capture:
• Operation Sandridge — Kenneth Beagle Murder (SMD Page 122)
• Operation Spaldwick — Ricky Rayner Murder (SMD Page 123)
• Operation Strethall — Patrick Pasipanodya Murder (SMD Page 112)
All of these murders were contract killings and as yet have not resulted in any arrests
or prosecutions
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Context
Corruption
Operation Tiberius has defined corruption as:
• The corrupt compromising of arrests/operations to the benefit of organised crime
• Corruptly accessing the PNC and other law enforcement databases to the benefit
of organised crime
• Networking with serving officers, witting and unwitting, to gain intelligence to
assist organised crime
• Providing specialist knowledge to organised crime, i.e. surveillance, technical
deployment and undercover techniques
• Actively engaging in criminality with organised crime i.e. funding drug
importation, money laundering, recycling drugs
Operation Tiberius has not pursued any corruption intelligence, where the corrupt act
is purely for the benefit of the officer involved, for instance stealing cash during
searches.
This definition crystalises the problems faced by the Internal Investigations Command
since its inception as CIB 3 in 1998. CIB 3 was formed as an operational arm for the
long term pan London scoping exercise, Operation Othona. Othona had been running
since 1994 and had identified many corrupt networks, some linked to organised crime
but many were purely self-serving.
From its inception CIB 3 was under extreme pressure to produce results in the fight
against corruption. Resultantly a short term strategy was adopted against the easier to
detect, self serving networks, but inevitably this led to a dilution of the Command's
ability to undertake medium to long term strategies against networked corruption.
Significant successes were achieved against those officers acting corruptly for their
own benefit. However the burden of lengthy Resident Informant debriefs and the
complex and labour intensive court cases that followed, allowed the deeply
entrenched, networked organised crime corruption to carry on unchecked.
It was not until Operation Greyhound in 1999 — 2000 that the Internal Investigations
Command's focus returned to these organised crime networks and proved that
determined targeting using a mid to long term strategy could be successful against
them.
However these networks have shown incredible resilience and it must be stated that
some of the original Operation Othona subjects from 1994 are still the subject of
corruption intelligence today.
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Organised Corruption Methodology
All of the identified eight syndicates are amongst the highest echelon criminals, not
only in North East and East London, but Pan London and in some cases nationally.
All of them have identified the benefit of having sources within law enforcement and
in particular within the MPS. In most cases the full scale of the syndicates' criminal
networks has not been identified, this means that the organisation could have
unknown conduits controlling unidentified, corrupted MPS staff.
It is clear that the main members of a network will not generally deal with the
corrupted officer directly, in most cases there will be an associate who is tasked to
seek the information on behalf of the syndicate, the conduit. In most cases this will be
a fellow criminal or a former MPS officer.
It is also often the case that the syndicate will employ sterile corridors. Meaning that,
only the conduit will know who the corrupted officer is and often the corrupted officer
will not know whom the final customer is. The sterile corridor serves a number of
purposes:
• Prevents the corrupted officer knowing who the final customer is, where if he did
know, he may refuse to carry out the corrupt act
• Keeps the principles distanced from any corruption investigations
• Prevents the organisation getting the reputation of working with the police. (There
is still distrust and distaste towards corrupt police officers, even from the
criminals themselves)
• Lessens the chances of direct infiltration of the organisation by undercover
officers, etc.
Examples of this theory are:
• The Hunt Syndicate
• Mark Wright
• DS Ray Ahearne
• The Palmer Syndicate
• David Kent
• Kent's Source
Customer Organisation
– Criminal Conduit
– Corrupted Officer
Customer Organisation
Criminal Conduit
Corrupted Officer
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• The Adams Family
• Derek Keene
• DS Nigel Waldron
• DS John Smith
• DC Bob Yeomans
– Customer Organisation
– Criminal Conduit (Former Officer)
Corrupted Officer
Corrupted Officer
Corrupted Officer
As with all rules there are exceptions, Martin Morgan's relationships with Robert
Kean and Theodosis Chrysostomou, are clear examples of the principle in an
organisation having direct contact with the corrupted officer. It is known that both
these relationships developed through previous longstanding informant/handler
relationships with Bill Kelleher, Morgan's uncle, dating back to the 70's and 80's.
Recruitment of Corrupted Officers
The ability to recruit corrupted officers is the most difficult aspect of organised crime
corruption to proof against. The places and situations in which officers can come into
contact with conduits and corrupters are innumerable. Examples are:
• Informant/handler
• Fellow officers
• Former officers
• Football/rugby/golf clubs
• Gyms
• Freemasonry and other organisations
• MPS sports clubs
• Social functions
• Sexual partners
The Role of Former MPS Officers
Operation Tiberius has identified the key role that former MPS officers play in
assisting organised crime. They have a unique role of being not wholly criminal in the
eyes of law enforcement and not wholly police officers in the eyes of the criminals.
They have, therefore, the ability to pass between the world of law enforcement and
the organised crime syndicates with impunity.
Establishing their role is more difficult than that of serving officers, after all they
cannot be monitored through PSI, we cannot use the threat of Discipline against them
and they know every tactic and strategy that we would use against them. Additionally
it is not they who carry out the corrupt checks or steal pertinent documents, they act
as the vital conduit between the syndicate and the corrupted officers.
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These former officers are a very saleable commodity and, as evidenced by Fred Cutts
consultancy role, can service more than one syndicate. They have what the criminals
want, direct and unattributable access to serving officers who have access to
intelligence and MPS databases.
The best example of corrupt former officers networking together is former DCI Jim
Dean's retirement lunch. IDG staff monitored this event and identified the following
corrupt former officers as being present:
• Former PS William Kelleher – (Kean Syndicate)
• Former DCI Fred Cutts (Bowers Syndicate)
• Former DS Nigel Waldron (Adams Family)
• Former DS Ray Ahearne (Hunt Syndicate)
All these former officers were personally invited to the lunch by DCI Dean. However
what makes the guest list of the lunch more sinister is that until his retirement DCI
Dean controlled all the informants at SO 1(3). One of those SO 1(3) informants had
identified to his handler, DS Ray Ahearne, that former DCI Fred Cutts was corrupt,
knowing this Dean still invited him to the lunch.
It should be noted that the bulk of those attending the lunch remain unidentified.
As can be seen the role of former officers is significant and sometimes
underestimated, these conduits however pose as serious a threat to the MPS as the
organised crime syndicates they serve.
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Organised Crime Syndicate Synopses
The synopses below provide a summary of:
• the make up of each network,
• the main serving and former MPS staff associated with them, and
• a resume of their activities
Each syndicate is dealt with in detail in the supporting material included with this
report and the relevant page numbers for each syndicate are shown in red.
1. The Adams Family — Operation Trinity (NCS) (SMD Pages 3 —10)
The Syndicate
• Tommy Adams
• Micky Adams
• Patsy Adams
• Terry Adams
• Danny Adams
Associated MPS Staff
• Derek Keene (Former DS)
• DC Bob Yeomans
• Nigel Waldron (Former DS)
• John Smith (Former DS)
The Adams family is still the major crime family in North London. A number of
instances of corruption have been identified associated with the family, however the
overall intelligence picture is sparse, considering the family's infamy.
In 1995 a copy of a hand written witness statement was discovered during a search of
the Beluga Club, controlled by the Adams family. The witness, who made the
statement, was Ron Johnson the minder of Michael Olymbious, who had been killed
by the Adams family over a drugs debt. The existence of the statement was only
known to the murder team and had not been disclosed to the CPS.
In 1996 former DS Derek Keene was overheard on an SIS probe in Solly Nahome's
office. Nahome was a close confidant of the family, although they later murdered him.
Keene was heard to discuss with Tommy and Danny Adams three other MPS officers,
who were corruptly assisting the family by conducting corrupt checks for them. These
officers were DC Bob Yeomans, former DS Nigel Waldron and former DS John
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Smith. Yeomans is still serving at Romford police station and the others still frequent
Chigwell Sports Club.
During the 2000 murder investigation following Solly Nahome's assassination a
freelance journalist, Jo-Anne Goodwin, was interviewed and stated that one of her
journalistic sources on the Adams family was a corrupt police officer. Goodwin
refused to reveal her source and, as yet, this officer has not been identified.
2. The Bowers Syndicate — Operation Deenside (SO 11 SIS)
(SMD Pages I I — 38)
The Syndicate
• Tony Bowers
• Paul Bowers
• Martin Bowers
• Roy Hilder
• George Lamprell
• 'Tall' Ted Williams
Associated MPS Staff
• Fred Cutts (Former DCI)
• DI John Redgrave
• DC Mick Charman
The Bowers Syndicate is the main subject of Operation Deenside (SIS) and is
involved in large scale drug importation, high value lorry hijacking and money
laundering. They operate from the Peacock Gym in Canning Town and employ
former DCI Fred Cutts as a 'consultant' for the gym. Cutts is well networked among
serving MPS officers, analysis of his home telephone billing shows contact with some
99 law enforcement related telephone numbers in a three month period. SIS have high
grade intelligence that Cutts directly frustrated one of their strategies against the
Peacock Gym, through advice he gave to Martin Bowers. Cutts has also given
character evidence for one of the syndicates distributors, who pleaded guilty to
supplying substantial quantities of cannabis.
Intelligence is also held that in June 1994 Cutts supplied the 'Johnny Millwall
Docket' to Tall Ted Williams at the Peacock Gym. The docket revealed the identity of
Geoffrey Brennan as an informant and compromised ongoing NCS operations at the
time. DI John Redgrave and DC Michael Charman are believed to have supplied the
docket to Cutts after Brennan double-crossed them during a corrupt transaction.
Operation Cornwall was the CIB operation, which investigated these allegations.
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3. The Hunt Syndicate — Operation Blackjack (SO 1(3)) &
Operation Nike (IDG) (S ID Pages 39 — 45)
The Syndicate
• David Hunt
• Stephen Hunt
• Micky Palmer
• Mark Wright
• Maurice Fisher
Associated MPS Staff
• DC John Mitchell
• Ray Ahearne (Former DS)
• Jim Dean (Former DCI)
• Gavin Robertson (Former DCS)
The Hunt Syndicate is one of the most violent groups in North East London and has
been responsible for a series of vicious assaults against debtors and rivals. Their main
sphere of influence is drug importation and protection. Substantial source sensitive
intelligence is held detailing the information supplied to the syndicate via Mark
Wright and Maurice Fisher, both of whom were handled or controlled by the officers
detailed above.
These compromises included identifying tracking devices on behalf of the syndicate,
leaking information about Operation Blackjack and the witnesses they intended to
interview, leaking financial investigation intelligence and conducting PNC and other
database checks on behalf of the syndicate.
Former DS Ray Ahearne was the main source of their information and since his recent
retirement he will undoubtedly maintain links with serving officers, changing from
the corrupted officer role to that of a conduit. DC John Mitchell remains a serving
officer and will be one of those with whom Ahearne remains in contact. It should be
noted that Ahearne also runs an annual golf trip to the United States, the membership
of this trip reads like a 'who's who' of both serving and former corrupt nominals,
providing further opportunity for networking.
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4. The Palmer Syndicate — Operations Almasi & Franica (S011 SIS)
(SMD Pages 46 — 75)
The Syndicate
• John Palmer
• Danny Tovey
• Richard Cashman
• Tony Burns
• Danny Shankshaft
• David Kent
Associated MPS Staff
• Fred Cutts (Former DCI)
• Ray Ahearne (Former DS)
• DC John Mitchell
• DC Paul Goscomb
• Jim Dean (Former DCI)
• David Kent's MPS contact
Although Palmer has recently been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for time
share fraud, he still exerts influence over his criminal network of experienced drug
importers and money launderers. Danny Shankshaft was another of former DS
Ahearne's informants and has recently alleged that Ahearne and DC Paul Goscomb
were corrupt. Shankshaft, Tovey and others are well connected with the Peacock Gym
and therefore have access to Cutts services. David Kent is of particular interest with
regard to his previously unidentified police contacts and rumours that he has contacts
within the DPP's office. Development is under way to identify Kent's contacts.
5. The Kean Syndicate — Operation Greyhound, Zloty, Summer,
Radial & Pyramus (IDG, NCIS, NCS & T6) (SMD Pages 76 – 90)
The Syndicate
• Bob Kean
• Michael Adams
• Gary Richman
• Clifford Redbourne
• Joseph Gunning
Associated MPS Staff
• DC Martin Morgan
• DC Paul Goscomb
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• Paul Kelly (Former DS)
• Bill Kelleher (Former PS)
• DC Sean McElhatton
• Duncan Redpath (Former DC)
• DC Damian Crilly
• PC Peggy Slater
The Kean Syndicate has probably been the subject of more corruption intelligence
than any other criminal syndicate in London, this is purely because they have also
been the subject of the most development work by IDG and ACG teams.
Kean, Morgan, Goscomb and Costello await trial in April 2002 for their part in a
conspiracy to falsely imprison Kean's money launderer, Ashley Sansom. Their
sophisticated operation to trace and capture Sansom, with the intention of doing him
serious harm, was frustrated by the Internal Investigation Command under Operation
Greyhound. However their criminality has not ended and intelligence relating to their
being involved in drugs importation was received in early 2001.
The development of this intelligence has resulted in the identification of the Zloty
network and has provided real time intelligence opportunities for the Tiberius team,
which are detailed later in this summary.
The Kean Syndicate is involved in drug importation and is suspected of having
ordered at least two contract killings, one of a rival and one of a suspected informant.
The operations conducted against the Kean Syndicate have shown that a sustained
attack against these networks can succeed. Zloty has highlighted the opportunities that
will arise, especially in the corruption arena, when criminals and corrupt police
officers have their backs to the wall.
6. The Camp Syndicate — Operation Gerah (IDG)
(SMD Pages 91 101)
The Syndicate
• Kevin Camp
• John Camp
• David Buisson
Associated MPS Staff
• PC Julian Connor
• Simon Pinchbeck (Former PC)
The Camp Syndicate are major drug importers and are also heavily involved in
providing security guards at sporting events, especially boxing. Simon Pinchbeck, a
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former PC at Enfield, who had carried out unauthorised checks with operational teams
on the Camps whilst a serving officer, has now retired and works for the syndicate in
a semi-legitimate role. PC Julian Connor, also at Enfield, has carried out unauthorised
INFOS checks and made enquiries of an operational team targeting the Camp's.
Connor is currently the subject of an IDG operation and likely to be subject to arrest
and either charge or fatal discipline as a result.
Connor has also been responsible for a corrupt approach towards a serving IIC officer
in an attempt to identify IIC activity against another serving officer, with whom
Connor shares a house.
The Tiberius team are aware of Connor's contacts within the MPS and fear that his
dismissal from the Service will not stem his ability to assist the Camp organisation.
7. The Chrysostomou/Panayiotou Syndicate (SA/1D Pages 102 — 110)
The Syndicate
• Theodosis Chrysostomou
• Evangelos Panayiotou
Associated MPS Staff
• DC Martin Morgan
• DC Sean McElhatton
• DI John Redgrave
• DS Paul Kelly
This syndicate are based in the Green Lanes area of North London and have operated
with impunity since the 1970's. The syndicate is responsible for the large scale
importation and distribution of heroin. The level of involvement between organised
criminals and corrupt officers could not be better illustrated than in this syndicate's
involvement.
Chrysostomou was a registered informant to Morgan and McElhatton. The only major
operation conducted against the syndicate was compromised when Morgan and
McElhatton 'stumbled across' a live plot. Source intelligence states that Kelly and
Morgan met Chrysostomou and discussed the recycling of seized drugs. It is clear that
Chrysostomou's relationship with these officers was corrupt but they have also acted
as business associates.
Morgan, McElhatton, Chrysostomou and Panayiotou all have shares in two
racehorses. In 2000 Chrysostomou was in the process of purchasing a property in
partnership with Morgan's wife, the vendor of the property being a friend of
Morgan's. The property deal was aborted when Morgan was arrested as part of
Operation Greyhound. Source information states that Chrysostomou and Redgrave
own property together in Cyprus.
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Panayiotou received a 2 year sentence for possession of firearms, which has only
proved to be a minor inconvenience to the syndicate. Analysis conducted by
Operation Tiberius reveals that Barry McLeavy, a close associate of Kelly, Morgan
and McElhatton is still in telephone contact with Panayiotou.
8. The Kaan Syndicate (SAID Pages 111 — 119)
The Syndicate
• Soner Kaan
• Ibrahim Kaan
• Mehmet Yusuf
• Dale Golder
• Erol Tarraz
• Asenija Carlo
Associated MPS Staff
• DS Dale Wild
• DC Johnathan Lightfoot
• Graham Golder (Former DS)
The Kaan syndicate are again a North East London group involved in large scale
heroin importation. They have been responsible for a number of gruesome assaults
leading to the lopping off of victims fingers with garden shears and machetes. One of
their main enforcers is Dale Golder, who, worked with Patrick Pasipanodya, until
Pasipanodya was the victim of a contract killing. Together they are suspected of
carrying out the finger loppings. Golder is the son of Graham Golder a disgraced
former DS who has infiltrated the murder enquiry investigating Pasipanodya's death.
Soner Kaan was arrested for the assaults mentioned above and almost as soon as he
was arrested informant logs compiled by DS Dale Wild and DC Johnathan Lightfoot
from the Marylebone source unit were professing his innocence. The enquiry team
sought contact with their infOrmant but DS Wild stated that the informant was
unwilling to meet anyone else.
Telephone analysis reveals some 66 calls between Dale Wild and Dale Golder during
the period of the assaults and Kaan's arrest. Dale Golder is not a registered informant.
Kaan was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment for heroin trafficking and orchestrating
the assaults, however his organisation continues to import drugs under the control of
his brother Ibrahim.
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The Internal Investigation Command's
Response
The Internal Investigations Command's (HC) initial response has been the scoping
exercise carried out by Operation Tiberius to give a true picture of the scale and
extent of the networks operating within the MPS. Partly as a result of the work
undertaken by Operation Tiberius, the whole structure of the Command is soon to
change to focus on the investigation of organised crime corruption.
The most significant change will be the separation of the Internal Investigations
Group (IIG) from the Command to be aligned with the Borough Support Command
(BSC) under Detective Chief Superintendent Norman. This will leave the AntiCorruption
Group (ACG) to deal solely with organised crime corruption.
Intelligence Development Group (IDG)
The aim of the Intelligence Development Group is to provide the most effective
service it can to its customers and to ensure that its work is prioritised accordingly. To
further enhance their service the IDG is to be split into two separate functions:
• Joint Intelligence Cell — providing an initial point of contact for all IIC
information and providing the intelligence service for IIG and BSC
• ACG Intelligence Cell — providing the intelligence research and development
for the ACG and dealing solely with organised crime corruption intelligence
These changes will bring the IDG in line with the National Intelligence Model,
enabling the ACG Intelligence Cell to deal only with Level 3 intelligence.
Anti-Corruption Group (ACG)
The ACG structure will change to form two teams with enough resilience to be able to
run two major anti-corruption operations each, utilising mid to long term strategies.
Some ACG officers will also be given access directly into the ACG intelligence cell
to improve the flow of intelligence and the ability of the operational teams to develop
their own operations.
With these changes in mind the Tiberius team has identified two syndicates that are
capable of development to a stage where they can be almost immediately handed over
to the two new operational teams. The other six syndicates will be developed, by both
the Intelligence Development Group and the Operation Tiberius team, to provide a
steady stream of operations to the ACG.
The two syndicates ready to be handed over are:
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The Kean Syndicate — Operation Greyhound, Zloty, Summer, Radial
& Pyramus (IDG, NCIS, NCS & T6) (SMD Pages 121 — 125)
The Kean Syndicate is currently the subject of development by the ACG, NCS and
Security Services under Operation Pyramus.
Operation Tiberius Development
At an early stage, Tiberius identified former DS Paul Kelly as being a common thread
between two of the five, supposedly linked, compromised murder investigations.
Kelly is believed to have made inappropriate approaches to the team investigating the
murder of Kenneth Beagle and to have facilitated checks for a suspect in the Ricky
Rayner murder.
A strong intelligence case and liaison with NCIS has led to the acquisition of a high
grade intelligence source against Kelly. The source has identified Kelly's continuing
association with Martin Morgan, Sean McElhatton, Bill Kelleher and DCI Steve
Hobbs, an SO 1(3) SIO
Successful applications have been made for the deployment of:
• directed surveillance
• a Q-logger facility
• a tracking device
All of these facilities have proved useful and have supported the assertion that Kelly
is still a member of the Zloty network. Authority is currently being sought for the
deployment of a data-grabbing facility against Kelly to identify any undeclared
mobile telephones he may be using.
The Tiberius team feels that the current intelligence against Kelly could be quickly
developed to a point where evidential opportunities would become available to
identify:
1. His current contacts within the MPS
2. The full extent of his criminality with the Kean Syndicate
3. His true position within the Syndicate
4. Evidential opportunities against the Pyramus subjects
Continuing Tiberius development work has recently evidenced McElhatton openly
associating with Morgan in direct breach of a lawful order given to him on 16th
December 2001 by DCS John Shatford. Discipline papers have been drafted but
service will be delayed until the proactive opportunities against these subjects have
been exhausted.
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The Bowers Syndicate — Operation Deenside (S011 SIS)
The Bowers Syndicate is currently the subject of a long term development operation
run by the Special Intelligence Section.
Operation Tiberius Development (SMD Pages 126 — 127)
Purely by applying for and analysing Cutts' home telephone billing some 99 calls
have been identified as being made by him to law enforcement agencies in a three
month period. These agencies range from the MPS and Ministry of Defence Police
through to Customs & Excise. These calls, made by a former senior law enforcement
officer, would not cause concern but for the fact that Cutts is part of one of the most
ruthless organised crime syndicates in the country.
The billing for a mobile telephone attributed to Cutts has recently been received,
which indicates that this is a telephone he uses for criminality. The high volume of
calls, 900 in 3 weeks, are mainly to Pay-as-You-Go mobiles.
Excellent intelligence is in existence, which shows Cutts actively assisted the Bowers
Syndicate by advising them about police investigative techniques. This advice
resulted in the frustration of a proposed technical deployment strategy by the
operational team. It is clear that Cutts is the eyes and ears of the Syndicate in relation
to law enforcement activity.
The Tiberius team feels that Cutts could be quickly developed to a point where
evidential opportunities would become available to identify:
1. His current contacts within the MPS
2. The full extent of his criminality with the Bowers Syndicate
3. His true position within the Syndicate
4. Any assistance he may be providing to the Palmer Syndicate
Development work is continuing and has resulted in the identification of vehicles and
companies owned by Cutts, which in turn has led to a financial development package
being passed to the FIU.
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Summary
Both of these syndicates are active in the organisation of major drugs importations
into the United Kingdom and their onward distribution throughout North East and
East London. Both syndicates are utilising well known and networked former and
serving MPS officers to assist them. The dismantling of these two syndicates and the
arrest and conviction of their corrupt associates would provide a powerful message to
both the remaining criminal syndicates and the officers who know their corrupt MPS
associates.
The true assessment of the damage caused by these corrupt networks is impossible to
make at this stage, until further proactive scoping has been undertaken. However a
statement by an experienced SIO currently attached to SO 1(3) gives some indication
of the depth of the problem in East and North East London:
"I feel that at the current time I cannot carry out an ethical murder investigation
without the fear of it being compromised"
The ramifications of this statement are serious and disturbing and provide a snapshot
of the current threat to the criminal justice system. Additionally the fact that none of
these syndicates have been seriously disrupted over the last five years provides an
insight into the effectiveness of their networks.
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Conclusion
'The Metropolitan Police Service is currently
under serious threat from infiltration by identified
organised crime syndicates in North East and
East London'
The Metropolitan Police Service has, since 1997, waged a successful war against most
forms of police corruption. Notable prosecutions have been achieved, in the most
demanding and difficult circumstances, against some of the most corrupt officers ever
identified.
However there has been only one success against corrupt officers directly assisting an
organised crime network, Operation Greyhound. The other successful operations have
dismantled networks of corrupt officers engaged in serious criminality, but purely for
their own gain.
The scoping exercise carried out by the Operation Tiberius team has identified a
wealth of intelligence identifying organised crime's infiltration of the MPS and other
law enforcement agencies. However much of this intelligence has failed to provide
evidential opportunities against corrupt officers. Operation Tiberius has identified the
following reasons for this:
• Corruption investigations carried out in isolation from the ongoing criminal
investigation
• Resultant lost evidential opportunities through lack of inclusion and liaison
• Distrust of operational teams outside the Internal Investigations Command
• Investigations focused purely on the MPS officer and not the syndicate he is
assisting
• Lack of resources to react to all the intelligence received
• Lack of resources to proactively investigate organised crime syndicates and their
corruption together
Some of these reasons can be considered as organisational failings, whilst some have
been driven by organisational necessity, for example, finite resources. However the
restructuring of the Internal Investigations Command will now provide a focused,
resilient and effective counter to the threat posed by organised crime corruption.
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Operation
Tiberius
Strategic
Intelligence Report
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Contents
Introduction & Terms of Reference
Page No:
2 – 3
4 – 5
6 – 24
Context
Executive Summary
Chapter 1 — Existing Intelligence — IIC and SIS 25
• The Adams Family 26 — 29
• The Bowers Syndicate 34 — 61
• The Hunt Syndicate 62 — 68
• The Palmer Syndicate 69 — 98
• The Kean Syndicate 99 — 113
• The Camp Syndicate 114 — 124
• The Chrysostomou/Panayiotou Syndicate 125 — 133
• The Kaan Syndicate 134 – 142
Chapter 2 — New Intelligence — Operation Tiberius 143
• Paul Kelly 144 — 148
• Fred Cutts 149
Chapter 3 — Strategic Analysis 150
• The Scope of the Problem 151 – 156
• The Damage to the Criminal Justice System 157
• Suggested' Strategies 158 – 164
Conclusion 165 – 166
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Introduction
Terms of Reference
In early October 2001, concerns were expressed by senior management within SO 11
and SO 1(3), that proactive and reactive operations, carried out within the SO 1(3)
area, were consistently being compromised. The assertion made, was that these
compromises were occurring due to endemic police corruption linked to major
organised crime.
After consultation with the Internal Investigations Command (IIC) a decision was
made by SO 11 and IIC that a secret strategic intelligence scoping exercise should be
commenced, to determine theextent
of police corruption and its links with organised
crime within East and North East London. This decision was ratified by the most
senior management within the MPS and authority was given for Operation Tiberius to
commence on 15 th October 2001.
Operation Tiberius has operated under the following terms of reference:
• To scope the degree of police corruption linked with organised crime in East and
North East London.
• Devise strategies to eradicate or disrupt police corruption and the organised
crime organisations it assists in East and North East London.
• Identify suitable core crime nominals in East and North East London for the
partnership agencies to target, in order to identify police corruption.
• Assess the damage caused to the judicial system as a whole, and the MPS in
particular, by police corruption linked to organised crime in East and North
East London.
The first two weeks of the operation were taken up with staff selection and induction,
obtaining covert premises and equipping those premises with furniture and IT
equipment. The staff were selected from IIC and SO 11 Special Intelligence Section in
the following ratio:
Internal Investigations Command Detective Sergeant x 2
'14 Detective Constable x 3
Special Intelligence Section Detective Constable x 2
EO Analyst x 1
Detective Superintendent Taylor (IIC) was appointed as SIO and a Gold Group
chaired by DAC Hayman was formed to consider the progress of the operation and
any strategic and ethical issues raised.
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Operation Tiberius became operationally effective on 31st
October 2001, when the
initial tranche of IT equipment became available, giving the team access to the IIC and
SIS intelligence databases. The first task was to allocate to each member of the team, a
broad area of concern for them to thoroughly research. Detailed below are the initial
areas of concern:
• The five linked SO 1(3) murder investigations
• Operation Zloty and the operations preceding and leading to it
• The Greek criminal networks and their links to corruption
• The Turkish criminal networks and their links to corruption
• Operations Deenside and Franica and their links to corruption
• Update of the Operation Zloty network and their associations
From the initial research it became clear that substantial intelligence existed on the
IDG database relating to both the terms of reference and the areas of concern above.
Worryingly it was evident that the bulk of the officers, suspected of corrupt
involvement with organised crime, had been the subject of corruption intelligence
since 1994. To date only a small number of these suspected corrupt officers (and now
former officers) have been prosecuted. Additionally the organised crime networks that
they have assisted continue to flourish.
From the intelligence available to them, the Operation Tiberius team has initially
identified at least eight organised crime syndicates with associations to corrupt
serving and former MPS staff.
This report forms the Operation Tiberius team's initial response to the terms of
reference, detailing the scope of the problem, strategies to address it, core nominals
suitable for development and the damage caused thus far to the criminal justice
system.
It should be noted that at this stage the Operation Tiberius team has not yet had access
to the following relevant databases:
• Holmes I and Holmes II Accounts for any of the linked murders
• Trident Databases
• Essex PSU
• Hertfordshire PSU
• NCS PSU (‘
• NCIS PSU
• HMC&E PSU
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Context
It is important at this stage to provide a context to the report, by defining some of the
terms and roles that will be used.
Corruption
Operation Tiberius has defined corruption as:
• The corrupt compromising of arrests/operations to the benefit of organised crime
• Corruptly accessing the PNC and other law enforcement databases to the benefit of
organised crime
• Networking with serving officers, witting and unwitting, to gain intelligence to
assist organised crime
Providing specialist knowledge to organised crime, i.e. surveillance, technical
deployment and undercover techniques
• Actively engaging in criminality with organised crime i.e. funding drug
importation, money laundering, recycling drugs
Operation Tiberius has not pursued any corruption intelligence, where the corrupt act
is purely for the benefit of the officer involved, for instance stealing cash during
searches.
The Corrupter
Any person who directly or indirectly places MPS or other law enforcement personnel
in a position where they will engage in corrupt activity as defined above, either
wittingly or unwittingly, on behalf of organised crime.
The Conduit
Any person forming the link between known members of organised crime networks
and the law enforcement personnel who can provide the product they require. The
conduit may be a criminal informant, a fellow law enforcement officer, a former
officer, a relative, a sexual partner or a friend.
The Corrupted
The person who actually commits the corrupt act on behalf of organised crime, i.e. the
PNC check. This person is not always aware that they are carrying out a corrupt act.
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Organised Crime
An organised group of criminals engaged in serious and organised crime in East
and/or North East London, i.e. drug trafficking, contract killings, armed robbery, large
scale money laundering. Usually NCIS core nominals or associated to them.
East and North East London
The area covered by the following OCU's :
YE, YR, NI, GD, HT, KF, KG, KD, JC and
'r
a'
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Executive Summary
The executive summary below provides a concise initial response to each of the four
terms of reference under which Operation Tiberius has operated.
I. To scope the degree of police corruption linked with organised crime
in East and North East London.
Operation Tiberius has initially identified eight main organised crime syndicates
in North East and East London with associations to corrupt serving and former
MPS staff.
In total some eighty individuals have been identified as being associated with the
corrupt networks serving these eight syndicates. Of those eighty individuals:
• 42 are serving MPS officers
• 19 are former MPS officers
• 19 are criminal members of the syndicates
These numbers are estimates and may be liable to increase or decrease as more
proactive and detailed scoping is undertaken.
Below in summary are detailed:
• the make up of each network,
• the main serving and former MPS staff associated with them and
• a resume`of their activities:
1. The Adams Family — Operation Trinity (NCS)
The Adams Family MPS Staff
Tommy Adams Derek Keene (Former DS)
Micky Adams DC Bob Yeomans
Patsy Adams Unknown officer — Journalists source
Terry Adams Nigel Waldron (Former DS)
Danny Adams John Smith (Former DS)
"is
The Adams family requires no introduction and is still the major crime family in North
London. A number of instances of corruption have been identified associated with the
family, however the overall intelligence picture is sparse, considering the family's
infamy.
1/
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I
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In 1995 a copy of a hand written witness statement was discovered at the Beluga Club,
controlled by the family. The witness, who made the statement, was Ron Johnson the
minder of he Michael Olymbious, who had been killed by the Adams family over a
drugs debt. The existence of the statement was only known to the murder team and
had not been disclosed to the CPS.
In 1996 former DS Derek Keene was overheard on an SIS probe in Solly Nahome's
office. Nahome was a close confidant of the family, although they later murdered him.
Keene was heard to discuss with Tommy and Danny Adams three other MPS officers,
who were corruptly assisting the family by conducting corrupt checks. These officers
were former DS Nigel Waldron, former DS John Smith and DC Bob Yeomans.
Yeomans is still serving at Romford police station and the others still frequent
Chigwell Sports Club.
I During the 2000 murder investigation following Solly Nahome's assassination a
freelance journalist, Jo-Anne Goodwin, was identified who stated that one of her
sources on the Adams family was a corrupt police officer. As yet this officer has not
been identified.
2. The Bowers Syndicate — Operation Deenside (S011 SIS)
The Bowers Syndicate MPS Staff
Anthony Bowers Fred Cutts (Former DCI)
Martin Bowers
Paul Bowers
The Bowers Syndicate is the main subject of Operation Deenside (SIS) and is involved
in large scale drug importation, high value lorry hijacking and money laundering.
They operate from the Peacock Gym in Canning Town and employ former DCI Fred
Cutts as a 'consultant' for the gym. Cutts is well networked among serving MPS
officers, analysis of his home telephone billing shows contact with some 99 law
enforcement related telephone numbers in a three month period. SIS have high grade
intelligence that Cutts directly frustrated one of their strategies against the Peacock
Gym, through advice he gave to Martin Bowers. Cutts is dealt with in more detail later
in this summary.
3. The Hunt Syndicate — Operation Blackjack (SO 1(3)) & Operation Nike
(MG)
The Hunt Syndicate MPS Staff
David Hunt Ray Ahearne (Former DS)
Steven Hunt DC John Mitchell
Micky Palmer Jim Dean (Former DCI)
Mark Wright Gavin Robertson (Former DCS)
Maurice Fisher
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The Hunt Syndicate is one of the most violent groups in North East London and have
been responsible for a series of vicious assaults against debtors and rivals. Their main
sphere of influence is drug importation and protection. Substantial source sensitive
intelligence is held detailing the information supplied to the syndicate via Mark
Wright and Maurice Fisher, both of whom were handled or controlled by the officers
detailed above. Ray Ahearne is the main source of their information and since his
recent retirement he will undoubtedly maintain links with serving officers, changing
from the corrupted role to that of a conduit.
4. The Palmer Syndicate — Operations Almasi & Franica (S011 SIS)
The Palmer Syndicate MPS Staff
John Palmer Fred Cutts (Former DCI)
Danny Tovey Ray Ahearne (Former DS)
Richard Cashman DC John Mitchell
Tony Burns Jim Dean (Former DCI)
Danny Shankshaft David Kent's MPS contacts
David Kent Gavin Robertson
Although Palmer has recently been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for time share
fraud, he still exerts influencC,of his criminal network of experienced drug importers
and money launderers. Shankshaft was another of former DS Ahearne's informants
and has recently alleged that Ahearne was corrupt. Shankshaft, Tovey and others are
well connected with the Peacock Gym and therefore have access to Cutts services.
David Kent is of particular interest with regard to his previously unidentified police
contacts and rumours that he has contacts within the DPP's office.
5. The Kean Syndicate — Operation Greyhound, Zloty, Summer, Radial &
Pyramus (IDG, NCIS, NCS & T6)
The Kean Syndicate MPS Staff
Bob Kean DC Martin Morgan
Michael Adams DC Paul Goscomb
Gary Richman Paul Kelly (former DS)
Cliffy Redbourne Bill Kelleher (former PS)
Joseph Gunning DC Sean McElhatton
Duncan Redpath (former DC)
DC Damian Crilly
PC Peggy Slater
The Kean Syndicate has probably been the subject of more corruption intelligence
than any other criminal syndicate in London, this is purely because they have also
been the subject of the most development work by IDG and ACG teams. This
development work has resulted in the identification of the Zloty network and has
provided real time intelligence opportunities for the Tiberius team, which are detailed
later in this summary.
I
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Chrysostomou was a registered informant to Morgan and McElhatton. The only major
operation conducted against the syndicate was compromised when Morgan and
McElhatton 'stumbled across' a live plot. Source intelligence states that Kelly and
Morgan met Chrysostomou and discussed the recycling of seized drugs. Morgan,
McElhatton, Chrysostomou and Panayiotou all have shares in two racehorses. In 2000
Chrysostomou was in the process of purchasing a property in partnership with
Morgan's wife, the vendor of the property being a friend of Morgan's. The property
deal was aborted when Morgan was arrested as part of Operation Greyhound. Source
information states that Chrysostomou and Redgrave own property together in Cyprus.
Panayiotou received a 2 year sentence for possession of firearms, which has only
proved to be a minor inconvenience to the syndicate.
8. The Kaan Syndicate
The Kaan Syndicate MPS Staff
Soner Kaan DS Dale Wild
Ibrahim Kaan DC Lightfoot
Mehmet Yusuf Graham Golder (former DS)
Dale Golder
Erol Tarraz
Asenija Carlo
The Kaan syndicate area again a North East London group involved in large scale
heroin importation. They have been responsible for a number of gruesome assaults
leading to the lopping off of victims' fingers with garden shears and machetes. One of
their main enforcers is Dale Golder, who, worked with Patrick Pasipanodya, until
Pasipanodya was the victim of a contract killing. Together they are suspected of
carrying out the finger loppings. Golder is the son of Graham Golder a disgraced
former DS who has infiltrated the murder enquiry investigating Pasipanodya's death.
Soner Kaan was arrested for the assaults mentioned above and almost as soon as he
was arrested informant logs compiled by DS Dale Wild and DC Johnathan Lightfoot
from the Marylebone source unit were professing his innocence. The enquiry team
sought contact with their informant but DS Wild stated that the informant was
unwilling to meet anyone else.
Telephone analysis reveals some 66 calls between Dale Wild and Dale Golder during
the period of the assaults and Kaan's arrest. Dale Golder is not a registered informant.
Kaan was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment for heroin trafficking and orchestrating
the assaults, however his organisation continues to import drugs under the control of
his brother Ibrahim.
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Summary
As can be seen from the profiles above, all these syndicates are amongst the highest
echelon criminals, not only in North East and East London, but Pan London and in
some cases nationally. All of them have identified the benefit of having sources within
law enforcement and in particular within the MPS. This should not come as a surprise
to either the experienced organised crime investigator or experienced anti-corruption
investigator, and therein lies the problem.
The intelligence contained in the above profiles, has invariably been supplied by the
non-IIC operational teams investigating the syndicates' criminality. None of the
intelligence has been proactively acquired by the IIC Intelligence Development Group.
These syndicates are organised and all working towards the common goals of making
profit, laundering their money, evading prosecution and preventing the forfeiture of
their assets. The current attempts by law enforcement to eradicate organised crime
groups are disjointed, with specialist units taking on different aspects of the
syndicates' criminality. There is no better example than IIC investigating the
syndicates' corrupt links in isolation from their main criminality, when it was the
investigation of the criminality that originally identified the corruption .
It is with this in mind that the Operation Tiberius team have approached the second
term of reference.
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2. Devise strategies to eradicate or disrupt police corruption and the
organised crime organisations it assists in East and North East London.
The Operation Tiberius team has identified a number of strategies, which will provide
an effective counter to the threat of organised crime in East and North East London
infiltrating the MPS.
Suggested Proactive Strategies
Option 1
Continue to investigate corruption associated with organised crime as it appears and
in isolation from the investigation of the organised crime network and its criminality.
This option is effectively the 'do nothing different' option. The Tiberius team believe
that this option is unacceptable and would lead to the formation of a scoping team in
the future to reassess the same problems. By waiting for intelligence about organised
crime corruption to surface, the extent of the true problem can never be truly assessed.
The corruption associated with organised crime is not reported to police, there are no
crime figures to measure it and traditional policing responses, such as 'fire brigade'
policing, will not address it. The accepted practice is to investigate individual police
officers as allegations of corruption against them come to light. Investigating
corruption controlled by organised crime is unique and as such requires a unique
approach. The Tiberius team believes that the answer is to target the organisation's
criminality and corruption together, the following strategies provide that approach.
Option 2
The formation of a specialist, corruption-proofed, organised crime taskforce to carry
out proactive operations against organised crime syndicates, which utilise corrupt
MPS staff. The concept is one of a single unit investigating both the syndicates'
criminality and use of corruption at the same time.
Operation Zloty has highlighted the disparate use of law enforcement to achieve a
single goal. The following units are all involved and have separate operation titles for
different aspects of the same operation:
• Metropolitan Police Service
• Internal Investigations Command
• Intelligence Development Group — Operation Zloty
• Anti-Corruption Group — Operation Pyramus
• National Criminal Intelligence Service — Operation Radial
• Special Liaison Unit s
• Operational Source Unit` '
• RIO Teams
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• National Crime Squad — Operation Summer
• Newmarket Branch Office
• Security Services & Secret Intelligence Service
Those who are realistic would agree that the liaison between these units thus far has
not been wholly successful. One dedicated operational task force, with control of the
full intelligence picture, would be able to make strategic and logical time imperative,
decisions, that would not only impact on the criminality but would take into account
any corruption issues.
The taskforce would:
• answer to a Gold Group to monitor ethical and strategic issues
• have unprecedented levels of operational security
• have a dedicated OPSEC officer to manage the systems needed to maintain
operational security
• be drawn from both the Internal Investigations Command and SO units,
specifically the Special Intelligence Section
• be staffed with vetted staff, experienced in the investigation of organised crime
and/or corruption
• have access to all IIC assets, including the ability to undertake covert checks,
utilise covert surveillance teams and utilise covert technical deployments
• have access to all SO assets, such as SOIL surveillance teams and technical
support
• have the ability to 'launder' the tasking of operational arrest teams, so as to
maintain its operational security
• be able to handle their own sources under strict audit and integrity scrutiny
• have access to the Crown Prosecution Service Visa Team for legal advice
The taskforce would have to be given realistic time constraints, patience has never
been a strong point in the MPS. The subjects being investigated are sophisticated and
sensible enough to employ the assistance of law enforcement to assist them, there will
be no quick fix. However, with effective use of disclosure, a number of operational
opportunities should be able to be regularly disseminated, while the long-term goal is
relentlessly pursued.
Tactically the taskforce would 'utilise all the investigative techniques and best practice
developed over the years by both Commands, especially with regard to financial
attack, after all, money is the driver in both their criminality and corruption.
Disadvantages
• Resource intensive, especially in the light of current MPS budgetary constraints
• Perception of elitism amongst staff of both Commands towards those selected for
the taskforce
• Long term nature of the task
• Lack of prosecution capability, therefore burdening other MPS units with arrest
and prosecution charges
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• Some outside assistance still necessary i.e. NCIS OSU
• Where would the task force sit within the MPS?
Option 3
IDG Intelligence officers permanently attached to law enforcement units, which are
already carrying out targeting operations against organised crime syndicates,
identified as utilising corrupt MPS staff.
This option still follows the single investigative unit ethos by permanently attaching
IDG intelligence officers to the operational team. The injection of anti-corruption
knowledge and operational security experience would greatly enhance the operational
team's effectiveness. The IDG officers would be able to conduct all the covert checks
required and would, subject to availability, be able to utilise other IIC covert
resources.
This approach would only be successful if the IIC officers were fully integrated into
the operational team and allowed unlimited access to all the intelligence and evidence
gathered by the team. The officers would also have to take an active role in the team's
decision making processes.
Whilst being more cost effective, as the bulk of the resource commitment would be
borne by the operational team, the following disadvantages have been identified:
• Lack of corruption proofing on the operational team
• Resentment towards IDG staff from the operational team
• Competing priorities between the IDG strategies and Op team strategies
• Revelation of IIC techniques to potentially untrustworthy officers
• Lack of corruption experience in the SIO
• What if known corrupt or suspected corrupt officers are already on the Op team?
• Ensuring the long-term commitment of the Op team to the full dismantling of a
network.
The current RIO system in place within the IDG has revealed some of these problems
and has led to the continued separation of corruption investigations from the criminal
investigations, which initially identified the corruption. Obviously all of these
disadvantages could be overcome through negotiation and education by IIC senior
management with operational SIO's and their senior managers.
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Suggested Disruption Strategies
Option 1
A campaign of disinformation against both the organised crime syndicate and the
suspected corrupt MPS staff they utilise.
The aim of this option is to discredit the MPS staff in the eyes of the organised crime
syndicate to such an extent that they will no longer trust them and therefore will stop
using them.
There are a number of ways that this can be achieved:
• Covert feeding of false information to the suspected corrupt member of staff,
which relates to the organised crime syndicate, causing the syndicate to take
unnecessary action. For example information regarding an imminent search of
syndicate controlled premises.
• Overt contrived contacts by known IIC staff with suspected corrupt officers,
witnessed by other officers
• Overt contrived contacts by known IIC staff with key members of the organised
crime groups, informing them of IIC's knowledge of their corrupt MPS contacts
Disadvantages
• High risk strategies
• Danger of retribution against corrupt MPS staff by the organised crime syndicates
• Can only be used against subjects who are not being actively investigated by other
units
• Possible Human Rights issues
• Risks to IIC staff approaching organised crime groups
• Only deals with the isolated cases where the corrupt officer is identified
• Will not stop the syndicate attempting to corrupt other MPS staff
• May encourage the syndicate to corrupt further MPS staff
• The implementation of such a strategy is labour intensive
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Option 2
The naming of identified corrupters within Police Orders, including a lawful order
that no member of MPS staff may have undeclared and unauthorised/ direct or indirect,
contact with the individuals named. Any undeclared and unauthorised contact would
be considered a discipline offence, carrying an automatic sanction of dismissal from
the Service.
The Operation Tiberius team believes that the current Service Confidence policy is not
an effective disruption technique. However it is probably the best policy that could be
achieved given the complexities and restrictive legislation involved. Therefore the
Tiberius team has sought to design a Service Confidence policy from the criminals'
perspective.
It is envisaged that full research and consultation with MPS Solicitors would be
required to ensure legality, Human Rights compliance and a defendable position for
any civil actions brought against the MPS. The entry in Police Orders could also
include exclusion from premises controlled by corrupters, i.e. night-clubs, restaurants
and pubs. (Precedent in exclusion of CO 14 Clubs & Vice staff from licensed premises
in Westminster)
This strategy would require an appeals system to cater for serving MPS staff, who are
innocent relatives of corrupters, etc. and policy would have to be formulated to cover
such eventualities.
This option could provide the following advantages:
• Notification of previously unidentified contact between MPS staff and corrupt
nom inals
• An effective sanction to deal with MPS staff who wish to continue undeclared and
unauthorised associations with the named individuals
• Gives the staff member a simple choice between continuing such associations and
remaining as a member of the Service. Where do their true loyalties lie?
• Makes itemised billing a far more effective investigative tool, by making simple
contact with a named individual a discipline offence, rather than having to prove
the content of any conversation
• Provides further scope for the prosecution of discipline offences resulting from
proactive investigations into the named individuals
• . Makes contact between corrupt MPS staff and their corrupters more difficult
• Lessens the potential for the corrupters to corrupt further MPS staff after they
have been 'named and shamed'
• Cost effective method of disruption
• Could be used when proactivity has failed against a corrupter
However this option could lead to the following disadvantages:
• Legal action against the Service by those named for libel/defamation
• Potential breach of named individuals' Human Rights
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• The same legal actions and breaches could be brought by/identified against MPS
staff
• MPS policy would have to be written in the light of HRA 2000 and other relevant
legislation
• Could only be used where the corrupter is not the subject of other pro-activity by
any MPS unit
• Who would administer the policy and carry out regular dip sampling of itemised
billing'
The Tiberius team feel that this is a viable option, if fully researched and ratified by
Solicitors Department.
Option 3
Existing dispersal and clustering techniques, either moving suspected corrupt MPS
staff or banding them together.
For a number of years, management within the MPS has attempted to deal with
suspected corruption at a local level. So called, management intervention has taken the
form of:
• removing alleged corrupt officers from specialist departments back to borough
postings across the MPS to disrupt networks
• placing alleged corrupt officers together on one particular unit to enable a strong
manager to deal with them
• placing alleged corrupt officers together on a unit to 'keep an eye on them'
The following disadvantages have been identified with these interventions:
• Spreading corruption networks throughout the MPS (dispersal)
• Exposing vulnerable staff to suspected corrupters (dispersal)
• Making central monitoring of staff difficult (dispersal)
• Making corrupt networks associations stronger and easier (clustering)
• • Stockholming' of previously respected management figures (clustering)
• Making proactivity against strengthened networks more difficult (clustering)
To an extent, the Service Confidence Procedure has achieved some success, by giving
a structure to the removal of suspected staff from sensitive posts. However the
disadvantages detailed above in relation to dispersal apply equally to Service
Confidence.
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Suggested Organisational Strategies
The Operation Tiberius team has identified a number of organisational strategies that
could be implemented to help proof existing operations against infiltration by
organised crime:
• Implementation of the MPS Integrity Strengthening Programme
• Implementation of Operational Security policy across the MPS, to include:
• Introduction of training to accreditation level of dedicated Operational Security
(OPSEC) Officers
• Vetting of all prospective OPSEC officers prior to training
• OPSEC officers to be appointed on all operations involving organised crime
• Introduction of OPSEC training on the SIO's course
• Overall responsibility for OPSEC to be placed with the SIO and included in all
risk assessments and decision making processes
• Regular quality assurance checks of OPSEC on relevant units with constructive
feedback to SIO's
• Inclusion Logs to be developed for all operations involving organised crime,
along the lines of a standard decision log, to include:
• The reasons for an individual's inclusion
• Their level of inclusion
• A section to be signed by both the person included and the person including
them, so avoiding any future disagreement as to levels and dates of inclusion.
It is felt that all these strategies would encourage a focused, innovative, professional
and, above all, effective approach to the investigation of organised crime and
corruption. Term of reference 3 identifies the syndicates ready for this approach.
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3. Identify suitable core crime nominals in East and North East
London for the partnership agencies to target, in order to identify police
corruption.
The initial scoping carried out by Operation Tiberius has identified two main
syndicates, which are ready for immediate development:
The Bowers Syndicate — Operation Deenside (S011 SIS)
The Bowers Syndicate MPS Staff
Anthony Bowers Fred Cutts (Former DC')
Martin Bowers
Paul Bowers
The Bowers Syndicate is currently the subject of a long term development operation
run by the Special Intelligence Section. However Fred Cutts has become the subject of
a Mexican stand-off between the SIS and IIC, with both units assuming the other is
actively developing the intelligence picture. In truth no one unit has taken
responsibility for his development.
Operation Tiberius Development
Purely by applying for and analysing Cutts' home telephone billing some 99 calls have
been identified as being made by him to law enforcement agencies in the past three
months. These agencies range from the MPS and Ministry of Defence Police through
to Customs & Excise. These calls, made by a former senior law enforcement officer,
would not cause concern but for the fact that Cutts is part of one of the most ruthless
organised crime syndicates in the country.
The billing for one of Cutts' mobile telephones has recently been receieved, which
indicates that this is a telephone he uses for criminality. The high volume of calls, 900
in 3 weeks, are mainly to Pay-as-You-Go mobiles.
Excellent intelligence is in existence, which shows Cutts actively assisted the Bowers
Syndicate by advising them about police investigative techniques. This advice resulted
in the frustration of a proposed technical deployment strategy by the operational team.
It is clear that Cutts is the eyes and ears of the Syndicate in relation to law enforcement
activity.
The Tiberius team feels that Cutts could be quickly developed to a point where
evidential opportunities would become available to:
1. identify his current contacts within the MPS
2. identify the full extent of his criminality with the Bowers Syndicate
3. identify his true position within the Syndicate
4. identify any assistance he may be providing to the Palmer Syndicate
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However, in line with the suggested proactive strategies above, Cutts should not be
developed in isolation but as a key member of the organisation, using the single
investigative unit strategy.
Nly The Kean Syndicate — Operation Greyhound, Zloty, Summer, Radial & Pyramus
(IDG, NCIS, NCS & T6)
The Kean Syndicate MPS Staff
Bob Kean DC Martin Morgan
Michael Adams DC Paul Goscomb
Gary Richman Paul Kelly (former DS)
Cliffy Redbourne Bill Kelleher (former PS)
Joseph Gunning DC Sean McElhatton
Duncan Redpath (former DC)
DC Damian Crilly
PC Peggy Slater
As has been previously stated, the Kean Syndicate is a prime example of disparate law
enforcement agencies attempting to target an organised focused network. The
arguments for and against this strategy have been discussed above and will not be
repeated here.
Operation Tiberius Development
At an early stage, Tiberius identified former DS Paul Kelly as being a common thread
between two of the five, supposedly linked, compromised murder investigations. Kelly
is believed to have made inappropriate approaches to the team investigating the
murder of Kenneth Beagle and to have facilitated checks for a suspect in the Ricky
Rayner murder. These compromises are dealt with in detail within the main body of
this report.
A strong intelligence case and liaison with NCIS has led to the acquisition of a high
grade intelligence source against Kelly. The source has identified Kelly's continuing
association with Martin Morgan, Sean McElhatton, Bill Kelleher and DCI Steve
Hobbs.
Successful applications have been made for the deployment of:
• directed surveillance
• a Q-logger facility
• a tracking device
All of these facilities have proved useful and have supported the assertion that Kelly is
still a member of the Zloty network. Authority is currently being sought for the
deployment of a data-grabbing facility against Kelly to identify any undeclared mobile
telephones he may be using.
The Tiberius team feels that the current intelligence against Kelly could be quickly
developed to a point where evidential opportunities would become available to:
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1. identify his current contacts within the MPS
2. identify the full extent of his criminality with the Kean Syndicate
3. identify his true position within the Syndicate
Summary
Both of these syndicates are active in the organisation of major drugs importations into
the United Kingdom and their onward distribution throughout North East and East
London. Both syndicates are utilising well known and networked former and serving
MPS officers to assist them. The dismantling of these two syndicates and the arrest
and conviction of their corrupt associates would provide a powerful message to both
the remaining criminal syndicates and the officers who know their corrupt MPS
associates.
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4. Assess the damage caused to the judicial system as a whole, and the
MPS in particular, by police corruption linked to organised crime in
East and North East London.
The true assessment of the damage caused by these corrupt networks is impossible to
make at this stage, until further proactive scoping has been undertaken. However a
statement by an experienced SIO currently attached to SO 1(3) gives some indication
of the depth of the problem in East and North East London:
"I feel that at the current time I cannot carry out an ethical murder investigation
without the fear of it being compromised."
The ramifications of this statement are serious and disturbing and provide a snapshot
of the current threat to the criminal justice system. Additionally the fact that none of
these syndicates have been seriously disrupted over the last five years provides an
insight into the effectiveness of their networks.
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Conclusion
The Metropolitan Police Service has, since 1997, waged a successful war against most
forms of police corruption. Notable prosecutions have been achieved, in the most
demanding and difficult circumstances, against some of the most corrupt officers ever
identified.
However there has been only one success against corrupt officers directly assisting an
organised crime network, Operation Greyhound. The other successful operations have
dismantled networks of corrupt officers engaged in serious criminality, but purely for
their own gain.
The scoping exercise carried out by the Operation Tiberius team has identified a
wealth of intelligence identifying organised crimes infiltration of the MPS and other
law enforcement agencies. However much of this intelligence has failed to provide
evidential opportunities against corrupt officers. Operation Tiberius has identified the
following reasons for this:
• corruption investigations carried out in isolation from the ongoing criminal
investigation
• resultant lost evidential opportunities through lack of inclusion and liaison
• distrust of an operational team
• investigations focused purely on the MPS officer and not the syndicate he is
assisting
• lack of resources to react to all the intelligence received
• lack of resources to proactively investigate organised crime syndicates and their
corruption together
• lack of experience and skills to investigate organised crime
Some of these reasons can be considered as organisational failings, whilst some have
been driven by organisational necessity, for example, finite resources.
It is the view of the Operation Tiberius team that these organisational failings can be
addressed through a change of mind set and the adoption of the organised crime task
force ethos (see proactive strategy option 2). This strategy will not work in isolation
but will require secondments to existing teams (see proactive strategies option 3) and
the adoption of lawfully audacious disruption strategies as detailed above.
The MPS has a serious problem with organised crime infiltrating its databases and
compromising its operations, only a holistic approach to this problem will result in
success. In addition to the proactive and disruption strategies, the MPS must be
proofed against further infiltration, through the implementation of the Integrity
Strengthening Programme and Operational Security and Inclusion policies.
Most importantly the Internal Investigations Command should not fall into the same
trap again of waiting for organised crime corruption intelligence to come to it. It
should proactively seek the intelligence by regularly scoping, 'up and coming'
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organisations and working in partnership with other units engaged in their
investigation.
In conclusion, Operation Tiberius has identified the serious threat posed to the MPS by
organised crime, this is not the first time this threat has been identified, but now new,
innovative, far reaching and audacious strategies are ready to be implemented to
neutralise that threat.
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Chapter 1
Existing Intellegence
I
II
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The Adams Family
Operation Trinity
Operation Nike
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The Adams Family
Background
The Adams Family has been the major force within organised crime over the last
decade. Their empire has spread from its North East London roots to encompass
national and international networks. Many national newspapers have run major articles
about them and the impunity with which they have run their criminal empire
Any attempt to commit to paper the extent and nature of that empire, would double the
size of this report and prove as a distraction to the core subject of this report, their
corrupt contacts.
The family's main members are:
• Tommy Adams
• Terry Adams
• Patrick Adams
• Danny Adams
• Tommy Adams Jnr
• Michael Adams
For each of these principles there are their relatives and individual associates, building
a massive network of contacts.
Corruption Intelligence
As with most organised crime families in London, no scoping has been carried out to
determine the full extent of the corruption associated with them. Analysis has been
conducted of the intelligence held by IIC and a wealth of nebulous information has
been identified along with some excellent specific intelligence.
Again with fame comes rumour and the bulk of intelligence concerning the Adams
family assumes that they must have corrupt police in their pocket to have evaded
capture for so long. Credibility is given to this assertion by intelligence regarding the
leak of a witness statement concerning the murder of Michael Olymbious to the
family.
However specific intelligence exists regarding the following network of former and
serving MPS officers, known as the Keene network:
• Derek Keene
• Nigel Waldron
• John Smith
• Bob Yeoman
Former DC
Former DS
Former DS
Serving DC
(Adams' direct contact)
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Additionally intelligence exists regarding a freelance journalist called Jo-Anne
Goodwin, an acknowledged expert on the Adams family, who has a corrupt police
officer as one of her sources of information about them.
The Olymbious Witness Statement
A 728 submitted by DCI Marsden of 4 AM1P dated 16/10/95 is a report concerning
the finding by police of a witness' statement of Ron JOHNSON from Operation
HEATON (dated 19th May 1995) at Belugas Club, Finchley Road NW3 on 11th
October 1995 This statement which is crucial to the investigation of themurder of
Michael OLYMBIOUS has been confined to police circles and not released to any
outside agencies i.e. Crown Prosecution Service.
It was discovered by police searching Belugas Club on I 1 th October 1995 and was in
the constructive possession of Bobby BILL a potential suspect for the murder of
Michael OLYMBIOUS. The report states:
"The club although fronted by Subject is effectively owned by the ADAMS family from
North London. The 'ADAMS' are without doubt one of the country's leading criminal
families with links to organised crime.
This enquiry has been concentrating for several weeks on the theory that
OLYMBIOUS was murdered because of the recovery of a large consignment of
Ecstasy tablets from a flat at 833 Chelsea Cloister SW3 (BD section) in February
1993. The drugs were found by a cleaner who informed the police. The drugs with a
street value of £1.5 million were taken into police possession. OLYMBIOUS had been
minding the drugs for the 'ADAMS' family, in particularTerry ADAMS.
After the murder of OLYMBIOUS, JOHNSON (OLYMBIOUS' minder for 20 years)
was interviewed at length by officers from 'Operation Heaton'. He was quickly
eliminated as a suspect having been 'lured away' by Sam DUNDAS (defendant) at the
crucial time of OLYMBIOUS' death.
On 5th April and 15th May 1995 JOHNSON made statements to officers from
'Operation Heaton'. In the latter statement, comprising of 8 pages JOHNSON details
at some length OLYMBIOUS' illegal cigarette/drugs trade, his financial situation the
debts of £600,000 to the family from North London (ADAMS) various criminal
activities and crucially a meeting in March 1995 between OLYMBIOUS and Lou
MENDY, at which JOHNSON was present. During this meeting MENDY reminded
OLYMBIOUS of the debt to the family' and OLYMBIOUS' requirement to pay the
debt. MENDY stated to OLYMBIOUS that £40,000 had to be paid by 15th March
1995 otherwise there would be 'no debt'. After the meeting OLYMBIOUS discussed
the conversation with JOHNSON and took the content of the meeting and the mention
of the debt being called by MENDY as a death threat.
This statement was extremely pertinent to the murder of OLYMBIOUS and steps were
taken to place JOHNSON within the 'Protected Witness Scheme'. This matter was
discussed during a meeting with Commander GRIEVE and Detective Superintendent
PATRICK. After Supt PATRICK had personally seen JOHNSON it was decided that he
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was not to be accommodated within the 'Protected Witness Scheme'. Considerable
steps were taken from that time to ensure that evidence he had tendered in his
statement on 19th May 1995 in particular with reference to MENDY were not
mentioned to any individuals outside Operation Heaton. Because it was considered
that JOHNSON was extremely vulnerable it was decided that this evidence would not
be put to suspects arrested in taped interviewed situations.
On Wednesday 11th October 1995 at 6.30am a pre-planned operation was carried out
by officers from Operation Heaton. The operation was to search the address of
Terry ADAMS
2. Lou MENDY
3. Sam DUNDAS and to search Belugas Club, Finchley Road NW.
The operation was successful although Terry ADAMS was not at home having
suddenly left his home address at 10pm the night before with his wife and child. In a
flat above Belugas Night Club officers found Bobby BILL alias ADAMS and
ROBERTS. In a training shoe in his bedroom was found a photostat copy of
JOHNSON'S hand-written original statement dated 19 th May 1995. It should be
mentioned that Bobby BILL is a highly dangerous individual. He is actually involved
with the ADAMS family and is strongly suspected in 1993 with carrying out two
separate murders in Holland. Bear in mind ADAMS' sudden departure with his
family from his home address some 8.5 hours before he was to be arrested and his
home address searched. Preliminary enquiries show he left suddenly and hurriedly at
10pm. The inevitable conclusion to be drawn is that ADAMS had been 'tipped off."
It is obvious from this report that a supposedly secret murder investigation was
confidently and effectively infiltrated and compromised.
The Keene Network
Derek KEENE was medically discharged on 20 th February 1986, his service record is:
Sept 72 — Mar 76
Mar 76 — Jun 79
Jun 79 — Aug 82
Aug 82 — Aug 83
Aug 83 — Feb 86
Y District
N District
N District
C8 — Flying Squad
J District
As can be seen from his service history, his posting to the Flying Squad was
shortlived. The circumstances surrounding his move were that a confidential document
was removed from the DCI's desk at the Flying Squad offices, KEENE 'found' the
document and returned it 24 hours later. An enquiry was undertaken but was
inconclusive and KEENE survived, albeit back on a divisional CID posting, until his
retirement.
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KEENE's income after his retirement appeared to be his police pension and Madagans
PLC, 42-44 Henry St, Northampton for whom he carried out debt collecting or bailiff
work.
KEENE was a registered Police informant, registered at the Epping NCS office. DS
Graham LILLINGTON was his handler until he retired recently, it is not known if he
is still registered or who he is now handled by.
Contact with the Adams Family
Derek KEENE first came to notice as associating with the Adams Family on 16
th
September 1995 at 36 Greville Street London EC1, the business premises of Saul
NAHOME, a main associate of the family. Operation Trinity, run by the SIS, was
targeting the Adams family and had progressed to a stage where an audio probe had
been deployed within NAHOME's premises. A telephone call was made to a
vodaphone no 0831 547250 by NAHOME. The subscriber of that vodaphone was Mr
K L KEENE, 5 Lambourne Close, Chigwell, Essex. There was no reply to
NAHOME's call.
On 18th September 1995 NAHOME rang the same number and spoke to a male called
Derek KEENE. They discussed the money Derek will take to NAHOME.
On 23 rd September 1995 NAHOME telephoned and they discussed £60,000 for some
premises. It was not possible to identify whether it was to rent, buy or sell the
premises.
On 24th October 1995 NAHOME rang KEENE and asked for his last name for the
licence. He spelt it as KEENE. This licence it is believed concerns a night club.
On 14th November 1995 KEENE visited 36 Greville Street and gave his home
telephone number as 0181 500 4355 subscriber is Mr K L KEENE, 5 Lambourne
Close, Chigwell, Essex. He asked for a meeting with Terry ADAMS because he
wanted to discuss an ex police officer, Steve HUNT, who has served 22 months in
prison in France for drug trafficking.
On 16th November 1995 KEENE again visited 36 Greville Street and met Terry
ADAMS who offered the hand of friendship, by offering to take out the supplier of the
drugs to Leah BETTS, who died of an overdose. Apparently because KEENE was a
friend of the father, an ex Police Inspector. It appears from the conversation that
KEENE's real contact with the organisation was Patrick ADAMS, now resident in
Spain. Terry believed Patrick had a spy in the camp who was paid and protected by the
Police. They discussed Terry ADAMS' arrest who claimed he was not forewarned.
This was obviously a lie but KEENE could not believe he was not warned. ADAMS
offered KEENE a weekly wage just to front a licence in a Soho nightclub. It was
during this conversation that it was suspected that KEENE was or had been a police
officer.
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On 12th December 1995 NAHOME rang KEENE and they discussed debts of £40,000
incurred by one of the ADAMS' club, the Emporium. KEENE offered his services as a
debt collector, before Westminster Council were involved.
On 15th December 1995 Paul TIERNAN, another Adams associate, telephones a
Derek, believed from a mobile phone. Afterwards TIERNAN tells NAHOME that it is
on us very active, but NAHOME is alright. It can only be presumed that this is
KEENE and that he has warned TIERNAN of police activity.
Research of KEENE's telephones at the time revealed that he had contacted Leyton
Police Station and 003452471440, the subscriber of which is Mark FIEVET – Piccolo
Restaurant, Giovgio, Estopona, Spain. This number has also been used by Patrick
ADAMS as a contact number when booking airline tickets.
There had now been a number of instances when it was felt that subject was passing
police information to the ADAMS. However there was nothing specific that would
confirm this or identify his source.
On 4th January 1996 KEENE visited 36 Greville Street and met Paul TIERNAN.
KEENE claimed that all the agencies were quiet, because they were helping with the
triple shooting in Essex. KEENE had not seen his informant since Christmas but was
meeting him on Saturday. It was interpreted that his source was someone with inside
knowledge of police operations. TIERNAN intended to meet KEENE the following
week to discuss the information he obtained. KEENE subsequently said to Paul
TIERNAN that he met his contact on Saturday but there was no indication as to what
was discussed.
On 22nd February 1996 KEENE visited 36 Greville Street where he had a whispered
converation with NAHOME and Danny ADAM. KEENE said that he knew that the
British Police were listening to Patrick ADAMS telephones in Spain. He said this is in
return for similar facilities granted to the Spanish Police in this country, who are
investigating a long term fraud. The British Police get a week or so at a time. KEENE
says he is going to see someone on Saturday but at the moment everyone is cagey.
On 19th March 1996 KEENE was heard to say to NAHOME "He won't give the
surname, he's working a drugs thing at the moment. It's been put on hold since last
Sunday when he (believed to be DS John SMITH) appeared in the News of the World
because he's meant to be giving some tom one, some prostitute and there's a lot of
aggravation over, see this bloke wants to be, he'd offered himself as a registered
informant, well if he does that, then it, I've told to make sure he does, he gets him
registered because if he does, if he gives any information at all, any information that
comes from him, even if he gives it to a strange old bill, when they do a register check
it all has to go through my mate …. NIGEL" (Believed to be DS Nigel Waldron)
"Well no, but apart from the fact that he asked me a name two months ago and
remember I said to you I needed some more information, well once again my mate
who's had this but of a tumble he's actually done it on the computer and there is
nothing in that name with a warrant out and he asked me for an international warrant.
Well Interpol do register on our system, the police system most of the time, if they
I
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haven't registered it well I can't cope with it. Well that name he asked me, CLOSE
nothing at all"
KEENE was obviously facilitating checks for the ADAMS family via WALDRON
and SMITH.
On 13 th May 1996 KEENE rings out from 36 Greville Street to a DC Bob YEOMAN
attached to Leyton, however he was not in the office at the time. He also later spoke to
DS John SMITH and DC Nigel WALDRON at SERCS Barkingside.
On 23 td September 1996 intelligence was received that KEENE was trying to obtain
some information from a member of the MPS regarding the address 34 Camden Road
E17 (or E10). The MPS employee he wass using may work within the 0181 345 0000
exchange area (Ilford Switching Centre). The MPS employee has told KEEN that he
will arrange for a search of the CAD system to be made on the address. On 18
th
September 1996 the MPS employee was working at Greenwich Magistrates Court.
KEENE was believed to be using Orange mobile number 0976 243125 at the time and
on the same day this number was called by 0181 345 2497, 0181 345 2337 (20/9/96)
0181 345 2452 (23/9/96), all extensions at Leyton CID office, where DC Bob
YEOMAN worked.
Due to the covert and sensitive nature of the audio probe none of the above
intelligence could be used as evidence and neither KEENE, or any other member of
his corrupt syndicate, were ever arrested.
Operation Blackjack
However KEENE later came to notice in 1999, in a coincidentally similar way, during
a 3 Area Crime OCU operation targeting the HUNT family, operation BLACJACK.
KEENE was employed by the London Borough of Redbridge as a bailiff after his
retirement. In this capacity KEENE came into contact with Michael PALMER, a car
dealer with premises at 53 Chigwell Road, London E18. These premises were the
subject of Operation BLACKJACK and were technically attacked using an audio
probe.
KEENE is heard on the probe on 14 th January 1999 agreeing to find out for PALMER
whether he or the HUNT's (David and Steve), PALMER's landlords, were the subject
of Police activity. KEENE later attends the premises on 21 St January 1999 and tells
them that they are being looked at and that another male called Mark KARPEL is also
being looked at. KEENE states that they are being looked at until 3 td February 1999,
this implies that he has seen a flagging form or similar.
KEENE is heard on the probe to state that his contact is a DI on SO, but there is also
implication that he is getting the information through a member of the Chigwell
football team. KEENE was arrested on 13 th May 1999 with the other targets of
Operation BLACKJACK and was interviewed in relation to the information he
supplied to PALMER.
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When KEENE's address was searched a set of photocopied case papers were found
which related to another of the Operation BLACKJACK suspects, Austin OWEN. The
case papers referred to a complicated fraud involving high value vehicles and were not
a defence set. The witness statements were in manuscript and contained witness
statements that were never given to the CPS. The officer involved in the case was a TI
Justin ROWLEY from Ilford who is suspected of looking after OWEN, albeit this
information has only come from a passing comment on the probe.
In interview KEENE stated that he had got the case papers from the defence solicitors
or from OWEN to have a look at as an ex police officer. KEENE denied passing the
information to PALMER and stated that he would never undermine a Police
prosecution.
KEENE was charged with perverting the course of justice but was later acquitted at
Snaresbrook Crown Court. KEENE remains in regular contact with serving officers
and is a member of the Chigwell Sports Club football team. KEENE was banned from
Chigwell and his membership suspended, whilst he awaited trial. However, once
acquitted, he was swiftly reinstated.
The Journalistic Source
Jo-Anne GOODWIN is recognised in journalistic circles as the Adams family expert,
she has written numerous articles about them, mainly published in the Daily Mail. The
most detailed of her reports was in the Daily Mail of Saturday 19 th August 2000,
entitled 'The Curse of the Untouchables'. The article is laced with allegations of police
corruption, jury rigging and CPS corruption.
With her reputation in mind, the Saul NAHOME murder squad made a decision to
visit her with a view to possibly tasking her sources for information. On 7th
September 2000 DI COUCH visited Miss GOODWIN and was told by her that she
would contact her sources and see if they could help, she then mentioned that one of
her sources was a 'corrupt police officer'. It was not clear whether the officer had a
corrupt relationship with the Adams family or was just leaking intelligence regarding
them to journalists.
The minimal attempts made to identify the corrupt officer by the IDG failed and he
remains unidentified.
Summary
The above intelligence shows a pattern of corruption commensurate with the top crime
family in London. It can only be assumed, without further proactive scoping, that the
Adams family continue to utilise corrupt MPS staff to further their criminality.
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The Bowers SiOicate
&
Operation Deenside
DC Gary Collins
Special Intelligence Section
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The Bowers Syndicate
Operation Deenside
1 – Introduction & Objectives
During the summer of 1998 S011-SIS initiated Operation ALMASI which was
directed against the drug importation and money-laundering activities of an organised
group of criminals based in North East London & Essex.
As the operation developed it was realised that the subjects of ALMA SI were closely
associated with key figures from a group of organised criminals controlled by the
BOWERS family from Canning Town. It quickly became clear that the BOWERS
family were engaged in organised crime on a scale which far exceeded that being
undertaken by the Operation ALMASI targets and as a result the SIS commenced
Operation DEENSIDE in the Autumn of 1999.
The initial objectives of Operation DEENSIDE were:
• to identify the extent of the BOWERS organisation and its impact on crime in East
London,
• to identify the core group in control of that organisation and those other
individuals who were vital to its criminal operations.
• to identify the financial and material assets of the organisation
• to devise and undertake a strategy to disrupt and eventually neutralise the
BOWERS family as a viable criminal organisation.
Background
In recent years the BOWERS family have become acknowledged as the dominant
criminal organisation in East London. It is now known that they have contacts with
organised criminal groups elsewhere in Europe and the Far East and use these to
facilitate the large-scale importation of cocaine, amphetamine and cannabis. They are
also well connected with other criminal groups around the UK and handle their own
drug distribution to a number of other regions, particularly Scotland and North and
East England.
The BOWERS organisation are heavily involved in the smuggling of bootleg tobacco
and alcohol into the UK and its nationwide distribution. They are also very active in
the organised hijacking and disposal of high value HGV loads.
The BOWERS family maintains a front as a legitimate organisation committed to the
promotion of sporting events, primarily boxing and football (Peacock Promotions).
They cultivate a respectable image by running youth projects and charity activities and
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to this end they actively seek to associate with sporting and show-business celebrities,
police officers and local politicians. The truth however, is that the BOWERS family
control a large and ruthless criminal empire which dominates all aspects of organised
crime in East London and which is respected and feared throughout the UK.
Preliminary research identified the main players behind the organisation as Tony
BOWERS, his brothers Martin BOWERS and Paul BOWERS, his business partner
Roy HILDER and their associates George LAMPRELL and Lewis NICHOLLS. These
subjects are violent career criminals, with a broad knowledge of the conventional and
technical surveillance techniques employed by law enforcement. It was established
that the BOWERS brothers have maintained a long-term and probably corrupt
relationship with former Met Detective Chief Inspector Fred CUTTS.
The BOWERS criminal empire is controlled from offices at The Peacock Gymnasium,
Caxton Street North, Canning Town E16, and to a lesser degree from The Peacock
public house, 92 Victoria Dock Road, Canning Town El 6. The two premises are
situated in a mainly industrial area where the local residents are traditionally hostile
towards police and where it is notoriously difficult to mount covert operations. A
covert video camera set up to cover the front of the Peacock Gym at the beginning of
this operation was located and put out of action almost immediately by persons
unknown.
By November 1999 the main subjects had been under surveillance for several weeks.
A tracker and probe had been deployed against a car used by Lew NICHOLL but these
facilities were removed when he changed vehicles soon afterwards. Intelligence
gathered up to that point suggested that the organisation was importing shipments of
drugs concealed in HGV loads of flowers originating in Holland. The trucks would
arrive at Dover by ferry from Rotterdam and would be driven from Dover to New
Covent Garden, diverting on route from the M2 to Sheerness for the drugs to be
unloaded. Sources indicated that the shipment would then be collected from Sheerness
and taken to a safe-house, possibly in Loughton, prior to being broken up and supplied
down the chain.
Intelligence also suggested that representatives of the BOWERS organisation met their
buyers near a pond in Loughton, where they would take advance payment and leave
the customer to wait while the order was put together. They would return later and
deliver a car in which the drugs would be concealed. The presence of Billy
FREEMAN (right hand man to Paul BOWERS) at the Peacock Gym was cited as a
good indication that a drug transaction was in progress since he rarely went there at
other times. It was also said that Tony BOWERS would not tolerate any criminal
activity anywhere near the Gym.
A covert video camera had been set up to cover Tony Bowers' home address but,
although it provided some corroborative background intelligence in relation to the
target, it was later removed for deployment elsewhere.
During this period a female airline employee was found to be associating with
NICHOLL and was suspected of being involved in his drug trafficking activities. She
was identified as a British Airways purser, Miss Zoe BAGBY, who was profiled and
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found to have unexplained assets of £20,000 in her bank account. She is believed to
have been a central player in their earlier importations but has not featured recently.
It was also discovered that Lewis NICHOLL was linked to 29 Winchester Street,
London SW I where his daughter Elizabeth NICHOLL was residing with her commonlaw
husband, a Derek WHITE, who is a prolific money launderer and involved with
various criminal groups from East Anglia. It also transpired that Elizabeth NICHOLL
owned a flower business at Covent Garden Market where she was suspected of
receiving drugs concealed in deliveries of flowerpots imported via Holland.
Over the course of the next year the list of potential targets began to multiply as new
intelligence about their activities and infrastructure came to light. It was established
that the BOWERS brothers were employing Joseph ASHMAN and Jonathon
TURNER to co-ordinate a very lucrative HGV hi-jacking operation throughout
Southern and Eastern England. Research showed that the overwhelming majority of
HGV's stolen South of a line running from The Wash to Southampton during the
previous two years had turned up empty in Rainham and within a couple of miles of a
transport yard owned by ASHMAN. The stolen loads included designer clothing and
footwear, cigarettes, spirits and computer equipment, and even allowing for re-sale at
massive discount there can be little doubt that the BOWERS organisation profited
from these activities to the tune of several million pounds.
During this period ASHMAN moved with his wife and two sons from their council
house in Canning Town to a large detached house in Rainham about l '/2 miles from his
transport yard. ASHMAN has many contacts in the haulage business, particularly in
East Anglia, who are vital to the Bowers hi-jacking, drug distribution and bootleg
networks.
Jonathon TURNER, another career criminal from Canning Town, appeared to be
closer to the core of the BOWERS organisation and is believed to be Tony BOWERS
right hand man. Throughout this operation he has been very active supporting
ASHMAN's hi-jacking and bootleg operations, and handling the distribution of
cocaine and cannabis to other criminal groups in Suffolk and East Yorkshire.
The main criminal contacts on the East coast for ASHMAN and TURNER during this
period were identified as:
• David BLAND from Hull,
• James FREEMAN who has addresses in Plaistow and Hull,
• Paul FREEMAN (not related) from Ipswich,
• Leon PHILLIPS from Felixtowe.
The activities of FREEMAN, PHILLIPS, ASHMAN & TURNER were also being
investigated by the Major Crime Unit of Suffolk Police in relation to organised highvalue
container thefts from the freight terminal at Felixtowe Docks and ongoing
liaison was established with DI Chris MAYHEW from that department. There have,
however, been concerns about the security of information passed to Suffolk CID and
the flow of intelligence to them has therefore been carefully controlled.
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Associates
By now a number of other individuals associated with the BOWERS organisation had
been identified. John FOY from Meopham in Kent was believed to be laundering the
organisation's drug proceeds and was also thought to be their link man with drug
suppliers overseas. He had been a frequent traveler to Spain and to France where he
was wanted for money laundering offences. FOY used to be a regular visitor to the
Peacock Gym but has not been seen by the operational team since 1999. His current
whereabouts are not known.
David ARMSTRONG from the Isle of Dogs was thought to be the main enforcer for
the BOWERS organisation. A large and imposing ex-boxer with a Cocaine habit and
ready access to firearms, ARMSTRONG is considered to be an unstable and
dangerous psychopath. He hates police and has been the subject of two previous armed
arrest operations. He may currently be in Scotland recovering from gunshot wounds
although this has not been confirmed.
Tommy MOFFATT is involved in organised crime in Glasgow and is known to be
receiving substantial supplies of cocaine from the BOWERS organisation for onward
distribution to other parts of Scotland. He is of interest to the Scottish Drug
Enforcement Agency with whom the SIS have established a continuing liaison.
Stephen CLARK from Woodford Green, a co-director of Peacock Promotions and
owner of The Power House club in Hackney, was believed to be 'hands-on' in
arranging drug importations on behalf of the BOWERS organisation. Stephen is the
son of Patrick 'Patsy' CLARK (Brinks-Mat robbery) and his business interests include
Abbeycastle Properties and the Essex Arms in Victoria Dock Road E16.
Tony GASH, a lorry driver from Plaistow, is regularly employed by ASHMAN &
TURNER on their HGV hi-jacking operations.
Fred Cutts Involvement
It was clear that the BOWERS brothers and their key associates were well distanced
from the criminal empire they were controlling and it would be extremely difficult to
tackle them directly. A strategy was agreed to target their two most active
subordinates, ASHMAN & TURNER, in the hope that the resulting disruption might
provide a window of opportunity to attack the core group.
In March 2000 TURNER was placed under conventional surveillance supported by
covert CCTV covering the area in front of his house. On the first day of operations he
was observed going into the house with a heavy bag taken from the boot of his car and
over the next few hours several callers came and went. The team executed a search
warrant at the house and arrested TURNER with 71/2 kilos of cannabis resin in his
possession. It is thought that he had already sold a considerable amount of the
cannabis and some cocaine before being detained. After appearing in custody
TURNER was subsequently granted bail pending trial. On 26/10/2000 TURNER was
convicted for possession with intent to supply and was imprisoned for nine months.
Former DCI Fred CUTTS appeared as a character witness on behalf of TURNER at
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the trial. Just before Christmas 2000 TURNER was electronically tagged and released
from Prison. He resumed his place within the organisation but appeared to be taking
more of a background role.
At this stage it had been confirmed that Tony BOWERS was conducting the day-today
running of the organisation from the directors office at The Peacock Gym and it
was proposed to apply for Part III Authority to install covert listening equipment at
that location. Uncorroborated intelligence suggested that the target office was
electronically swept on a regular basis and the building was very secure. As previously
stated, the premises are located in a hostile area and gaining entry for such a
deployment would clearly be very difficult to accomplish. The TSU were therefore
approached and requested to complete a CTR and long-term feasibility study.
In the meantime, SIS attempted to gain access to the Peacock Gym by alternative
means. It was already known that the management at the Gym made their facilities
available to local uniformed officers to reinforce their respectable image. It was also
known that at any given time there would be in excess of a dozen stolen and burnedout
cars abandoned in the immediate vicinity of the Gym. It was decided to approach
the local OCU Commander with a view to having some of his sector officers posted to
a local vehicle crime operation which would involve them asking the management of
the Gym for use of the premises for a few nights as a temporary OP. It was hoped that
SIS & TSU could then be infiltrated into the building to carry out a thorough
reconnaissance of the directors office prior to a full technical deployment. The local
OCU Commander was already concerned about his officers frequenting the Gym and
gave his full co-operation. The sector team made their request to the management at
the Gym while remaining totally unaware of the real motive for their operation. The
management appeared undecided until Tony BOWERS made a call to Fred CUTTS.
The request was outlined to CUTTS who told BOWERS that under no circumstances
should the officers be given access to the Gym outside of opening hours.
High Value Lorry Hijacking
ASHMAN remained active stealing HGV loads and distributing bootleg cigarettes on
behalf of Tony BOWERS throughout this period. An intelligence package in relation
to his activities was disseminated to HMC&E who intercepted and searched one of
ASHMAN's trucks as it re-entered the UK from Holland. Nothing was found.
However, ASHMAN also planned and executed the hi-jacking in transit of an HGV
loaded with Timberland boots in Suffolk. SIS intelligence located the load at a
warehouse in Essex where it had been concealed pending delivery to a third party and
as a result Essex Police executed a search warrant there and recovered the £200,000
load intact.
During the 12 weeks leading up to 7 th of November 2000 the operational team were
fully engaged with Operation MAGICIAN (the Millennium Dome robbery) and had
very little opportunity to progress Operation DEENSIDE until this commitment was
concluded.
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Cocaine Distribution
On 30
th
of November 2000 the operational team discovered that ASHMAN had
arranged to sell 1 kilo of cocaine to Paul FREEMAN who would be travelling from
Ipswich to East London for the transaction. This intelligence was passed to Suffolk
MCU who intercepted FREEMAN and Richard DRURY en route back to Suffolk.
They were found to be in possession of 1 kilo of 78% pure cocaine and £130,000 cash.
Additionally they were both identified by Suffolk Police as prominent nominal
subjects. Subsequent intelligence revealed that the cocaine had been supplied by Tony
BOWERS for £27,000 and had been delivered to FREEMAN by Paul BOWERS.
Meanwhile, further intelligence was developing which implicated David BLAND and
James FREEMAN from Hull as being involved with the BOWERS organisation in the
supply of cocaine, hi-jacking HGV loads and carousel fraud. BLAND was found to be
a target of the NCS office at Scunthorpe and ongoing liaison was developed with that
unit.
The liaison already in place with the DEA in Scotland provided intelligence that one
of their main drug distributors had recently received three kilos of cocaine from Tony
BOWERS for £86,000. The DEA could not intercept this consignment although they
were able to identify common individuals and associations between their Operation
BACKSLIDER and SIS Operation DEENSIDE.
Counterfeit Cigarettes
Just before Christmas 2000 Tony BOWERS and Lew NICHOLL traveled together to
Amsterdam. A courier on his way to meet them was intercepted by HMC&E and
found to have in his possession a sample of counterfeit cigarettes
Just after Christmas 2000 Tony BOWERS made another trip, this time to China,
which was thought to be the point of origin for counterfeit, British branded, cigarettes.
The Bowers syndicate were planning to have them manufactured and smuggled into
the UK.
On 16th January 2001 the SIS followed ASHMAN to a car park in Rainham where it
was suspected that he intended to steal a commercial vehicle and its load. Instead, he
drove off in a van he had collected from an Asian man. About half an hour later he
drove the van back and returned it to the Asian man who drove away in it back
towards London. The van stopped in Barking and its load was transferred to another
vehicle. This vehicle was followed to Forest Gate where its contents were being
unloaded into a terraced house when local officers arrived and detained two Asian
men. Inside the house were one hundred & eleven thousand bootleg cigarettes
including what appeared to be a substantial part of a previous load. The prisoners and
counterfeit cigarettes were handed over to HMC&E who dealt with the matter by way
of forfeiture and destruction. ASHMAN's role in these events was evidenced on video
and stills photographs.
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Leon PHILLIPS, a career criminal active in Ipswich and Felixtowe was identified as
another link in the BOWERS drug distribution network in Suffolk. He was also
suspected of assisting in the planning of ASHMAN's hi-jacking operations.
Throughout February & March 2001, a steady flow of intelligence suggested that
ASHMAN was planning to hi-jack a high value lorry load on a regular run between
Fishguard and London, probably on the M4. A joint SIS and Thames Valley Police
operation was mounted during the early hours of 7 th March 2001, but the suspects
aborted their plan at the last minute due to unforeseen logistical problems. Although
the target vehicle and load were never identified, it was anticipated that this hi-jacking
would be re-scheduled for a later date and that intelligence sources would provide
sufficient warning to prepare a police response.
On 23 tu March 2001 the SIS acquired intelligence indicating that ASHMAN had
arranged the hi-jacking of a HGV carrying a high value load somewhere in the
Rainham or Dagenham areas that morning. SIS immediately deployed to the area with
an S011 surveillance team supported by the Crime Squad from Hornchurch.
ASHMAN was followed to his yard in Rainham and as events unfolded other suspects
and vehicles began arriving there. The suspects began making their way towards
Dagenham in small groups and it was confirmed that they were communicating by
hand-held radios and using scanners to monitor police radio traffic. TURNER arrived
on his own and without meeting any of the others made several sweeps around the
area seeking to identify any covert police presence. At 3pm a Spanish registered HGV
carrying cigarettes and spirits valued at £850,000 was ambushed by at least five men
as it left a freight depot at Manor Way in Rainham. The Spanish driver was attacked,
tied up and driven away in a van. The hi-jacking was not witnessed by police. Within a
few minutes the HGV was identified on the Al 3 heading for ASHMAN's yard.
Immediately after entering the yard, and while the Crime Squad were still believed to
be on their way to secure the area, the stolen HGV re-emerged and was abandoned
nearby. The driver escaped and by the time local units were on-scene at ASHMAN's
yard most of the suspects had vanished. It is now known that an unidentified Crime
Squad officer compromised radio security on a local PR channel and the suspects were
therefore forewarned of the arrival of the arrest team. Nonetheless, Jonathon
TURNER, Paul BOWERS and William FREEMAN were all arrested at the yard and
the HGV and its load were recovered intact. The driver was found later in a remote
area of Epping suffering from back injuries. The prisoners were bailed pending
forensic & ID parades, but ultimately there was insufficient evidence to charge.
Intelligence gathered over the following 24 hours indicated that ASHMAN and the
remaining suspects were busy dumping their mobile phones, and that Tony BOWERS
had demanded a full de-briefing to find out what had gone wrong. Undoubtedly Fred
Cutts would have been an important part of the debrief team.
During the early morning of 27th March 2001 a lorry loaded with Dell lap-top
computers en route from Dublin to London via Fishguard was hi-jacked on the M4 at
Membury Services. The driver was overpowered and left tied-up at the scene, the
HGV tractor unit was later found abandoned in Slough. The trailer and load were
never recovered. The method, timing and location of the attack were exactly as had
been anticipated on the 27 th March 2001 operation and there can be no doubt that the
BOWERS organisation were responsible. The total absence of any intelligence to give
prior warning of this incident was taken as an indication that either:
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SLUM, 1
• ASHMAN and his team were testing the security of their new phones, or
• that the hi-jacking had been contracted out to other criminals, who were probably
unaware of the police ambush in Rainham a few days earlier and were unwittingly
being used to ascertain whether there was an informant in the BOWERS camp.
Authority had been granted some time earlier for a tracker to be fitted to ASHMAN's
car but deployment had been held off for fear of risking a compromise while the above
events developed. It was now decided that deployment should be further postponed
until it could be confirmed that ASHMAN was not going to change his vehicle again,
and his level of caution had returned to normal.
During May 2001 SIS identified ASHMAN's source of inside information for the
HGV hi-jacking operations as a James McMEEKIN from Chingford. McMEEKIN
was active in corrupting key individuals within specific freight companies in order to
secure sensitive information relating to the timetables and routes of their high value
shipments. He was also believed to be seeking to corrupt individuals within the cashin-transit
industry with a view to selling the information provided by them to
professional armed robbers. This aspect of the operation was passed on to S07 for
further development.
In July and August 2001 ASHMAN & TURNER were followed on a number of trips
to Felixtowe where it was discovered that they were planning to use a large team of
criminals to simultaneously steal three containers loaded with Nike sportswear from
the ferry terminal. A large-scale joint operation was implemented by SIS and Suffolk
Police which involved following the London targets and their HGV tractor units from
ASHMAN's yard in Rainham to a location outside Felixtowe where they would be
met by local criminals who would facilitate entry to the dock area. It was intended to
ambush the suspects as they attempted to leave the ferry terminal with the stolen
containers, which they planned to drive to a holding area in Hull later that night. On
two separate evenings the suspects were successfully followed to Felixtowe but
aborted their plans at the last minute when the target containers were unexpectedly
sent elsewhere. They were further frustrated when another team hi-jacked a Nike
consignment shortly after leaving Felixtowe docks a few days later. ASHMAN's plans
were eventually shelved to allow the situation to settle and pending the arrival of more
suitable loads at the terminal.
On 8th August 2001 intelligence was received that ASHMAN was planning the
imminent theft of a lorry load of cigarettes from an unknown location in Rainham later
that evening. Surveillance was mounted on ASHMAN who was seen driving a rented
van onto the Fairview Industrial Estate in Rainham, accompanied by another
unidentified man who may have been Jonathon TURNER. The van emerged a little
later and drove to ASHMAN's yard a couple of miles away. Soon afterwards a lorry
towing a container on a trailer also left the Fairview Industrial Estate and was followed
to ASHMAN's yard. It drove inside and the gates were locked behind it. The suspects
were given sufficient time to begin unloading the trailer, before the operational team
entered the yard, supported by uniformed officers & dogs. The stolen trailer had been
fully unloaded and next to it was one of ASHMAN's HGV's which now contained
6,000,000 cigarettes with a re-sale value of approximately £1,250,000.
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The following suspects were arrested at the yard —
• Joseph ASHMAN
• Anthony Charles GASH
• John Joseph PHILLIPS
• Leslie PHILLIPS
An unknown suspect, believed to have been TURNER, managed to climb over a rear
fence and escaped across marshland behind the yard.
It was quickly ascertained that the cigarettes recovered were counterfeit Benson &
Hedges produced in China and smuggled into the UK under the guise of a container
load of cooking foil. The case was taken over by HMC&E who jointly charged the
suspects with evasion of £660,000 unpaid duty. Their enquiries into previous
smuggled loads may eventually bring this figure into the region of £1,500,000. When
the defendants were eventually granted bail ASHMAN was very anxious to reassure
Tony BOWERS that none of these events could be linked to him.
Violence
On 04/02/2001 the body of John DONOVAN was found on a deserted stretch of dualcarriageway
outside Aberdeen with a fatal gunshot wound to the head. His car had
been left on the opposite side of the road and a shotgun was lying near to the body. He
was subsequently identified as James John DONOVAN of 19 Spinnaker House, Byng
Street, Isle Of Dogs E14. DONOVAN was known to have been involved with David
ARMSTRONG in delivering consignments of Cocaine from London to Scotland,
probably on behalf of the BOWERS organisation. DONOVAN was also married to
ARMSTRONG's ex-wife.
Officers from Grampian Police traveled to London soon afterwards and made
enquiries which included interviews with ARMSTRONG and the management at the
Peacock Gym. The Scottish liaison was handled through DC HENDY at SO7 Projects
Team and they remain unaware of the SIS interest in these matters. It is understood
that Grampian CID eventually wrote-off the incident as a suicide.
On the evening of 20 th March 2001 ARMSTRONG was shot and seriously wounded in
a car outside Spinnaker House, Byng Street E14. Evidently he had been aware of a
threat to his safety and had borrowed a friend's car in an effort to avoid being
identified. One of the tyres of the vehicle had been deflated while it was unattended
and as ARMSTRONG got into the car a number of shots were fired at him throughout
the driver's window. He was hit in the face and neck by two .32" caliber bullets which
lodged in the roof of his mouth and against his spine. ARMSTRONG was taken to the
Royal London Hospital and kept under armed guard while he underwent emergency
surgery. He was visited there the next morning by Tony BOWERS. Over the next few
days ARMSTRONG received in excess of sixty visitors, the majority being well
known East London criminals.
SIS were de-briefed in relation to the incident by DCI GRIFFITHS at SGC/AMIP
Arbour Square. He was of the opinion that the shooting was more probably linked to
SECRET 43
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an earlier attempt on the life of Chris PEARMAN with whom DONOVAN &
ARMSTRONG were associated rather than to any involvement of the BOWERS
organisation. For the next two months the BOWERS organisation maintained an
unusually low profile. Tony BOWERS arranged for David ARMSTRONG to stay
with Tommy MOFFATT in Glasgow until he had recovered from his wounds.
Investment
Around this time It was discovered that Tony BOWERS was considering a £6,000,000
investment in a business venture involving the construction of a hotel and casino
complex in the Docklands Development Area and ASHMAN was seeking to move his
transport business to a new location in Essex.
Cannabis Importation
By June 2001 two separate high grade human intelligence sources were indicating that
Tony BOWERS was in the final stages of arranging the importation of a ton of
Cannabis from Thailand. It would probably arrive in the UK from Holland later in the
year concealed in a container load of Oriental vases.
Research now revealed that Tony and Paul BOWERS owned a company called
Furniture Direct, which was located on an industrial estate in Rotherhithe near to
Milwall Football Club. The company had a history of importing ceramic pots and
vases from the Far East and was managed on behalf of the BOWERS brothers by a
James Martin O'DEA. James O'DEA, who now lives in Stockwell, was released from
prison in France in 1999 after serving nine years of a twelve year sentence for drug
trafficking. At the time of his arrest O'DEA had been living in Holland where he had
been running an extensive transport network that controlled the regular movements of
HGV's loaded with Cannabis from Asia to the UK via the channel ports. Paul
BOWERS and his right-hand-man William FREEMAN were regular visitors at
Furniture Direct and it was considered likely that the premises would be the receiving
point for the shipment of Cannabis when it arrived in the UK.
By now the TSU had completed their feasibility study and had elected to attack the
Peacock Gym in three separate stages. The first phase would involve the deployment
of an advanced covert CCTV outside the venue to provide accurate and up to date
intelligence regarding the patterns of movement there. The second phase would
involve physical entry to the building and a full CTR inside. The third phase would be
the installation and concealment of covert listening devices in the director's office.
The whole plan was expected to take a number of months to complete
The TSU were also tasked to provide two covert CCTV systems to cover the
warehouse of Furniture Direct in Rotherhithe, pending the anticipated arrival of Tony
BOWERS' shipment of Cannabis from Thailand. This facility was in place by the end
of July 2001 and indicated that James O'DEA was running the Furniture Direct
warehouse with the help of his son Laurence, and possibly a Harold RAPHEAL from
Bermondsey. There appeared to be very little in the way of legitimate business
conducted from the premises. O'DEA's wife had been followed from the family home
SECRET 44
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in Stockwell to offices at 21 Dartmouth Road SW1 (Near to NSY). She is thought to
still have business interests in Amsterdam.
Over the preceding months SIS had been aware that the BOWERS family owned
another location in the vicinity of the Peacock Gym that was used in connection with
their criminal activities. The premises, referred to as 'The Shed', were finally
identified as a small warehouse adjoining the Peacock Public House. By the first week
in October TSU had installed remotely monitored covert CCTV covering this location
to compliment those already covering the Peacock Gym and the warehouse of
Furniture Direct in Rotherhithe.
All three systems have now been providing excellent visual product for several weeks.
BMK Supply
During July 2001 conventional surveillance and intelligence sources revealed that
Jonathon TURNER was coordinating the supply of the amphetamine precursor
chemical BMK to a group of criminals, who were intending to set up their own
facilities for amphetamine production in the Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire force
areas. While SIS surveillance continued, TURNER was evidenced meeting
representatives from Nottingham who took away a sample of BMK. A few days later
he provided a courier with a full delivery of several litres of the chemical. A joint SIS
& Nottinghham NCS surveillance and arrest operation was mounted to target the next
courier on his return to Nottingham. The next transaction was successfully covered
and the target was followed away to the M11, where he was lost by the NCS
Surveillance Team, within minutes of the hand-over.
It had now become clear that TURNER was undertaking this venture for his own
benefit and the rest of the BOWERS organisation were not involved. The SIS
redirected their attention back to the main DEENSIDE targets and a separate operation
was created around the BMK supply and eventually tasked to Nottinghamshire Crime
Squad for further development.
Operational Update
The deployment of the listening device within the Peacock Gym has suffered a further
set back after the TSU found a door within the premises, which they were unable to
defeat. Further attempts at deployment will be made in the near future.
Fred Cutts is going to be made the manager of the casino, to be built by the Bowers
organisation in the Docklands Development.
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Appendix A
Subject Personal Profiles
(alphabetical order)
David ARMSTRONG
H/a — 19 Spinnaker House, Byng Street, Isle Of Dogs E14.
DOB – 30/11/1958
CRO — 139959/77F – previous convictions for assault.
Warning signals — WEAPONS — VIOLENT
Believed to have ready access to firearms.
F510, heavy build, scars on forehead & left cheek, extensive tattoos, graying black
hair. Left handed. Gunshot wound scars to right side of neck and face.
• ARMSTRONG is the main enforcer for the BOWERS organisation. He is a former
boxer, and a violent and unstable cocaine user.
• Frequenter of the Fitzroy Lodge Boxing Club, situated in the arches on Hercules
Road SE 1.
• Much feared and respected within the London criminal fraternity.
• Very violent towards police & has been the subject of two armed operations.
• In late 2000 ARMSTRONG seriously assaulted two men from the North of
England who had lost 20 kilos of cocaine and 22 kilos of cannabis belonging to the
BOWERS organisation. The attack left one of the victims partly blinded and was
carried out on the instructions of Tony BOWERS and Roy HILDER.
• ARMSTRONG had been partnered with Chris PEARMAN and John DONOVAN,
who was shot dead near Aberdeen on 04/02/2001. All three had been employed by
the BOWERS organisation to run drugs consignments into Scotland.
• ARMSTRONG was shot twice in the face & neck outside his home on 20/03/2001
and was last heard of staying with Tommy MOFFATT in Glasgow to recover from
his wounds.
Previous phone numbers
07944 421 815
Previous vehicles used
J497FGC – Red Vauxhall Calibra
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Joseph Thomas ASHMAN
Alias – Tony WOOD
H/a — 103 Lambs Lane South, Rainham, Essex.
DOB – 20/03/1968
CRO — 167718/81E, VIOLENT — WEAPONS —ESCAPER.
Convictions include GBH, assault on police, criminal damage, burglary, TDA &
disqualified driving.
F510, stocky build, short brown hair, tattoos both arms.
Active West Ham supporter.
Close associate of Tony BOWERS and Jonathon TURNER.
Wife — Mandy ASHMAN. Two young sons.
Owner of D&P Metals (scrap), New Road, Wennington, Essex.
Owner of Rainham Haulage, shares premises above.
• Very active lorry hijacker on behalf of the BOWERS organisation and used as a
link with organised criminals in Suffolk & Hull. Also a distributor of drugs and
bootleg alcohol & tobacco for the organisation.
• Currently on bail to HMC&E for evasion of duty on £1,2500,000 worth of
counterfeit B&H cigarettes seized a his yard on 08/08/2001.
Previous phone numbers
0207 511 2818
0956 202 352
07903 611 118
Previous vehicles used
L109LYP – Red Shogun 4X4
T712MLD – Black Mercedes 320
G746WMJ – Grey Saab
M910AHJ – White Lexus Coupe
Elston David AVATT
Nickname 'ELS'
IC/4
H/a — 29 Avery Gardens, Ilford, Essex.
DOB — 01/06/1960 – Calcutta
CRO — 5163/76G — convictions for handling & TDA.
F506, tattoos both arms, London accent.
• Regular criminal associate of Joseph ASHMAN.
• Heavily involved in the disposal of stolen goods, VAT fraud and distribution of
bootleg and counterfeit cigarettes around East London.
Previous phone numbers
07940 267 099
I
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Previous vehicles used
N/K
Zoe BAGBY (Miss)
H/a — Keasden Avenue, Blackpool FY4 3JE
N/T PNC
• British Airways Purser & associate of Lewis NICHOLL
• When financially profiled was found to have an unexplained £20,000 in her bank
account.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles used
N/K
David BLAND
H/a — 28 Chaucer Street, Hull, East Yorkshire.
H/a — 1 Chestnut Grove, Village Garden, Hull HU8 8QL.
DOB – 11/1 1 /1968
CRO — 74803/84E
F508, short stocky build, balding brown hair.
Wife — Donna ANDERSON
Ex-wife — Deborah HARTLEY
• Arrested in Northumbria with James FREEMAN during early 2001 for removal of
wall mounted ATM's.
• Business interests — Napoleon's Club in Hull.
Previous phone numbers
01757 630 995
07775 576 344
07815 013 803
07759 426 589
Previous vehicles used
K722GUA – White Ford Escort van marked `Watersear
P585WUG – Red Vauxhall Corsa
M839XHG – Blue Volvo T5
P446LNA – Green Peugeot 406 (Other plate reads P996LNA)
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Anthony BOWERS
H/a — 3 The Green Walk, Chingford, London E4 7ER.
DOB – 15/03/1958 — London.
CRO — 39419/77Y, convictions include robbery, burglary, handling, theft, deception
& ABH.
F508, stocky/fat build, cropped black hair.
Wife — Amanda BOWERS.
• Head of the BOWERS criminal organisation but has always been able to
successfully distance himself from its activities.
• Very careful when using the phone & conducts most of his business face-to-face.
• Business interests —
• The Peacock Gymnasium,
• Peacock Promotions
• Safeguard Enterprises
• Part owner of the Essex Arms in Victoria Dock Road.
• Lloyds TSB account A73758369 at 60 The Broadway, Stratford, sorting code
number 77 — 91 — 60.
• Has well established links with drug networks in Glasgow, Aberdeen, Hull &
various areas of Essex & Suffolk.
• Regular visitor to Holland and occasionally to China/Thailand.
• Uses John TURNER as his right-hand-man.
Previous phone numbers
0208 928 0030
0207 511 3799
07958 345 223
0410 550 118
Previous vehicles used
L643ERX – Green Shogun 4X4
Ml2GYM – Blue Shogun 4X4
L42EJH – Silver Jaguar
49 SECRET
1ECRET
Martin BOWERS
H/a. — 66 Silvertown Way, Canning Town E16.
H/a — 4 Clarkson Road, Canning Town E16.
DOB – 08/02/1961
CRO – N/T
Wife — Kim BOWERS
• Business interests —
• The Peacock Gymnasium,
• Peacock P/H.
• Not thought to be a major player in the criminal activities of the organisation.
• Appears to be more active in the legitimate running of the Peacock Gym and
Peacock Promotions.
Previous phone numbers
0208 523 8113
07939 868 544
Previous vehicles used
Ml2GYM – Blue Shogun 4X4
S48LFL – White Transit van
Paul Charles BOWERS
H/a — 24 Drew Road, Canning Town, London E16.
H/a — 3 Clarkson Road, Canning Town E16.
H/a — 44 Mortlake Road, Canning Town E16.
DOB – 01/01/1966
CRO — 157790/78U, all convictions as a juvenile.
• Business interests —
• The Peacock Gymnasium,
• Peacock Promotions
• Safeguard Enterprises.
• Co-owner of an industrial drum factory with a Danny SHARLAND — possibly in
Stratford.
• Arrested with Jonathon TURNER & William FREEMAN for hi-jacking a lorry
load of cigarettes & spirits in Rainham on 23/03/2001. Not Charged.
• Close associate of Joe ASHMAN.
• Uses William FREEMAN as his right hand man.
Previous phone numbers
07979 264 805
07940 220 043
50 SECRET
SECRET
Previous vehicles used
B3PCB – Gold Mitsubishi
SMC782M – Black BMW
P596PCB – Green VW Golf
R921TKJ – Black Saab 9000
Stephen CLARK
H/a — 14 The Albany, Woodford Green, Essex IG8 OTJ
DOB — 09/06/1966
CRO — I88443/81G
• Owns and runs the Power House club in Hackney.
• A director of Peacock Promotions and has business interests in Abbeycastle
Properties.
• A part owner of the Essex Arms in Victoria Dock Road, the rest of which is owned
by the BOWERS family.
• CLARK makes arrangements for drug importations on behalf of the BOWERS
organisation and will go 'hands on' if necessary. He is also involved to an
unknown degree in their HGV hi-jacking operations.
• Stephen CLARK is the son of Patrick 'Patsy' CLARK CRO — 15814/57K, of
Brinks-Mat fame.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles used
N/K
Fred CUTTS
H/a — 308 Haynes Park Court, Slewins Close, Hornchurch, Essex.
CRO — N/T
• Corrupt former Met Police DCI, ex-Flying Squad, close associate and advisor to
Tony BOWERS.
• Is likely to have provided the organisation with detailed knowledge of police
surveillance methods and technical capabilities.
• Compromised attempted technical deployment at Peacock Gym.
• Frequents Chigwell Police Sports Club and believed to be an active corrupter of
serving police officers.
• Believed to represent the Peacock Gym in his capacity as a wrestling coach.
• On 27/10/2000 appeared at Snaresbrook Crown Court as a character witness for
Jonathon TURNER who was standing trial for possession of 71/2 kilos of Cannabis
with intent to supply.
• Partner believed to be Miss Scorcha Ann THOMSON who has a car (R676NEB)
registered at the same address.
SECRET 51
SECRET
Previous phone numbers
01708 472 061
07710 458 267
0410 458 267
07960 697 943
Previous vehicles used
H39OPPU – White Mercedes
R676NEB – Red Fiat Coupe (girlfriend's?)
K47PWL – Green BMW 520i
Richard DRURY
H/a — 26 Shackleton Road, Ipswich.
Arrested 30/11/2000 with Paul FREEMAN by Suffolk Police in possession of 1 Kilo
of Cocaine supplied by Tony BOWERS.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles used
N/K
Anthony FOY
H/a — Current whereabouts not known.
DOB – 10/01/1962
CRO — 83889/80E
• FOY was once the main link with overseas drug suppliers and the money launderer
for the BOWERS organisation.
• In 1995 FOY is rumored to have cut the throat of Jimmy MAHER, an enforcer for
the ADAMS crime organisation and he was also suspected of involvement in a
shooting in Kent in 1997.
• A close associate of Gerald COPELAND.
• His current status and whereabouts are not known. FOY used to be a regular
visitor to the Peacock Gym but has not been seen by the operational team since
1999.
• When last heard of FOY was still wanted in France for money laundering offences.
Previous phone numbers
I
SECRET 52
SECRET
N/K
Previous vehicles used
N/K
James 'Jed' FREEMAN
H/a — 434 Anlaby Road, Hull.
H/a — 24 Beckton Road, Plaistow E16.
DOB – 13/01/1957—
CRO — 97705/70G
F508, fat build, short dark brown hair.
• Had been involved in supplying Amphetamine with ASHMAN & TURNER in
1999 but moved to HULL soon after being interviewed as a potential suspect for
the HOLE & EVANS murders.
• Arrested in Northumbria with David BLAND during early 2001 for removal of
wall mounted ATM's.
Previous phone numbers
0207 473 6485
0956 413 468
07899 094 790
Previous vehicles used
N142KGV – Peugeot 406
Paul FREEMAN
H/a — 22 Clapgate Lane, Ipswich.
CRO — 145795/94W, convictions for theft, handling & TDA.
Suffolk Police PROM-NOM
DOB – 26/09/1960
F602, short dark hair, moustache, left handed.
• Main suspect for theft of cigarettes valued at £2,000,000 from Felixtowe Docks in
June 2000.
• Arrested 30/11/2000 by Suffolk Police with Richard DRURY in possession of 1
kilo of Cocaine supplied by Tony BOWERS.
• Believed to be skilled in hot-wiring HGV's and disabling alarm systems.
• Business interests in K&K Controls & Equipment, 22 Clapgate Lane, Ipswich.
• FREEMAN's wife works for British Telecom.
Previous phone numbers
07950 967 828
53
SECRET
07939 315 052
07947 496 864
Previous vehicles used
N407VDV – Blue Toyota Corolla
William 'Billy' FREEMAN
H/a — 56 Appleby Road, Canning Town E16 1LQ.
CRO – 84360/64M
DOB – 20/02/1952
F600, stocky/muscular build, bald.
Partner — Amanda Jane JEFFORD.
• Arrested with Jonathon TURNER & Paul BOWERS for hi-jacking a lorry load of
cigarettes & spirits in Rainham on 23/03/2001. Not Charged.
• Right hand man to Paul BOWERS.
Previous phone numbers
0207 511 6441
07961 308 720
Previous vehicles used
M644TVW – Pale blue Rover Coupe
P432NLU – Blue Peugeot 406
S766KAR – Silver/Grey Renault Clio (girlfriend's)
Anthony Charles GASH
H/a — 61 West Road, West Ham E 15.
Previous address at 58 Queensland House, North Woolwich.
DOB — 30/03/1961
CRO — 43199/8114
• Regularly used by Joe ASHMAN to drive and dispose of HG V's on his hi-jacking
operations.
• Arrested with ASHMAN, John PHILLIPS and Leslie PHILLIPS at ASHMAN's
yard on 08/08/2001 for evasion of duty on £1,2500,000 worth of counterfeit B&H
cigarettes.
Previous phone numbers
07904 219 919
SECRET 54
SECRET
Previous vehicles used
P446LNA – Green Peugeot 406 (other plate shows P996LNA)
Roy Charles HILDER
Nickname 'Porky'
H/a — 2 Farrington Place, Chislehurst, Kent (CCTV on-site)
DOB – 30/12/1948
CRO — 7153/65E
F507, stocky build, short greying hair.
Wife — Sue HILDER. Daughter (unknown).
• Partner of Tony BOWERS and thought to be one of the controlling members of the
BOWERS organisation.
• Business interests — The Peacock Gymnasium, Peacock Promotions & Safeguard
Enterprises.
• Cautious and surveillance aware, especially since being ambushed and shot while
leaving his house a few years ago.
• Has a long association with the ADAMS, O'REIELLY, ARIF & BRINDLE
families and is frequently called upon to act as a go-between in negotiations.
• Uses George LAMPRELL as his right hand man.
Previous phone numbers
0208 325 6156
0207 511 3799
Previous vehicles used
857MWL – Silver Porsche
R4SFH – Maroon BMW
R I 8CSH – Yellow VW Beetle
X2SFH – Pale Blue Mercedes Coupe
R551EMX – Silver VW Passat
George LAMPRELL
H/a — 44 Mortlake Road, Canning Town, London E16.
DOB – 03/01/1955
CRO — 105027/75Y.
F600, scars on chin.
Wife — Linda LAMPRELL.
• Right hand man for Roy HILDER.
• Frequents the Peacock P/H in Victoria Dock Road, Canning Town E16.
• Has not featured highly since the commencement of Operation DEENSIDE.
SECRET 55
SECRET
Previous phone numbers
0207 511 6442
Previous vehicles used
857MWL – Silver Porsche
James 'Jamie' Patrick McMEEKIN
H/a — 57 The Ridgeway, Chingford, London E4.
DOB — 11/09/58 Islington
CRO — 74316/72X
F600, fat build, wears glasses, blue eyes, short straight brown hair.
• Declared occupation given as Bricklayer.
• Provides inside information relating to the targets of ASHMAN's hi-jacking
operations.
• Was involved in the hi-jacking of a Spanish HGV carrying spririts & tobacco in
Rainham on 23/03/2001.
Previous phone numbers
0208 926 4008
Previous vehicles used
N/K
Tommy MOFFATT
H/a — Upper Rock Mount, Springfield Road, Barrhead, Glasgow G78 2SG.
DOB — not known
CRO — not known
• MOFFATT is believed to be heavily involved in organised crime in Glasgow and
of interest to the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency.
• He is known to be receiving substantial supplies of cocaine from the BOWERS
organisation for onward distribution throughout the rest of Scotland.
• Last heard of looking after David ARM STUNG while he recovered from gunshot
wounds as a favor to Tony BOWERS.
Previous phone numbers
0141 876 1743
07931 775 669
Previous vehicles used
SECRET 56
SECRET
N/1(
Elizabeth NICHOLL
H/a — 29 Winchester Street, Pimlico SW1.
DOB — N/K
CRO — N/K
Daughter of Lewis NICHOLL.
Wife of Derek WHITE (money launderer and drug trafficker).
• Believed to run a flower business in Covent Garden, which is also a front for her
drug dealing activities.
• Receives unspecified drugs in deliveries of flowerpots imported via Holland,
possibly arranged by her father Lewis.
• Not known whether or not she is connected to the BOWERS organisation.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles used
N/K
Lewis NICHOLL
H/a — Little Hails, The Street, Boxley, Maidstone, Kent ME14
DOB – 09/01/1949
CRO — 7640/63P, convictions include ABH, theft, disorder offences
Arrested twice in 1996 importing drugs into UK via Stanstead & Heathrow.
F506, slim build, bald on top, greying brown hair at sides.
Wife — Carol NICHOLL,
Ex-wife — Eileen NICHOLL
Daughter — Elizabeth NICHOLL
• Business interests —
• B&B Components, 1 Hardy Street, Maidstone ME14,
• Roto-Signs, Unit 10, Ileronden Road, Parkwood Trading Estate.
• Frequent visitor to Amsterdam with Tony BOWERS,
• Has also visited Japan & Hong-Kong with Tony BOWERS.
Previous phone numbers
01 622 674 071
01622 677 662
01622 685 308
SECRET 57
SECRET
07785 953 232
0385 953 232
Previous vehicles used
R921TKJ – Black Saab
M585PKN – White Seat
N975 WOE – Grey Audi A4
E273YHK – Red Bedford pickup
James Martin O'DEA
H/a — 79 Dovet Court, Mursell Estate, Lansdown Way, Stockwell SW8.
DOB — 15/08/1945
CRO — 3657/63K — conviction for importing Ecstasy via Holland.
• Figurehead owner of Furniture Direct on behalf of the BOWERS organisation.
• The premises comprise of a large warehouse opposite Milwall Football Club, Units
40-42 on the Enterprise Industrial Estate, Bolina Road, SE16 3LF (SIS have
covert CCTV covering this site).
• They also have three lock-up containers next to warehouse which are believed to
contain stolen property and possibly drugs.
• The company had a history of importing ceramic pots and vases from the far East
is the likely receiving point for an anticipated 1 ton shipment of cannabis thought
to be en route to the UK.
• O'DEA was released from prison in France in 1999 after serving nine years of a
twelve year sentence for drug trafficking.
• At the time of his arrest he had been living in Holland where he had been running
an extensive transport network that controlled regular movements of HGV's
loaded with cannabis from Asia to the UK via the channel ports.
• O'DEA lives in a council flat with his wife Bernadette and son Laurence.
• Bernadette appears to work at 21 Dartmouth Road SW1 and may still have
business interests in Amsterdam.
• Laurence, who is in his early 20's works at the warehouse with his father.
Previous phone numbers
0207 735 4016
Previous vehicles used
S659VKK – Black Ford Explorer 4X4
P732THT – White Fiat Ducato van
SECRET 58
SECRET
John Joseph PHILLIPS
H/a — 33 Coronation Drive, Elm Park, Hornchurch.
DOB — 25/01/1944
CRO — N/T
• A professional lorry thief regularly used by Joe ASHMAN on his hi-jacking
operations.
• Known to have been involved in the attempted hi-jacking of a lorry load of
cigarettes & spirits in Rainham on 23/03/2001 where TURNER, William
FREEMAN & Paul BOWERS were arrested.
• Arrested with Joe ASHMAN, Tony GASH and Leslie PHILLIPS at ASHMAN's
yard on 08/08/2001 for evasion of duty on £1,2500,000 worth of counterfeit B&H
cigarettes contained in a stolen lorry load.
Previous phone numbers
07977 944 552
0170 886 8083
0170 843 8737
Previous vehicles used
Y134JWC – Silver VW Polo
Leslie Walter PHILLIPS
H/a — 32 Ibottson Avenue, Canning Town El 6.
DOB — 08/04/1945
CRO — 40188/64
• Arrested with Joe ASHMAN, Tony GASH and John Joseph PHILLIPS at
ASHMAN's yard on 08/08/2001 for evasion of duty on £1,2500,000 worth of
counterfeit B&H cigarettes contained in a stolen lorry load.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles used
N/K
Leon PHILLIPS
H/a — 16 Falkenham Road, Kirton, Riverdale Court, Undercliff Road, West Felixtowe.
H/a — 29 Neptune Square, Ipswich, Suffolk, IP4 I QH.
DOB – 13/03/1968
CRO — 194318/85U — VIOLENT.
SECRET 59
SECRET
F510, stocky build, short black hair, brown eyes, tanned complexion.
• 'PHILLIPS is a body builder and heavy user of cocaine and steroids.
• Business interests — FTS Bonded Warehouse, 101-102 Dock Road, Felixtowe.
• An associate of Joe ASHMAN and active in the theft and hi-jacking of high value
HGV and container loads.
Previous phone numbers
01394 448 023
07980 210 003
Previous vehicles used
M111LTP – Blue BMW M3
Christopher John PEARMAN
H/a — 62 Gouldman House, Cleveland Way El.
DOB — 01/03/1952 Stepney.
CRO — 57292/65X – convictions include several for burglary and two for importing
cannabis.
IC/1, F600, scar right arm.
• An associate of the BOWERS organisation and usually partnered with John
DONOVAN (deceased 04/02/2001) and David ARMSTRONG before they were
both shot in separate incidents earlier this year.
• It is believed that PEARMAN's own life is under threat as a result of a long
running feud which originated with the fatal stabbing of his son Darren at the
Epping Forest Country Club some time ago. Evidently Darren was killed by four
bouncers at the club, one being a man called FULLER. In spite of taking extensive
precautions to avoid the inevitable retaliation FULLER was subsequently shot
dead by PEARMAN and the remaining three bouncers have made it clear that they
now intend to kill PEARMAN.
• A previous attempt was made on his life where shots were fired into his car after
one of the tyres had been deflated. This was identical to the method used when
ARMSTRONG was shot and wounded in his car on 20/03/2001 although it is not
clear if the two incidents are connected.
• On 06/04/2001 PEARMAN was arrested near the Hippodrome Nightclub in
Leicester Square after threatening a cab driver with a gun. At the time he was
wearing covert body armour and carrying a 5 shot snub-nosed revolver and a lock
knife. He was accompanied by an IC/6 man called Allali ABDSAM AD.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles used
N/K
SECRET 60
SECRET
Harold RAPHAEL
IC/3
H/a — (not confirmed) 6 Boughton House, Tennis Street, Southwark SEl.
DOB — 16/09/1959
CRO — 155953/74W
• Believed to be an employee of James Martin O'DEA at Furniture Direct,
Enterprise Industrial Estate, Bolina Road, SE16 3LF.
Previous phone numbers
Previous vehicles used
L865NAR – Maroon Ford Escort
Jonathon TURNER
Nickname 'Square'
H/a — 31 Addington Road, Canning Town, London El 6.
DOB – 0/10/1961
CRO — 135569/78Q, Weapons, Drugs. Conviction for supplying cannabis.
F509, thin build, short swept-back black hair, scars left nose & left neck.
Active West Ham supporter.
Wife — Kelly TURNER (nee McCARTHY).
• Business interests — The Peacock Gymnasium.
• Close associate of Joe ASHMAN.
• Very active within the BOWERS organisation, is the right hand man of Tony
BOWERS.
• Usually attends the Peacock Gym several times each day.
• Arrested with William FREEMAN & Paul BOWERS for hi-jacking a lorry load of
cigarettes & spirits in Rainham on 23/03/2001. Not Charged.
• Strongly believed to have been involved in the hi-jacking a trailer load of
smuggled counterfeit cigarettes valued £1,250,000 in Rainham with ASHMAN &
others on 08/08/2001.
• Also undertakes his own independent drug trfficking.
Previous phone numbers
0207 511 8473
07944 834 636
Previous vehicles used
L109LYP – Silver Shogun 4X4
P446GMP – Blue Shogun 4X4
M479SYA – Red Citroen Xantia
SECRET 61
SECRET
The Hunt Syndicate
Operation Blackjack
&
Operation Nike
SECRET 62
SECRET
The Hunt Syndicate
Operation Blackjack
The Hunt syndicate have been a feared criminal force in East London for many years.
Stephen Hunt is especially violent, relishing the opportunity to disfigure criminal and
business rivals with acid and Stanley knives.
The family business is scrap metal and many of the assaults carried out by the
syndicate have been used to drive local competing scrap merchants out of business.
This 'legitimate' business enterprise provides a front for their criminal activities,
which centre around the importation of class A drugs, protection rackets and high
value vehicle crime.
The Hunt syndicate has developed an extensive criminal empire, which so far has
evaded significant penetration from law enforcement. The syndicate has achieved this
invulnerability through a mixture of utilising corrupt police contacts and the
intimidation of witnesses brave enough to give evidence against them.
No better example of these methods exists than Operation Blackjack. The operation
commenced in 1998 and was a sensitive operation run by SO 1(3) Organised Crime
Group, utilising the deployment of listening devices within business premises
controlled by the Hunt syndicate. Various of the Hunts' criminal associates were
recorded during the operation, but one in particular was of interest in relation to
corruption, Mark Wright.
WRIGHT was born on 19 th December 1956 and the subject of CRO: 71333/92K, he is
an upper echelon criminal operating within the north east, and east end of London with
contacts throughout the United Kingdom and mainland Europe. At the time of the
operation WRIGHT was a registered informant, pseudonym Michelle BANNER, for
Detective Sergeant Ray AHEARNE, registered since 19
th
February 1998 at the SO
1(3) source unit at the Old Ilford police station.
The listening device provided details of conversations where either Mark WRIGHT, or
other criminals involved, talked about WRIGHT having a police source. The following
are examples of the conversations recorded:
20th November 1998 – David HUNT is on the telephone to Mark WRIGHT. The one
sided overheard conversation suggests that WRIGHT has been talking to his police
contact. The conversation suggests that WRIGHT is telling HUNT that his source has
told him that HUNT is being looked at whilst at the yard and that the police are
investigating a loan he has taken out. Both these facts were correct and undertaken as
part of Operation Blackjack.
11 th March 1999 – Michael PALMER and Mark WRIGHT are talking and WRIGHT
tells PALMER to "tell 'Davie' (David HUNT) that the old bill are going to see Bob
FINCH, you know that, you might not know Bob FINCH, tell Davie the old bill are
SECRET 63
SECRET
going to see Bob FINCH". Again this information was correct and only known to
Operation Blackjack officers.
In other conversations WRIGHT suggested that his police contact was contacted via
his brother George and that the contact's son played football with George's son. It is
strongly suspected that this was a smoke screen to conceal the fact that WRIGHT was
in fact a registered informant to Detective Sergeant AHEARNE. The other criminals
discussed WRIGHT having a `cozzer snout' and 'having help'.
Operation Nike
Operation NIKE was an IIC operation focusing on Detective Sergeant Ray
AHEARNE and his relationship with registered informants and in particular the
following concerns:
• The inappropriate disclosure of information to registered informants regarding
current pro-active operations conducted by the National Crime Squad and Her
Majesties Customs and Excise.
• Assuming the identity of other officers to conduct sensitive enquires such as
INFOS checks in relation to registered informants.
• Lone meetings with registered informants and a generally cavalier approach
towards informants, which undermined the integrity and professional reputation of the
MPS.
• Operation NIKE also identified two other officers from the source unit at JX
(Ilford) DCI Jim DEAN (since retired), the source unit controller, and DC John
MITCHELL co handler to many of DS AHEARNE's informants
Detective Chief Inspector James DEAN
DCI DEAN was the Controller at SO1 (3) `JX', and DS AHEARNE's direct line
manager. Both officers served together in the past and are good friends. There have
been serious concerns historically regarding DEAN, which have been the subject of a
protracted CIB2 investigation known as Operation COLLIER. DEAN was strictly
admonished following this investigation for selling his car to a protected informant,
which had been arranged by the informant's handler, who incidentally was a friend of
DEAN's. The handler had in fact been raping, blackmailing, and encouraging the
informant to facilitate the importation of heroin. Further details of this operation are
shown under the heading Miscellaneous Intelligence.
DCI DEAN had come to notice because of his lax approach towards AHEARNE's
informant handling style. DC1 DEAN had not been trained as a level 4 Controller, he
permitted lone meets, and authorised retrospective meetings, which he allegedly
authorised and date stamped the previous day, when he was in fact off duty. Clearly, at
best he 'turned a blind eye' to AHEARNE's behaviour, at worst he was party to some
form of corrupt activity with AHEARNE.
SECRET 64
SECRET
As a result of Operation Nike DEAN was made the subject of service confidence and
retired from the service in 2001. The IDG DPS monitored a lunch he held in Wansted
East London to celebrate his retirement. Attendance was by personal invite only and a
number of IDG core nominals attended including Ray AHEARNE, Fred CUTTS, and
Bill KELLEHER, a principle of Operation Zloty.
Detective Constable John MITCHELL:
DC John MITCHELL was a member of the Dedicated Source Unit at `.1X' and the cohandler
for many of AHEARNE's informants. AHEARNE has recorded that on a
number of occasions DC MITCHELL was present during meetings with informants.
There are concerns surrounding two particular meetings with informants, namely
`Peter BRANCH' and 'Tony DELL. Customs and Excise monitored the first meeting,
and the latter was monitored to a degree on behalf of the IDG. The conclusion drawn
as a result of both these meetings is that DC MITCHELL was not present at either
meeting.
The Mark Wright Allegations
On its own the material from the Operation Blackjack listening device did not point
towards DS AHEARNE being WRIGHT's police source. However a further allegation
was received about Mark WRIGHT from H.M. Customs & Excise Professional
Standards Unit.
The allegation was made by Investigating Officer John BUTLER who stated that on
17
th
February 1999 DS AHEARNE rang Bob SHELSWELL of HMC & E Intelligence
(B). AHEARNE stated that his informant was aware that a tracking device had been
found on a vehicle belonging to Tony BENEDETTINI. He said that he was aware that
BENEDETTINI was involved with the GROOM family in the importation of drugs
and that Danny SHANKSHAFT (See 'The Palmer Syndicate' below), in whom DS
AHEARNE stated he had an interest, distributed the drugs on their behalf.
Later the same day at 5.45pm a source of intelligence, graded Al, revealed a
conversation between Mark WRIGHT and Danny SHANKSHAFT where WRIGHT
stated that, "…. my source has told me that the tracker was a Customs one…".
The above intelligence was researched and the informant reports relating to WRIGHT
for 17th February 1999 were covertly obtained. The following is a chronological
sequence of events in relation to DS AHEARNE's actions on 17 th February 1999:
• At 8.40am DS AHEARNE telephones Mark WRIGHT @ Michelle BANNER, He
leaves a message at WRIGHT's home address to ring him. (Contact sheet 277
refers time stamped at 11.10 on 17/02/1999)
• At 9.40am DS AHEARNE has a telephone conversation with WRIGHT. The
contact sheet states that Source stated was on his way back from the continent
SECRET 65
SECRET
being buying some alcohol. Asked source location of concealment at Ghavi's
(difficult to read) H/A. Source confirmed upstairs in bedroom. Source to contact
later re possible meeting.' (Contact sheet 278 refers time stamped at 11.10 on
17/02/1999
• At 2.20pm DS AHEARNE has a telephone conversation with WRIGHT. The
contact sheet states that 'Source requested meeting later in day. No specific
arrangements made.' (Contact sheet 279 refers time stamped at 18.26 on
17/02/1999)
• At some time between 2.30pm and 3.30pm DS AHEARNE rings Bob
SHELSWELL of HMC & E Intelligence (B) and asks if they have lost a tracking
device. DS AHEARNE states that he has an informant who was aware of a
tracking device being found on a vehicle in Barking belonging to Tony
BENEDETTINI and was in a position to recover it. (There is a contact sheet for
Mark WRIGHT on 15 th February 1999 where a tracking device is mentioned,
however a copy of this report is not in the possession of the IDG) He states that he
was aware that BENEDETTINI was involved with the GROOM family in the
importation of drugs and that Danny SHANKSHAFT, in whom he states he has an
interest, distributes the drugs on their behalf. Mr. SHELSWELL states that he will
make enquiries with their technical people and come back to him.
• Shortly after their conversation Mr. SHELSWELL rings DS AHEARNE back and
tells him it is probably one of theirs from Operation BASKET based around
BENEDETTINI in the East Ham area. DS AHEARNE states he will get back to
Mr SHELSWELL. (Mr SHELSWELL never heard from DS AHEARNE again)
• At 3.50pm DS AHEARNE has a telephone conversation with Mark WRIGHT. The
contact sheet states that 'General conversation concerning the arrest of Stephen
HUNT and Shani WHINCUP. NOI. Possible meet after 1630.' (Contact sheet 280
refers time stamped at 18.26 on 17/02/1999)
• At 5pm DS AHEARNE has a telephone conversation with Mark WRIGHT. The
contact sheet states that 'Arranged to meet at 1730.' (Contact sheet 281 refers time
stamped at 18.26 on 17/02/1999)
• At 5.30pm DS AHEARNE, on his own, has a meeting with Mark WRIGHT in
Redbridge. The contact sheet states that 'Source suspects that the name Lenny
COLLOYLER maybe false. Source believes first name is Benny and surname is
Italian. Benny paid £70,000 deposit on house Blackheath area. Benny believes
police interest in him is over lorries. 'Fisheyes' from Birmingham known as
` Mark'. GC re Stephen HUNT and Shani.' (Contact sheet 282 refers time stamped
at 18.26 on 17/02/1999)
• At 5.45pm a source of intelligence graded Al, controlled by HM Customs &
Excise revealed a conversation between Mark WRIGHT and Danny
SHANKSHAFT, an associate of Tony BENEDETTINI. WRIGHT states, "….my
source has told me that the tracker was a Customs one…".
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This sequence of events casts considerable doubt upon the relationship between DS
AHEARNE and his informant WRIGHT. At best DS AHEARNE is allowing sensitive
intelligence to be drawn from him by WRIGHT and at worst he is corruptly passing
the intelligence to WRIGHT, to the benefit of organised crime in East London.
The Proactive Targeting Of Mark Wright
On 8th April 1999 DS AHEARNE received intelligence from an informant,
pseudonym Michelle POOLE, that Mark WRIGHT was involved in the importation of
cannabis resin into the United Kingdom. (Contact sheet 3 refers time stamped at 16.59
on 08/04/1999) The same day 'POOLE' went on to say that Mark WRIGHT was due
to take a large sum of money out to the Netherlands to finance a drugs importation and
to meet a British contact who would arrange the importation.
`POOLE' asked DS AHEARNE if he could go to Holland with WRIGHT, and was
told that he had no authority to participate but 'there was nothing stopping him
traveling with WRIGHT on the basis of "eyes & ears only"'. (Contact sheet 4 refers
time stamped at 16.59 on 08/04/1999)
This is a clear breach of informant handling guidelines and effectively gives 'POOLE'
participation authority to show verbal enthusiasm in a foreign country. The allegation
takes on a more sinister light when it is considered that 'POOLE' is in fact Eddie
WRIGHT, Mark WRIGHT's brother. DS AHEARNE's actions effectively give Eddie
WRIGHT a defence should he be arrested.
The 'Samantha Mitel' Allegations
DS AHEARNE also handled Maurice FISHER, DOB 9/07/51, NIB 37428/65F, under
the pseudonym Samantha MITEL. In 1998 FISHER's controller was Detective
Superintendent Gavin ROBERTSON (now retired). FISHER had a prosecution for
fraud aginst him dropped due to unauthorised and undocumented contact with
ROBERTSON being revealed during the trial.
Gavin ROBERTSON now runs a private detective agency and employs FISHER as a
investigator. FISHER, in the meantime, remained a registered informant to
AHEARNE and MITCHELL, with DEAN now the controller. AHEARNE has
previously assumed the identity of MITCHELL to undertake flagging checks with
NCIS upon FISHER. It is difficult to identify any legitimate reason why AHEARNE
would choose to deliberately mislead NCIS staff.
AHEARNE's actions regarding FISHER were brought into more stark contrast when a
National Crime Squad operation, investigating a drug importation by Nottingham
criminals, was compromised matter. An NCS informant 'Dave ROBBINS', had
participating status to show verbal enthusiasm and to introduce an undercover officer,
posing as a lorry driver. However due to politics between the NCS and Customs the
u/c deployment was cancelled, this put ROBBINS in the difficult position of having to
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tell the importation team that he could no longer provide a driver for the proposed
importation. The Nottingham criminals had made it clear during the operation that
they were funded by a London based syndicate and ROBBINS was told that they
would not be happy. ROBBINS then received a number of threats and damage was
caused to his home.
On 28th September 1999 ROBBINS was contacted, for the first time, by Maurice
FISHER, who arranged to meet ROBBINS in a pub in Nottingham to discuss the
problems with the importation. The meeting was covered by the NCS and prior to
arriving FISHER carried out anti-surveillance manoeuvres and swept the car park of
the pub on a number of occasions. Once at the meeting FISHER took ROBBINS to the
toilets and made him remove his shirt, obviously looking for a 'wire'. FISHER was
now happy that he could talk to ROBBINS and revealed that he was the representative
of the Hunt syndicate, who were funding the importation. Conversation then took
place about the possibility of getting the driver back on board.
After the meeting FISHER again carried out anti-surveillance manoeuvres, having first
watched ROBBINS get into his car. Within an hour of the meeting FISHER rang DS
AHEARNE and gave him details of ROBBINS and his car, evidenced by a contact
sheet submitted by AHEARNE the following day. However the circumstances
surrounding FISHER's meeting with ROBBINS are completely different on the
contact sheet, even stating that the meeting was at a hotel in Essex.
On 29th September 1999 AHEARNE was again in telephone contact with FISHER and
submitted contact sheets bearing no resemblance to the account provided by
ROBBINS regarding the meeting. Also on 29 th September 1999 DC MITCHELL is
shown as conducting a PNC check on the vehicle ROBBINS had driven to and from
the meeting at the same time that AHEARNE would have been on the telephone to
FISHER. On that same day FISHER contacted ROBBINS asking for his middle name
and wife's name so that he could 'check him out'. ROBBINS declined to provide the
details. It is suspected that FISHER would have provided these details to AHEARNE.
DS AHEARNE retired from the MPS in August 2001, but is known to have extensive
contacts throughout the MPS, NCIS, NCS and other law enforcement agencies.
AHEARNE is well networked with IDG core nominals and was present at Jim
DEAN's retirement lunch with many of them. It is suspected by the Tiberius team that
AHEARNE will probably seek employment with Gavin ROBERTSON, thus
perpetuating his links with FISHER and other corrupt nominals, known to
ROBERTSON.
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The Palmer Syndicate
Operation Franica
DC Gary Collins
Special Intelligence Section
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The Palmer Syndicate
Operation Franica
Introduction & objectives
Operation FRANICA was created in July 2000 to run in tandem with an existing NCS
operation code named ALPINE. Operation ALPINE had been a long-term
investigation undertaken by the NCS Penrith Office intended to identify, locate and
seize the criminal assets of John PALMER who had accrued an illicit fortune of
massive proportions from armed robbery, drug trafficking and more famously through
multi-million pound time-share frauds.
The NCS ALPINE team had identified a group of criminal associates from London
who were believed to be laundering some of PALMER's money through their own
network. The initial information identified the launderers as Anthony SIMS, Peter
SIMS, Daniel TOVEY and Anthony BURNS (refer to Appendix B for profile details),
and suggested that they were also involved in the organised importation and
distribution of Cannabis and Cocaine across North East London and Essex with their
main areas of activity being centered on Chigwell and Buckhurst Hill.
BURNS and several of his other associates were already subjects of an S011-SIS
operation codenamed ALMASI which was directed against their own separate
Cannabis, Cocaine & Ecstasy distribution channels.
The ALPINE intelligence was disseminated to the MPS and S011-SIS were tasked
with developing it into a pro-active operation. Operation FRANICA was commenced
by SIS-B Team on 20 th July 2000.
The stated objectives of FRAN ICA at that time were:
(A) to fully identify all members of the syndicate and their associates,
(B) to identify their methods for laundering the proceeds of crime,
(C) to gather evidence in relation to the criminal activities of the group,
(D) to effect the arrest and successful prosecution of those involved.
During the following months it was confirmed that the syndicate were moving a
steady trickle of suspicious cash through a jointly owned bar in Buckhurst hill. There
is no doubt that this money represented some form of criminal proceeds but there was
no clue as to its origin and very few indications that the suspects were at that time
actively engaged in crime.
Some of their associates on the other hand proved to be actively involved in serious
and organised crime on a day-to-day basis and, as a result, the main emphasis of
Operation FRANICA began to focus on these individuals instead.
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The original target group remained relatively inactive for the duration of Operation
FRANICA and the main focus of interest had by then turned to the activities of Danny
SHANKSHAFT and his associates. By that time the geographical area of activity had
also shifted away from Chi ell & Buckhurst Hill to the East London Docklands
corridor.
The original objectives of Operation FRANICA were not achieved to any real degree
except in amassing intelligence, which might prove useful in the future. However, this
was offset by the collateral penetration of the East London underworld and appreciable
disruption to those groups and individuals, who were operating in the same areas as
SHANKSHAFT.
Notes taken from the prison de-briefing of Danny SHANKSHAFT are contained in
Appendix A at the rear of this report.
Personal profile details of the subjects concerned are detailed in alphabetical order in
Appendix B at the rear of this report.
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EGRET
Chronology of Events
It was envisaged at its inception that FRANICA would be a protracted operation,
which should be developed gradually and carefully towards its goals, particularly in
view of other SIS operational commitments at that time. The operation was
commenced by SIS B-Team on 20 th July 2000 with detailed research into the
backgrounds and lifestyles of the four targets named in the ALPINE dissemination.
Emphasis was initially placed on Tony SIMS, who was thought to be most active drug
trafficker of the syndicate members and because of his known links with PALMER.
It was discovered that the syndicate had recently purchased The Queens public house,
63 Queens Road, Buckhurst Hill, IG9 5BU and, after re-fitting the premises, had
changed its name to The T- Bar. It was strongly suspected that part of the syndicate's
money laundering operation involved mixing criminal proceeds with the legitimate
cash passing through the T- Bar.
In view of this two undercover officers were deployed at the commencement of the
operation to infiltrate the bar and gather intelligence in relation to the activities of the
management and their customers. This aspect of the operation was given the code
name LONER.
It transpired that the T – Bar had an almost exclusively criminal clientele and was
being run along the lines of a private members club, with very little cash being paid
over the bar. Although the UC officers were able to provide some useful intelligence,
they were always regarded with a degree of suspicion by the target group and were
never fully accepted by the staff or customers at the bar, right up to the point of their
withdrawal over a year later.
A parallel financial investigation code named BOULDER was undertaken into the
assets and business dealings of the syndicate members and it soon became clear that
each of the targets was enjoying a lifestyle far beyond any legitimate income they may
have had. It was discovered that the syndicate was trying to establish a conduit for
banking large sums of money in Scottish banknotes, which would not arouse
suspicion.
Financial investigation in relation to Tony BURNS revealed that he and Tony SIMS
were in possession of cash assets totaling approximately £500,000. It also revealed
that he had taken his family on a 4 day £2,600 holiday to Jersey with Terrence
AGOMBAR and his family (refer to Appendix B).
Unfortunately, although there was no doubt that the syndicate was laundering
considerable sums of money generated from crime, the investigation was not able to
identify the source of their wealth.
The first months of operation FRANICA were spent building up detailed profiles on
the four main targets and a considerable amount of background information had been
amassed. This historical intelligence showed that BURNS, TOVEY and the SIMS
brothers were accomplished and extremely violent career criminals who had well
established links with the highest echelons of the London criminal underworld.
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In the early stages of FRANICA the operational team's attempts to mount
conventional surveillance on the targets were hampered by a lack of manpower
resulting from the heavy S011 commitments to Operation MAGICIAN – the
Millennium Dome robbery. This situation did not improve until MAGICIAN was
concluded in mid-November of 2000 and more resources became available.
By the end of November Leslie PUMMELL had been identified as the right hand man
for Danny TOVEY. PUMMELL and the main targets were under regular surveillance
and on most days were observed running domestic errands. Most evenings would find
them drinking together at the T — Bar. The syndicate members were clearly not
engaged in any gainful business or trade but there was also a notable lack of evidence
of any criminal activity.
As Christmas approached, Peter SIMS and his family moved from a council flat in
Bermondsey to a large detached house in Bromley. He had been spending long periods
away from his family in Spain and this was though to be putting a strain on his
marriage. He was placed under surveillance but appeared to be taking no part in the
dealings of the syndicate.
During December 2000 Tony SIMS and Leslie PUMMELL were seen visiting
Wanstead Rugby Club at Woodford Bridge on several mornings each week and it was
subsequently discovered that Danny TOVEY had in fact bought the entire property
including the clubhouse and grounds. The club went on to be identified as a meeting
place and training facility for criminals and nightclub doormen.
At roughly the same time a man called Donald ESSEX was identified as a close
associate of the syndicate and a regular customer at the T – Bar. It was later discovered
that ESSEX was related to the SIMS brothers through marriage and had supplied Tony
SIMS with false identity documents in his own name. These documents had allowed
SIMS to obtain a Westminster City Council doorman's license, by concealing his
history of extreme violence.
During January 2001 financial investigation had revealed that Tony BURNS had a
balance of £270,000 in his Abbey national account and had been to Barbados over
Christmas with his family on a holiday costing £12,000. He had since booked two
more holidays which cost him a further £25,000. Meanwhile, although without any
legitimate source of income, Peter SIMS had also taken his family to Barbados over
Xmas at a cost of £13,400 and on his return bought a £19,000 BMW, paying £11,000
towards it in cash. SIMS also booked two more Caribbean holidays for later in the
year at a cost of £26,200.
The outward lack of activity gave the impression that the syndicate was taking a
temporary break from their lives of crime. However on 30th January 2001 intelligence
was received from HMC&E that Danny TOVEY was about to receive a ton of
Cocaine being smuggled in to the UK via Holland. The information stated that the
importer was a Danny SHANKSHAFT and indicated that he had previously been
involved in a venture with some Turkish criminals to import 40 kilos of Heroin.
SHANKSHAFT was subsequently seen to visit the clubhouse at Wanstead Rugby
Club and was placed under surveillance. No more was ever heard about the
consignment of cocaine.
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Danny SHANKSHAFT
SHANKSHAFT was identified as a highly active go-between within the east London
criminal fraternity, regularly driving across the East End several times each day on his
way from one meet to the next. He was also found to be a regular visitor to the
Peacock Gym run by the BOWERS crime family in Canning Town (refer to SIS
Operation DEENSIDE).
Although it was not realised at that time, it was later discovered that SHANKSHAFT
was working as an informant for DS Ray AHEARNE at JX, after being registered on
15 th January 2001 under the pseudonym 'Neil BURROWS'. (The full informant file
for Neil BURROWS has since been passed to SIS B-Team and EO FAHY is currently
preparing an evaluation report on its content)
On 13
th
January 2001 Covert CCTV was deployed covering the clubhouse and car
park at Wanstead Rugby Club. The image product was of marginal quality and
provided very little useful intelligence. This facility was later removed.
On 9
th March 2001 SHANKSHAFT made a brief visit to premises on the Ferry Lane
Industrial Estate in Rainham which revealed a link with the owner, a Robert KHAN.
The nature of SHANKSHAFT's involvement with KHAN, a major drug trafficker,
was not established until much later. Towards the end of March SHANKSHAFT
provided detailed information to his handlers in relation to the criminal activities of
Robert KHAN. It was finally revealed during his in-custody de-briefings in July that
he owed KHAN a considerable sum from an old drug debt and as a result his life had
been threatened (refer to SHANKSHAFT de-briefing notes Appendix A).
During March 2001 SHANKSHAFT provided his handler with a wealth of
information relating to Danny BRAITHWAITE (also known as Danny SYLVESTER),
who at the time was wanted in connection with offences arising from Operation
ALMASI. On 16 th March 2001, while under surveillance, SHANKSHAFT drove to
Barking and was observed meeting BRAITHWAITE. SHANKSHAFT then drove to
Bethnal Green where BRAITHWAITE picked up another car. BRAITHWAITE was
followed and arrested in Roman Road E2. After this incident SHANKSHAFT
virtually ceased to provide his informant handlers with any further useful information.
On 22
nd
March 2001 SHANKSHAFT was followed to suspicious meetings in
Romford and Canning Town. It was noted that he also visited the offices of D J
Private Investigators Ltd at 2 Rixen Road El 2.
On 5 th April 2001 intelligence was received that SHANKSHAFT was in contact with
Tony TRINDER, a violent armed robber and major East London criminal. (refer to
subject profile in Appendix B).
Meanwhile, surveillance had been continuing on TOVEY, BURNS, Les PUMMELL
and Tony SIMS with only domestic activity being observed. Very little of interest had
been occurring at either Wanstead Rugby Club or the T-Bar. In contrast
SHANKSHAFT now suddenly became very busy and all available resources were redeployed
to cover his movements.
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On 3 rd May 2001 he was followed to Redbridge where he met a fat bald man driving a
blue Ford Galaxy. They went together to Barkingside and from there to the park at
Clayhall where they met a third man. The fat bald man was subsequently identified as
Brian SEWELL, frequently employed by SHANKSHAFT to pick up and deliver
consignments of drugs.
On 4th May 2001 SHANKSHAFT was particularly busy and drove to a meeting at the
Peacock Gym. From there he went to a car park in Whipps Cross where he met two
unknown men, who arrived in a small van and a people carrier and some form of
exchange appeared to take place. From Whipps Cross SHANKSHAFT drove to a third
meet at the car park of the Albion public house in Rainham. The following day
SHANK SHAFT was back at the car park of the Albion to meet another unknown male
driving a black Mercedes.
On 7th May 2001 intelligence was received that SHANKSHAFT had negotiated a
future drug transaction with a man later identified as Graham PETHRICK.
On 8th May 2001 DC HENDY from OCG Projects contacted SIS to pass on
information relating to Tony TRINDER who had been arrested in possession of a
sawn-off shotgun as part of Operation REGULATE. He subsequently provided SIS
with the billing for Trinder's mobile phone.
The same day intelligence was received that SHANKSHAFT had been let down on a
parcel that had been late arriving, which was destined for Brian SEWELL. However a
further delivery of drugs was due in the next few days from John OLDFIELD. On 9 th
May 2001 SHANKSHAFT arranged to take OLDFIELD and his wife to view the load
which had now arrived.
Subsequent intelligence showed SHANKSHAFT being very busy trying to place
parcels from the delivery. One of these parcels was to be collected bya man identified
as Geoffrey PETHRICK (refer to subject profile in Appendix B).
Subsequent intelligence from other sources indicated that OLDFIELD and a Billy
STRATFORD were importing a ton of cannabis each month through OLDFIELD's
haulage business.
At lunchtime on 10th May 2001 SHANKSHAFT was followed to Leytonstone High
Road, where he had a long meet with a previously unknown, short, bald man, who
arrived in a silver Vauxhall Vectra. This person was subsequently identified as John
KENDALL. After leaving the meet SHANKSHAFT want to a sauna in Stratford, and
then to the car park of the Albion public house in Rainham. There he met the driver of
a green VW Golf who took a hold-all from his boot and then went with
SHANKSHAFT in his Escort to a nearby locksmiths. They returned to the car park
shortly afterwards and then left separately. The driver of the green Golf was
subsequently identified as Geoffrey PETHRICK (refer to subject profile in Appendix
B).
Geoffrey PETHRICK and his twin brother Graham were researched and identified as
professional and violent armed robbers. At the time they were flagged to HMC&E,
however, as the Customs interest in the twins was not currently active, it was agreed
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that SIS would take over the flag on the PETHRICK brothers for the duration of
Operation FRANICA.
During the morning of 11
th
May 2001 SHANKSHAFT was followed to George's
Diner in Silvertown Way, Canning Town E16 where he met John KENDALL in his
Silver Vectra, and the middle aged & grey haired driver of a silver Mercedes who may
possibly have been Leslie GROOM senior. After leaving the diner SHANKSHAFT
and KENDALL went together to the Peacock Gym in Canning Town and were greeted
outside by Tony BOWERS. Later that afternoon BOWERS, SHANKSHAFT and
KENDALL were seen nearby at the back door of the Peacock public House, in deep
conversation with an unknown fourth man.
On the morning of 14th May 2001SHANKSHAFT was followed to the Peak Fitness
Gym near Dagenham Heathway. About 40 minutes later he walked out into the car
park behind the gym with another man and handed him a package. This man turned
out to be Tony PACITTO, a violent armed robber and close associate of the
PETHRICK brothers. Both men returned to the gym and, shortly afterwards,
SHANKSHAFT drove away. Surveillance stayed with PACITTO who left the gym in
a blue VW Golf an hour later and drove to a car park in Hornchurch. He was
eventually met by the driver of a gold Honda Legend who was later identified as
Edward PEMBERTON. After a brief conversation, there was a two-way exchange of
packages between the two cars, which then began driving towards the exit. The cars
were blocked by the operational team and after a brief struggle both of the drivers
were detained . A search of the vehicles revealed a kilo of powdered amphetamine and
£2,000 cash in the Golf, and a kilo of solid amphetamine in the Honda. Both prisoners
were charged with possession with intent to supply and were remanded in custody the
next day.
On 15 th May 2001 SHANKSHAFT arranged to visit Tony TRINDER in prison,
although these plans were cancelled later as TRINDER was being moved. Intelligence
was also received that SHANKSHAFT had contacted OLDFIELD regarding another
consignment of drugs. On 16th May 2001 intelligence was received that
SHANKSHAFT had ordered amphetamine from OLDFIELD as well as some body
armour.
On 18 th May 2001 John OLDFIELD was followed to 27 Nealms Crescent, Emerson
Park, Hornchurch, a large and expensive detached house undergoing major
renovations. The premises were found to be a newly purchased property that the
OLDFIELD family were planning to move into later in the year. OLDFIELD &
SHANKSHAFT later met in Hornchurch at lunchtime and SEWELL visited
SHANKSHAFT at home later that afternoon.
On 19th May 2001 SHANK SHAFT and SEWELL entered into negotiations for the
supply of 30 kilos of cannabis resin, which SHANKSHAFT was offering at £850 per
kilo. Later that day SHANKSHAFT & SEWELL drove to Hornchurch and took
delivery of a large consignment of cannabis resin from John OLDFIELD. The
transaction is believed to have taken place in a small, secluded car park behind some
shops, opposite the Cricketers Arms in Hornchurch High Street. SEWELL is believed
to have driven the load away in his Blue Fiat via Lyndhurst Avenue, while
SHANKSHAFT and others stood look-out.
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On 21 st May 2001 intelligence revealed that SHANKSHAFT was trying to ascertain
how much cash was contained in the black boxes that were carried by postmen. An
associate of his called Dave identified Jeff SMART, who had worked for the Post
Office and would be able to find out.
Towards the end of May 2001 intelligence sources revealed that SHANKSHAFT was
engaged in a number of failed cannabis importation attempts. His associates in these
attempts were Steve RADFORD, Terry DALLINSON, Graham PETHRICK and Brian
SEWELL.
On 31 St May 2001 a source known to DI Gary KIBBEY (SIS) provided the following
intelligence:
`Danny TOVEY has asked David KENT to find out how SYLVESTER was
arrested'
It is believed that this refers to the arrest of Danny BRAITHWAITE on 16th March
2001 and may indicate some suspicion about SHANKSHAFT's involvement. It was
assumed that KENT must have unknown contacts in the police service which were not
available to TOVEY. KENT has been identified as David James KENT 6, Oakland
Close, Buckhurst Hill, Essex, a stockbroker, who was arrested as part of Operation
Almasi. He is a known associate of TOVEY and many of the DEENSIDE subjects.
Early on 4th June 2001 information was received which indicated that SHANKSHAFT
intended to take delivery of a gun sometime during that day. Armed surveillance was
mounted at his house and, during the course of the afternoon, he was followed around
the Hornchurch area in his car while he went about various domestic errands. At
5.55pm he visited a previously unknown address at 173 Lodge Avenue, Romford,
leaving the address empty handed a few minutes later. Then SHANKSHAFT visited
the Cricketers Arms in Hornchurch and picked up a small boy, possibly his son, before
driving to Barking where he was lost for a time. SHANKSHAFT was picked up again,
now alone, in the area of Canary Wharf where he met an IC/3 male who had been
waiting in a dark blue Peugeot 205. After a lengthy conversation the IC/3 went to a
house in Byng Street, Isle Of Dogs and then returned to SHANKSHAFT who drove
off alone. It was understood at the time that the IC/3 had been approached to provide a
gun but was not able to get one at short notice.
The address in Byng Street is thought to have been that of David ARMSTRONG, an
enforcer for the BOWERS family who was shot and wounded a couple of months
earlier (refer to Operation DEENSIDE). The IC/3 male is thought to be 'Rob' who is
referred to in the de-briefing notes in Appendix B. SHANKSHAFT then drove to a
large waste disposal yard situated at 100 Carpenters Road, Stratford, which may be
connected to Leslie GROOM.
On the morning of 5 th June 2001, while under surveillance SHANKSHAFT was
visited at his home by two men. One was John KENDALL and the other was later
identified as Terry SMITH. They left soon afterwards and walked away together
towards Elm Park, followed a few minutes later by SHANKSHAFT carrying a holdall.
He met up with KENDALL & SMITH, who were standing by a BMW that had been
parked a few streets away. SHANKSHAFT placed the holdall inside the BMW,
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SMITH then got in and drove the car away. SHANKSHAFT and KENDALL walked
around the corner, where they got into KENDALL's Vauxhall Vectra and also drove
off.
The BMW was followed for some distance and was then stopped by armed officers.
The holdall inside the car was found to contain an Uzi sub machinegun, complete with
a silencer and approximately 380 rounds of 9mm ammunition. In the boot of the car
they found a Yupiteru VT-225 radio scanner and a detailed map of Cambridge city
center. SMITH and SHANKSHAFT were arrested and both men were charged with
possession of a prohibited weapon.
SMITH and SHANKSHAFT were both remanded in custody. During interview
SMITH had claimed that SHANKSHAFT had put the holdall into the BMW and that
he had believed it contained printing plates for forged banknotes. SMITH and
SHANKSHAFT were both being held in Belmarsh and SHANKSHAFT was assaulted
and put under considerable pressure to corroborate SMITH's story. Threats were also
made against SHANKSHAFT's wife and children. Towards the end of July
SHANKSHAFT agreed to turn Queens Evidence and underwent a two day debriefing,
notes of which are contained in Appendix A.
Although surveillance continued for a while in relation to BURNS, who was thought
to be moving to Spain, Operation FRANICA effectively ceased in September 2001. A
new operation code named STOPWATCH was created to continue developing
intelligence in relation to the activities of John OLDFIELD, Billy STRATFORD,
Robert KHAN and Brian SEWELL although little progress seems to have been made
with this.
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Appendix A
Notes from the De-briefing
Of
Danny SHANKSHAFT
Smith and Kendall
Terry SMITH and John KENDALL carried out an armed robbery in 1987 during
which SMITH was knocked off of a motorbike by a Gas van and has walked with a
limp ever since. Terry and Lenny SMITH are brothers. They committed an armed
robbery 18 months ago at Silvertown Tidal Basin that was featured on Crimewatch.
On the day that Terry SMITH was arrested with the Uzi sub machine-gun he had
previously handled the weapon without gloves.
John KENDALL has been seeking to make new contacts since his release from prison.
SHANKSHAFT has introduced him to Peter PACITTO and the PETHRICK brothers.
PACITTO and one of the PETHERICK twins were arrested together on an armed
robbery a long time ago. John KENDALL intends to resume committing armed
robberies.
KENDALL originally intended to set himself up as an Amphetamine dealer and
ordered a batch of 'Speed' from the PETHRICK brothers through Danny
SHANKSHAFT. The Amphetamine was delivered by one of the PETHRICK brothers
who was driving a BMW convertible. SHANKSHAFT took it home and got Terry
DALLINSON to test it. DALLINSON is also known as 'Bodge!' or 'The Chemist'.
The batch was of very poor quality and was subsequently returned to the PETHRICKs.
The Uzi Purchase
John KENDALL had originally asked Danny SHANKSHAFT to get him the Uzi sub
machine-gun and two .38" revolvers. The weapons were needed for an armed robbery
he was planning with Terry SMITH.
After SHANKSHAFT had bought the Uzi, KENDALL and SMITH turned up at his
house. SMITH wanted to leave the gun at the house but SHANKSHAFT refused to
allow this. SMITH told him to bring the gun to him at St Nicholas Avenue around the
corner. SHANKSHAFT carried the gun to the car and placed it in the passenger side
before being given the cash for it.
Danny SHANKSHAFT made an approach to the following individual who frequents
the Peacock Gym – 'Noddy' IC/1 male, 30-40 yrs, F603, slim build, swept-back black
hair, wears a silver wristwatch. He trains at the gym three mornings each week and
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rides a Suzuki motorcycle. 'Noddy' introduced SHANKSHAFT to 'Rob' who was
there with him at the time –
`Rob' IC/3 male, 30-40 yrs, F603, chubby build, skinhead, originally from
Birmingham. Has prominent front teeth – nicknamed 'Ugly' and 'Walrus' – but not
used to his face. 'Rob' is an active Heroin & Cocaine supplier who mentioned having
threatened someone with a handgun (a `yogga') to recover a drugs debt. He drives a
small dark blue Peugeot (possibly a 106) with a combination coded ignition system.
He also has a blue Ford XR2I with red stripes on the bodywork.`Rob' stated that he
could provide the Uzi and the revolvers but the deal had to be done elsewhere because
Tony and Martin BOWERS will not allow any criminal activity to take place at the
gym.
`Rob' took SHANKSHAFT to a flat in Islington to collect the weapons but when they
arrived 'Rob's contact had been unable to get the guns. 'Rob' and SHANKSHAFT
later met at a café near Hackney marshes and went from there to an address belonging
`Rob's former crime partner, a man called 'Elvis' or some similar sounding name.
`Elvis' produced the Uzi sub-machine-gun but said that he could not get hold of the
two revolvers. He stated that he had been in possession of the Uzi for two years and
that it had never been used. SHANKSHAFT paid £2,500 for the Uzi.
Having bought the Uzi for £2,500 SHANKSHAFT sold it to Terry SMITH for the
same price because SHANKSHAFT wanted SMITH to settle a major problem for him.
Robert KHAN — Drug Debt
ROBERT KHAN, who has threatened to kill him if it is not paid-off, is holding
SHANKSHAFT responsible for a £100,000 drug debt. SHANKSHAFT wanted
SMITH to 'persuade' KHAN to drop the claim. The circumstances of this dispute are
as follows –
Some time prior to June 1999 Danny SHANKSHAFT was employed by Terry and
Leslie GROOM to deliver a vanload of cannabis to Yorkshire. SHANKSHAFT took a
hired Transit van to McDonalds in Canning Town where it was loaded with the
cannabis. He then drove it to Bradford and delivered the cannabis to a warehouse on
an industrial estate near to the Bradford Bulls rugby stadium. Afterwards
SHANKSHAFT drove back to London and delivered the van to a yard belonging to
the GROOM brothers near to Bromley-By-Bow.
In June 1999 GROOM brothers paid Danny SHANKSHAFT £500 to drive for them
again. He had just taken possession of 100 kilos of cannabis at a location outside
London when he was stopped & arrested by police. Also arrested were Terry
GROOM, Les GROOM and Mark WRIGHT. All of the defendants pleaded not guilty
at Snares brook Crown Court and were subsequently acquitted. The GROOM brothers
blamed SHANKSHAFT for losing the cannabis, which belonged to a Dutch supplier.
Apparently Robert KHAN bought the 'debt' for the loss of the cannabis. KHAN went
to school with SHANKSHAFT and owns a freight yard in West Ferry Lane, Rainham,
Essex. KHAN has reputedly carried out at least one murder and is also alleged to have
I
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shot Billy JASPER. KHAN informed SHANKSHAFT that he was being held
responsible for the loss of the consignment and £100,000 was required to settle the
matter. Evidently SHANKSHAFT pleaded that he did not have the money to pay the
debt but was told to re-mortgage his house otherwise he would be killed.
In March of last year SHANKSHAFT acquired the right-to-buy his father-in-law's
council house for £20,000. After the property was re-sold for £100,000 the £80,000
profit was split equally between SHANKSHAFT's wife and her brother Terry
DIXON.
Terry DIXON is married to the sister of Tony TRINDER. TRINDER, who is on
remand in Pentonville Prison for firearms offences, found out about the sale of the
house and informed KHAN that SHANKSHAFT had made £40,000 out of the deal.
KHAN has been working with John OLDFIELD who used to own the Cricketers Pub
in Hornchurch. John OLDFIELD has heard about SHANKSHAFT's debt and has
advised him to pay up soon before KHAN decides to kill him.
In April 2001 OLDFIELD had £15,000 in Bank Of Jersey notes which he asked
SHANKSHAFT to launder for him. SHANKSHAFT paid it into his account at
Barclays in Romford and returned £15,000 in Bank of England notes to
OLDFIELD.OLDFIELD is currently buying a new house in Emmerson Park.
SHANKSHAFT gave him a cheque for £30,000 to use for the deposit – this being
residual money from the house sale. OLDFIELD gave SHANKSHAFT £30,000 in
cash to pay back to KHAN as part of the drugs debt. SHANKSHAFT also gave
KHAN £3,000 he had made through gambling. Evidently the debt currently stands at
£70,000 still owing, with increasing interest.
Oldfield and Sewell
SHANKSHAFT recommended & introduced Brian `Solly' SEWELL to OLDFIELD
as a driver for his drug loads. On two occasions in February & May 2001 SEWELL
picked up 150 kilo loads of Cannabis from the car park opposite The Cricketers in
Hornchurch and delivered it to Hull and Bradford for OLDFIELD. Each time
SEWELL has returned a week later with £150,000 that has been given to
SHANKSHAFT and then passed on to OLDFIELD. SHANKSHAFT has been given a
£1,000 introduction fee each time. John OLDFIELD and Billy STRATFORD are
importing a ton of Cannabis per month.
David CAWARD
In 1998 Danny SHANKSHAFT was regularly moving large quantities drugs for David
CAWARD (aka CAWOOD, CAYWARD). Much of this property originated from
deals made at the Peacock Gym in Canning Town. Another location where criminal
deals are regularly negotiated is a 'card school', which is held at a pre-fabricated
building in Victoria Dock Road, near to the Gym.
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Later, SHANKSHAFT also started making regular delivery runs of cannabis resin for
KAYWOOD using a white VW van marked 'D & P Electricians' on the sides. Every
Sunday for about 5-6 months SHANKSHAFT would drive to a stonemason's yard
which belonged to a man called HOGAN whom he knew from when they had both
been members of the West Ham 'Inter City Firm'. At HOGAN's yard SHANKSHAFT
would meet a man called 'Wossell' or 'Wozzell' and collect cardboard boxes already
packed with 50-60 nine ounce bars of Cannabis resin.
SHANKSHAFT would then drive to a Harvester Restaurant near Gants Hill where he
would meet a maroon coloured Hackney Cab and load the boxes into the back of
it.The deliveries on behalf of CAWARD ended when the lorry driver who had been
bringing the Cannabis into the UK was arrested in France for drug trafficking.
Dave CA WARD approached SHANKSHAFT to find people who could sell drugs on
his behalf. SHANKSHAFT told him that Brian 'Sony' SEWELL 'could move puff for
nine and a quarter to nine and a half, and as a result SEWELL was employed.
CAWARD arranged some sort of deal with Steve PARSLEY who is a bookie who
lives near to Leslie GROOM. He is described as F510, fat build, 25-30 years, round
face, light mousy short hair, drives a new red Rover.
SHANKSHAFT subsequently went to meet PARSLEY at Clayhall park, and 'Sully'
SEWELL was sent to meet an associate of PARSLEY's called 'The Bus' who drives a
Ford Galaxy.
Whatever the deal was it was evidently successfully carried out as SHANKSHAFT
was later paid £1 250 for handling the introductions.
Informant Registration
In January 2001 Danny SHANKSHAFT went to Ilford Police Station and offered to
provide information to DC POLLARD. He was subsequently registered as an
informant under the pseudonym 'Neil BURROWS'
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Appendix B
Subject Personal Profiles
(alphabetical order)
Christopher Terence AGOMBAR
H/a – 203 Marks Road, Romford, Essex
H/a – 5 William Pike House, Waterloo Estate
DOB – 09/05/1974
CRO – 196623/90G
IC/1, F509, black hair
VIOLENT – WEAPONS – ASSAULT/POLICE
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles
N/K
Terrence AGOMBAR
H/a – 3 Gainsborough Square, Bexleyheath, Kent DA6 8BU.
DOB – 24/02/1963
CRO – 16974/80W
Wife – Tracy AGOMBAR
Convictions for robbery & kidnapping.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles
N/K
83 SECRET
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`Tommy' Thomas James AGOMBAR
H/a – 9 Warwick Bench, Guildford, Surrey GU1 3SZ.
DOB – 17/10/1960
CRO – 25221/84L
1C/1, F510
Convictions for theft and MAT offences.
Wife – Jennifer AGOMBAR
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles
N/K
Anthony BOWERS
See Profile in Bowers Syndicate Appendix A
Anthony BURNS
H/a – 67 Peel Avenue, Ilford, Essex
Postal drop – 66 Bonner Street, Bethnal Green E2 OQP.
DOB – 02/02/1963 – Bethnal Green
CRO – N/T – previous conviction for ABH.
IC/1, F511
National Insurance – NA574337D
Driver number – BURNS/601023/T99ZM
Wife – Jane Marie BURNS – nee RAY
• Previous employment as a stockbroker with Cantor Fitzgerald International.
• Suspected by SO8 of laundering proceeds of armed robberies during 1991 while a
director of Cedar Street Holdings Plc – not charged.
• Co-owner and manager of The T-Bar in Buckhurst Hill.
• Director of TBS Management Consultants Ltd – Reg No. 03700966
• Barclays current account – 374280862012008.
• Holds a Boxing Board of Control Promoters License.
• Also an associate of ex-Flying Squad DS John TURNBULL-SIMONGTON who
arranges doorman for licensed premises in the Buckhust Hill & Chigwell areas.
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Previous phone numbers
0208 551 3791
Previous vehicles
TBS7 – Silver Mercedes
Daniel Peter BRAITHWAITE
Also known as Danny SYLVESTER
Alias Danny REED
(No details currently held at SIS)
• Arrested 16/03/2001 in Roman Road E2 for fraud offences arising from Operation
ALMASI.
• BRAITHWAITE had been wanted for some considerable time and had been living
in Spain prior to his arrest.
Terrence William DALLINSON
H/a – 11 John Barnes Walk, Stratford El 5 4SX.
DOB – 26/02/1939 – Homerton
CRO – ??230156K
IC/1, F511, stocky build, tattoo right arm, arrogant personality.
Wife – Josephine DALLINSON.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles
M467YAV – Blue Fiat Punto
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Donald Carl ESSEX
H/a – 7 Dickens Rise, Chigwell IG7 6PA.
DOB – 19/09/1959 – Malta
CRO – 190781/76Q
IC/1, F508, scar on nose.
Wife – Martine Maureen ESSEX.
• Frequents The T-Bar in Buckhurst Hill
• Associate of Danny TOVEY & believed to be brother-in-law to the SIMS brothers.
• Thought to be be involved in the distribution of drugs on behalf of their syndicate.
• Suspected of being a drug supplier around various West End nightclubs, has
worked as a registered doorman at Stringfellows.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles
M361TMC – Mercedes C220
J96AUG – Blue BMW
Terence Leslie GROOM
H/a – 44a Gore Road, London E9.
DOB – ?3/09/1959
CRO – 1 16358/73B
Convictions include criminal damage, threatening behaviour, affray.
• Declared occupation – commercial vehicle trader.
• IC/1, F508, receding light brown hair, blue eyes, scar lower right leg.
• Historically involved with Danny SHANKSHAFT in drug trafficking.
Intelligence from 2000 suggested that GROOM was importing unspecified drugs
which were being stored on barges moored opposite the Anchor & Hope pub in
Anchor & Hope Lane.
• His father is Leslie GROOM, a respected East End criminal who is associated with
the BOWERS brothers, John PALMER and John OLDFIELD.
Previous phone numbers
0208 986 5267
0208 508 9029
01708 781 180
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Previous vehicles
R23CGU – Silver Mercedes
John KENDALL
H/a – Flat 103 Chantry Way, Rainham, Essex RM 13 8PX.
DOB – 23/02/1951
CRO – 78464/68E
VIOLENT – WEAPONS – ESCAPER – FIREARMS
Convictions for assault, firearms, armed robbery, theft, bail offences.
IC/1, F505, short, bald, slim/thin build, wears glasses.
Wife – Lorraine KENDALL
Son – Bill KENDALL
• Conviction for shooting a security guard during an armed robbery.
• Released from prison on 09/04/2001 after serving part of 18 year sentence for
armed robbery and a previous escape from Gartree Prison by helicopter.
• On release from prison KENDALL immediately began setting himself up as an
Amphetamine dealer and started planning armed robberies with Terry SMITH.
• Close associate of Danny SHANKSHAFT.
• Frequents the Peacock Gym.
Previous phone numbers
01708 630 061
07960 061 380
01708521230
Previous vehicles
N54LGC – Silver Vauxhall Vectra
Robert Edward KHAN
H/a – 3 Brockton Close, Romford, Essex RM 1 4EQ.
DOB – 02/02/1965 – Forest gate.
CRO – 56910/83Z.
Convictions for deception, ABH, handling & possession of Cocaine.
IC/1, F600, heavy build, dark brown eyes, cropped greying dark brown hair, tattoos
both arms.
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Wife – Hayley R KHAN.
• Business interest – Director of Lovind Fuels Ltd, Cambridge House, 27 Cambridge
Park, Wanstead El 1.
• Other premises at the Albright Industrial estate, Ferry Lane, Romford, Essex RM1
4EQ.
• Associate of Tony BOWERS.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles
N/K
Samuel John Henry OLDFIELD
Nickname – Big John
H/a – The Cricketers p/h, 64-68 High Street, Hornchurch RM 12 4UW .
H/a – 27 Nealms Crescent, Emerson Park, Hornchurch RM11 2PX.
DOB – 23/11/1954 – Plaistow
CRO – 142365/75H
Prison number – L11378
Convictions – handling X 7, theft of lorry loads, possession of 196 kilos of Cannabis
with intent to supply (in France).
National insurance – YW03981C.
IC/1, F509, short dark brown hair, stocky build.
Wife – Kerry Ann OLDFIELD nee GILL
Son – John William OLDFIELD
Daughter – Danielle OLDFIELD
• Believed to be related through marriage to John HOLMS CRO -81604/75N.
• Publican and owner of a haulage company.
• Intelligence has suggest that OLDFIELD is importing a ton of Cannabis each
month with a Billy STRATFORD.
• Director of Speed Transport Ltd.
• Also believed to have major interest in Spectrans UK Ltd, unit 7, Ensine Industrial
Estate, Arterial Road, Purfleet.
• Close associate of and supplier of drugs to Danny SHANKSHAFT.
• Believed to be a business partner of Robert KHAN.
• The following were part of a group of 47 London criminals who flew together to
Las Vegas from Gatwick via Houston Texas on 10/11/1999 – Tony BOWERS,
Martin BOWERS, Paul BOWERS, Lewis NICHOLL, Roy HILDER, John
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PALMER, Gary BROOKS, John OLDFIELD, Leslie GROOM, Jonathon
TURNER, Joe ASHMAN, Tommy WISBEY, David KENT.
Previous phone numbers
07752 974 945
01708 443 202
07961 305 048
01708 442 168
07752 974 975
Previous vehicles
R19JWO – Silver BMW 318i (daughter)
S4OKEL – Silver Mercedes E300 (wife)
L269LHJ – Grey Ford Fiesta van
R547UMJ – Blue Escort convertible
M592HPE – Blue Mercedes C180
`Tony' Anthony PACITTO
H/a – 45 Teviot Avenue, Averley, South Ockenden, Essex RM15 4QD.
DOB – 19/06/1961 – Paddington
PNCID – 83/161319J
Convictions for armed robbery & possession of drugs with intent to supply.
IC/1, athletic build, black hair
• Declared occupation – scaffolder.
• Associate of Christopher McCORMACK.
• Close associate of and believed drug runner for the PETHRICK brothers.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles
T795MLL – Blue VW Golf
John PALMER
1-1/a – currently serving prison sentence.
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DOB – 03/04/1950
CRO — 1348431/72M
• Top echelon figure in UK organised crime and former member of the Brinks-Mat
robbery team.
• PALMER has amassed a small fortune through a criminal career which
encompasses armed robbery, drug trafficking and multi-million pound property
fraud for which he was recently convicted.
• PALMER owns a considerable amount of property in the Canary Islands
particularly in Tenerife.
• Close associate of Kenneth NOYE with whom he is believed to have taken out a
£40,000 contract in 1996 to have a rival criminal called Edward WILLIAMS
killed.
• The following were part of a group of 47 London criminals who flew together to
Las Vegas from Gatwick via Houston Texas on 10/11/1999 – Tony BOWERS,
Martin BOWERS, Paul BOWERS, Lewis NICHOLL, Roy HILDER, John
PALMER, Gary BROOKS, John OLDFIELD, Leslie GROOM, Jonathon
TURNER, Joe ASHMAN, Tommy WISBEY, David KENT.
• PALMER is also an associate of John FLEMMING, another of the Brinks-Mat
robbery team.
Previous phone numbers
07747 656 458
07747 656 451
Previous vehicles
S599RNO – Jaguar
Edward PEMBERTON
H/a – 6 Arden House, Herne Bay, Kent.
DOB – 10/04/1946 – Aveley
CRO – 42617/63H
Previous conviction for possession with intent to supply 85 kilos of Amphetamine.
1C/1, tall/heavy build, balding brown hair
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles
G786VMM – Gold Honda Legend 2.7
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Geoffrey Timothy PETHRICK
(Twin brother of Graham PETHRICK
H/a – 14 Hawthorns, Woodford Green IG8 ORN
DOB – 28/11/1958
CRO – 161952/83A
Convictions for armed robbery, possession of firearms X 3.
Partner – Gemma Anne EARL.
• Business interests in the Top House p/h, Aveley, Essex.
• Arrested in 1983 during robbery on Security Express van together with his twin
Graham PETHRICK and Tony PACITTO. The three are now know to have set up
their own Amphetamine production and supply network.
• Associate of the ARIF family and Jimmy COLEMAN.
Previous phone numbers
07950 133 609
Previous vehicles
R913VTW – Green VW Golf
L144VRW – Green Peugeot (girlfriend)
R421GEV – Blue Yamaha motorcycle
Graham Donald PETHRICK
(Twin brother of Geoffrey PETHRICK)
Alias – James RIGBY
H/a – 3 Orsett House, High Road, Orsett Village, Essex.
DOB – 28/11/1958
CRO – 151060/75J
WEAPONS – DRUGS
• Arrested in 1983 during robbery on Security Express van together with his twin
Geoffrey PETHRICK and Tony PACITTO.
• The three are now know to have set up their own Amphetamine production and
supply network.
• Believed to control Unit 8, Marsh Way, Fairview Industrial Estate, Rainham,
Essex. Possibly a scaffolding company.
• Graham has served 3 years in Belgium for possession of 61 kilos of Amphetamine.
• Associate of the ARIF family and Jimmy COLEMAN.
Previous phone numbers
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07960 096 573
Previous vehicles
R624XDA – Blue BMW 328i
Leslie PUMIVIIELL
H/a – 1 Foremark Close, Ilford
DOB – 06/06/1956
CRO – 134139/82N
IC/1, short fat build. Short brown hair.
• Right hand man for Danny TOVY and will meet with him on most days.
• Frequents The T-Bar in Buckhurst Hill and also an associate of Tony BURNS and
Tony SIMS. Believed to be involved in the day to day distribution of drugs on
behalf of their syndicate.
• Also regularly frequents Wanstead Rugby Club.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles
E986YGJ – Black Saab
Steve RADFORD
H/a — 13 Regents Place, Loughton Essex IG 10 4PP.
DOB — 21/01/1971
CRO — 237968/96L
Convictions include manufacturing counterfeit currency.
IC/1, F510, stocky build, blue eyes, brown cropped hair.
Partner — Miss Louise WRIXON.
• An associate of Danny TOVEY and previously a target of SIS Operation
ALMASI.
• Frequents Wanstead Rugby Club
• Spends considerable periods of time in Spain organising transit of loads of
Cannabis into the UK.
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Previous phone numbers
07949 853 918
07960 666 244
07949 462 617
Previous vehicles
T198DUF – Silver Mercedes sports coupe.
Brian SEWELL
Nickname – Solly
Alias – Stephen KAYE
H/a – Flat 41Trinity Gardens, Canning Town E16 4QD.
DOB – 31/05/1951 – Plaistow
CRO – 56341/69P
DRUGS
Convictions for possession with intent to supply 600 Ecstasy tablets & Cocaine,
served 6 years.
IC/1, F509, bald, very fat.
Wife – Georgina SEWELL
• Driver for Danny SHANKSHAFT. Moves consignments of drugs around London
and the rest of the UK.
• Has previously associated with John TIBBS & Dugan ARIF.
Previous phone numbers
07960 482 915
0171 511 7961
Previous vehicles
S351NOH – Blue Ford Galaxy
X6620GT – Blue Fiat Punto
`Danny' Daniel William SHANKSHAFT
H/a – 205 Warren Drive, Hornchurch
DOB – 09/12/1963 – Stratford
CRO – 6128/78U
Convictions for burglary, theft & TDA.
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IC/1, F510, medium/stocky build, short dark brown hair, blue eyes, 3" scar left cheek,
tattoo 'Mum & Dad' left arm, tattoo 'West Ham' right arm.
National insurance – NS870117A.
• A prolific middle man with diverse contacts throughout the East London
underworld and capable of setting up the purchase or supply of virtually any illegal
commodity.
• Historically involved with Terry GROOM in drug trafficking. As of 2001 was
distributing large Cannabis deliveries for John OLDFIELD.
• Close associate of John KENDALL, John OLDFIELD, Tony TRINDER and
members of the BOWERS organisation.
• Frequents the Peacock Gym, Canning Town.
• Uses Brian SEWELL to arrange negotiations and make deliveries.,
• Registered to DS Ray AHERNE under the pseudonym 'Neil BURROWS'.
• Currently remanded in custody HMP Belmarsh for supplying an Uzi sub machine
gun with ammunition and silencer to Terry SMITH.
Previous phone numbers
07957 248 740
07950 156 240
07950 156 241
07950 141 857
Previous vehicles
M784EBJ – White Ford Escort
Anthony SIMS
H/a – 205 Collier Row Lane, Romford, Essex RM5 3JA.
DOB – 13/09/1961
CRO – 25361/81V -British Passport – 019399872
National insurance – WM874 309A
Wife – Karen Edith SIMS
• Declared occupation – Boxing Promoter.
• Britannia Building Society mortgage account – 021216035
• Britannia Building Society saving account – 072800818
• Close associate of John PALMER, and has traveled abroad with him.
• Co-owner and manager of The T-Bar in Buckhurst Hill.
• On 19/04/1986 while working as a bouncer at a club in Cricklewood with his
brother Peter SIMS was involved in a fight with a Daniel FRITH who was stabbed
to death. Both SIMS brothers charged with murder, GBH with intent & offensive
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weapon. Acquitted on murder & GBH, sentenced to 12 months con-dis for the
offensive weapon.
• Convicted in 1990 for throwing Ammonia in the face of a police officer &
sentenced to 4 years.
• Frequents Jimmy Mac's Gym in Camden High St.
• Holds Boxing Board of Control Managers and Trainers licenses.
• Has been working as a licensed doorman at west End clubs using I/D supplied in
the name of Donald ESSEX.
• SIMS wealthy lifestyle includes regular expensive family holidays in the tropics
and reflects the extent of his illegal income.
Previous phone numbers
01708 749 940
0970 479 935
Previous vehicles
TAW] 03H – Grey Landrover Discovery
P138JNO – White Suzuki Swift
Peter SIMS
H/a – 27 Alscot Way, Southwark SE15.
H/a – 1 57 Southborough Lane, Bromley, Kent BR2 8AP.
DOB – 31/07/1964.
CRO – 139711/85N.
Wife Jaqueline SIMS (30/08/1961).
Daughters Scarlet & Summer SIMS (twins – 29/12/1995).
• Appears to a relatively dormant member of the syndicate.
• On 19/04/1986 while working as a bouncer at a club in Cricklewood with his
brother Tony SIMS was involved in a fight with a Daniel FRITH who was stabbed
to death. Both SIMS brothers charged with murder, GBH with intent & offensive
weapon. Acquitted on murder & GBH, sentenced to 12 months con-dis for the
offensive weapon.
• Listed as a director of Ring-Guard Security, trading from 31 Alscot Way SE1
(mother's H/a).
• Holds Boxing Board of Control Trainers and Seconds licenses.
• Barclays Bank account – A262692 – sort code 20 80 57.
• SIMS wealthy lifestyle reflects the extent of his illegal income and includes
regular expensive family holidays in the tropics.
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Previous phone numbers
0208 467 5443
Previous vehicles
VIB80 – Grey Range Rover
R712MGN – Black Chrysler Voyager Estate
M12PJS – Purple VW Golf
D565YLB – Blue BMW 318i
W4590GX – Black BMW 318i
X195DGX – Silver Mercedes people carrier
Terrence George Michael SMITH
H/a – N/K (Currently in custody)
DOB – 12/02/1959
CRO – 31179/72J
Previous convictions for £20,000 armed robbery, escaping from custody.
VIOLENT
Prison number – B59625
• Arrested with Danny SHANKSHAFT after being supplied with an Uzi sub
machine gun, silencer & ammunition. It is believed that this weapon and two
handguns were to be used in a robbery that SMITH was planning with John
KENDALL.
• Currently on remand in custody HMP Belmarsh and awaiting trial for this matter.
Previous phone numbers
N/K
Previous vehicles
W248YAR – black BMW 328ci coupe
William Steven SPEAREN
H/a – 29 Shakespeare Road, London E17 6AS
DOB – 27/04/1966
CRO – 176300/83W
IC/1, F603, heavy build, tattoos both arms.
•
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• SPEAREN has a previous arrest record for possession of Cannabis and a CS gas
spray.
• His declared occupation is as a doorman at various West End clubs, although his
lifestyle indicates a considerably higher income.
• He makes frequent trips abroad, particularly to Hong Kong and Thailand.
• In June 2001 had £23,000 in his Halifax account.
• Flew to Brussels with Danny TOVEY on 21/06/2001.
Previous phone numbers
0973 550 348
Previous vehicles
N/K
Daniel Paul TOVEY
20 Chigwell Rise, Chigwell, Essex IG7 6AB.
DOB – 15/07/1963
CRO – 21087/85Z
• Drug trafficker, Boxing promoter.
• Co-owner and manager of The T-Bar in Buckhurst Hill.
• Owner of Wanstead Rugby Club as of November 2000.
• Business partner of Tony SIMS and Tony BURNS, involved I money laundering
on behalf of John PALMER. Historically Involved in class A & B drug
importation with Jimmy HOLMS and at one point was owed £60,000 by him.
• Thought to be interested in buying the Epping Forest Country Club.
• Frequents Jimmy Mac's Gym in Camden High St.
• Holds a Boxing Board of Control Trainers license.
Previous phone numbers
07939 377 511
Previous vehicles
W748NEN – Green Fiat Punto
V509KMA – Skoda Octavia
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`Tony' Anthony TRINDER
Nickname – Bunter
H/a – 46 Edwards Way, Hutton, Shenfield, Essex CRMI3 I BT.
DOB – 25/02/1960
CRO – 141943/76F
Prison number – FT9835
Convictions for possession of a firearm, robbery X 3, deception, burglary, TDA &
ABH.
IC/1, F510, heavy build, blue eyes, short fair curly hair
• Believed to carry a gun most of the time & recently arrested in possession of a
sawn-off shotgun.
• A nightclub drug supplier with his main activity centered on the Epping Forest
Country Club, Charlie Chan's & Shades.
Previous phone numbers
01277 230 367
07950 111 024
Previous vehicles
N/K
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The Kean Syndicate
Operation Zloty
Associated Operations
DC Colin Kennedy
Internal Investigations Command
SECRET 99
SECRET
The Kean Syndicate
Background
Operation Zloty is a long-term intelligence development operation designed to assess the current
threat that organised criminals and their associations with serving and retired police officers pose
to the MPS, other law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system in general. It's
objectives are outlined as follows:
(i) Identify the core members of any network operating within the MPS
(ii) Determine the extent of these networks
(iii) Identify the controllers of these networks
(iv) Identify previous and current penetrations of the MPS
(v) Assess the long-term threat towards the MPS
The analysis of intelligence available indicates that a persistent network continues to thrive within
the MPS, particularly the Northeast London area. This network is familiar to the DPS and a
number of it's core members have already been the subject of a successful DPS operation,
namely 'Greyhound' and are currently awaiting trial on 8 th April 2002:
• Robert Kean (drug trafficker)
• Martin Morgan (serving detective constable)
• Paul Goscomb (serving detective constable)
• Declan Costello (serving detective constable)
These subjects have been effectively and consistently undermining the MPS with virtual
immunity for the last ten years and were identified during the course of two previous DPS
intelligence gathering operations, `Othona' and 'Centaur'. A significant number of operations
have been conducted to either monitor, or indeed dismantle this network, however all have, as a
general rule, failed. Below is a brief synopsis of these operations:
Operation Othona — 1993
This operation remains secret, but can be best described as a pan London intelligence gathering
exercise in order to prove or disprove the existence of corruption, and if identified, its true extent.
Othona, proved to be the pre-cursor of the CIB Intelligence Cell and the introduction of
permanent covert resources available to CIB.
Operation Butterman — 1994
The 'Lewandowski' intelligence:
Former DC Ray Lewandowski reported that Morgan and initially Sean McElhatton had stolen a
kilo of cocaine, which they hoped to sell for between £12,000 – £15,000 and had approached the
proprietor of a café, called the 'Sportsman Club', Seven Sisters Road. The proprietor whose name
was unknown to the source at the time, in turn approached a Greek called Philip Neophytou
known as 'Fivos', who then asked Lewandowski. He, i.e. Lewandowski, told 'Fivos' that Morgan
could be trusted, however he recommended the drugs be tested to establish it's purity.
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What then happened is confusing. CIB clearly encouraged Lewandowski to monitor the situation
and confirm the venue to assist the proposed surveillance, which is documented by an operational
policy decision dated 22 April 1994. From the documentation that follows it would appear that
CIB did not cover the meeting, in late April 1994, between Morgan, McElhatton and the
proprietor of the café. Apparently this was because Lewandowski was unable to be specific
regarding which venue was to be used, albeit he stated that 'Fivos' was to purchase the cocaine
from Morgan for £12,000. The last piece of intelligence that was given by Lewandowski was that
the venue was in fact 360, Green Lanes, a venue believed to belong to Theodosis Chrysostomou.
Lewandowski left the United Kingdom around June 1994 for Australia where he has remained to
date. There is no other material to suggest that there were any further developments regarding this
particular CIB operation.
The 'Lee Paul' intelligence:
IDG records indicate that in late 1993 – early 1994, Morgan and Paul Kelly were covertly
photographed entering a café owed by Theodosis Chrysostomou, namely the International Sports
Club, Green Lanes. Present at this meeting was the source 'Lee Paul', Chrysostomou, and the two
police officers. It would appear that this meeting is entirely separate from that described by
Lewandowski for a number of reasons. Firstly, a tape has been recovered amongst papers relating
to 'Lee Paul' and operation 'Briard', marked 'Source A – '27.01.94 tape 17'. It appears to be the
recording of 'Paul's' debriefing, in which he talks about a meeting he had with Chrysostomou and
two police officers. Secondly, as outlined in the following paragraph, this meeting was not about
a particular deal, but their 'business' in general terms.
The gist of the conversation during the meeting was that Morgan, Kelly and Chrysostomou were
'ripping' off drug dealers and then selling the heroin to others. At one stage, a quantity of 66 kilos
is referred to. Of interest is that 'Paul' is shown what must be photographs, as he refers to "that's
Theo and the two police officers". These photographs have as yet not been located, however what
is certain is that this was a covert S011 (SIS) operation, possibly known as 'Fusilier', headed by
the then DCS Roy Clark. Precisely what the intelligence was, remains at this stage unknown.
Returning to 'Lee Paul', there then follows what can only be described as the 'Lee Paul'
compromise.
The 'Lee Paul' compromise:
A report produced by DCS Clark refers to the fact that he had been involved in a covert strategy
involving the informant 'Lee Paul', who at the time was handled by DS Cook (SERCS —
Southgate) and DC Collins (1 Area). 'Paul' was offering intelligence about the Adams family and
the corrupt police officers involved with them.
In March 1994, there was an apparent compromise of the secret handling of 'Paul' and the matter
became general knowledge at SERCS – Southgate. Clark and then Commander John Grieve
commenced a program of misinformation in an attempt to
(i) limit the damage generally
(ii) ensure the well being of the officers, and
(iii) protect any CIB enquiry that may ensue.
It was at this point that DI John Redgrave began to pursue Clark in order to "ensure the morale of
his team was not affected" about malicious rumours, and that he was "keen to put a stop to it".
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Clark pre-empted this by explaining to DSU Michael McCullagh (SERCS) that there was no CIB
investigation, and a meeting with Redgrave would serve the purpose of helping scotch rumours
about a major anti-corruption enquiry.
A meeting took place between Clark and Redgrave on 18 March 1994, where Clark pressed the
point that 'Lee Paul's' handlers were not part of an anti-corruption drive, and in fact, there was no
such investigation at either S011 or CIB. Of course, the proposed sale of the cocaine by Morgan
and Kelly around 24 April 1994 was then to follow as reported by Lewandowski. The obvious
implication is of course, that at this stage, Clark and Grieve, were in fact implementing a
corruption scoping exercise, perhaps operation `Othona'. Not surprisingly, Redgrave was not
prepared to let the matter rest, and a further memorandum from Clark to Gaspar dated 10 April
1995 describes how Redgrave threatened one of 'Paul's' handlers
Other intelligence:
DS Faure (CIB2) met, believed by chance, Morgan and Kelly in the Paviour Arms. Both Morgan
and Kelly believed they were under investigation by a 'team' led by Assistant Commissioner
Taylor and Grieve regarding an informant and 60 kilos of heroin. There is a connection with
either Spain or Portugal. The informant is known to two other officers, namely Cook and Collins.
Morgan and Kelly both believed their actions would stand up to the closest of scrutiny. This
appears to refer to the Lee Paul intelligence scenario.
Operation Cork – 1994/1995 (Operation Grout – 2000)
This operation was mounted following an intelligence disclosure from Customs and Excise who
were targeting Robert Kean in relation to an importation of cannabis. Their operation was known
as 'Cabal'. Surveillance of Kean had revealed a close association with William Kelleher, who at
the time was a serving uniform police sergeant stationed at Ilford police station. Customs and
Excise surveillance had evidenced a number of visits by Kean to Kelleher's home address, during
the time the importation was being organised.
CIB clearly intercepted Kelleher's Ilford police station extension, and soon identified the close
link he had with Morgan, who in fact was revealed to be his nephew. One particular conversation
that was intercepted clearly referred to an importation that Kean was organising, and suggested
Kelleher was directly involved in. This investigation was known as operation 'Cork'.
Unfortunately, the reports relating to this operation cannot be located and therefore the
conclusion is unknown. However, it would appear it never progressed further than an intelligence
gathering exercise.
Following Kean's arrest, active steps were taken by Morgan, in consultation with Kelleher to
secure the release of Kean from custody. Morgan attempted to:
(i) persuade Customs and Excise that Kean ought to be released in order to secure
another and separate huge seizure of drugs i.e. required some sort of participating
informant status and therefore required bail (covertly recorded at Customs House),
(ii) visited Kean on several occasions in company of Redgrave, in prison and court, to
presumably agree a strategy and,
(iii) proposed to present a quasi-text to a judge to secure Kean's release.
Notwithstanding the above, Kean was not granted bail and was eventually acquitted. Current
intelligence indicates that some members of the jury were 'bought' by Kean, and that Morgan was
involved in some way or another.
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Operation Centaur – 1995
Appears to be a spin-off from `Othona'. Of interest is a further memo sent by Clark to Gaspar
following the threat to DC Collins. His partner DS Cook, the other handler of 'Lee Paul', led
Clark to draw the following conclusion. Redgrave's inner circle included:
(i) Martin Morgan
(ii) Paul Kelly
(iii) 'Bob' Watton
(iv) 'Bill' Kelleher
(v) Gordon Livingstone,
All, at the time, favoured the following meeting places:
(i) The Cuckfield PH, Wanstead High Street and,
(ii) Brown's Wine Bar, Enfield.
The latter venue was to become the focus of a protracted covert operation, that confirmed that
Morgan was in fact part of a much wider network of corrupt police officers who are now the
subject of operations 'Zloty' and 'Tiberius'.
Operation Mistley — 1995
This operation was an investigation into former DS Graham Le Blond allegedly contacting Paul
Kelly suggesting payment was available for information i.e. corrupt compromises. The
circumstances were, that Kelly and Morgan were contacted whilst off duty by Le Blond. Le
Blond wanted the telephone numbers of a major criminal who had been arrested by SERCS for
drugs. Morgan and Kelly feared that they were being set up by Le Blond in order to discredit the
police and enhance his own situation as he was at that time under investigation for operation
`Jackpot'. Morgan reported the approach and CIB2 operation `Mistley` began in April 1995.
Nothing to the detriment of Le Blond, Kelly, or Morgan was discovered.
Operation Cornwall (Operation Nightshade) — 1997
This operation, in principle, concentrated on the corrupt relationship between a police informant
'Brennan' and his handlers, Redgrave and DC Michael Charman. Whilst the subject of covert
surveillance, Redgrave divulged that Morgan was aware of the original SERCS operation (1993-
1995) i.e. Nightshade (distribution of cocaine from Venezuela throughout Europe on a massive
scale). Redgrave did however reveal that Morgan was unaware of the corruption aspects.
Operation Elysee — 1997
A further covert operation to gather and update intelligence concerning the activities of Morgan,
Leslie Brown, Paul Kelly, John Redgrave, and Michael Charman. In particular, their involvement
in suspected compromises came under scrutiny. Operation 'Fragrance' featured as part of this
investigation (see 'Gore')
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Operation Gore — 1997
This CIB operation allegedly dealt with the operational compromises of the following operations:
(i) (Santolina) – Flying Squad (Finchley)
(ii) `Fragrance' — SERCS
In both cases, Morgan was suspected to be responsible. However, as a result of protracted
investigations, although it was probable that Morgan was involved in one way or another, (in the
former operation with DC Dave Dunn, and the latter with Redgrave and McElhatton) the
allegations remained unsubstantiated.
Operation Netherlands — 1998
A covert initiative designed to gather and update intelligence regarding Morgan and his
associates.
Operation Uppingham — 1998
Allegations of malpractice involving personnel from SERCS (Barkingside) between 1994 – 1995.
No further information available.
Operation Scotsdyke — 1999
An operation responding to intelligence received from Hampshire Constabulary concerning
details of an attempt to produce a forged or false informant file in order to compromise the trial of
Stephen Jory. This tactic had been tried at least twice before at previous trials involving both
Kean and Clifford Redbourne. There is a suggestion that there was an earlier CIB investigation
conducted by DCS Gaspar, into what was known as the 'Copley' papers. Again, there is no
further information available.
Operation Crow —1999
This operation was a covert development operation to identify a means of initiating an integrity
test against Morgan. One such scenario was to confirm and evidence intelligence that Morgan
was involved in taxing his informants. An informant payment was monitored, and the suggestion
was that Morgan had received some of that reward money from the informant.
Operation Python — 1999
A proactive operation that was conducted by NCS (Surbiton) into the activities of Theodosis
Chrysostomou. He was suspected to be concerned in a significant drug importation which
revealed evidence of police corruption. The existence of this operation came to light as a result of
the surveillance on Morgan, who in turn was seen to be associating with Chrysostomou
(Operation 'Crow/.
Operation Diary (Bank) — 1998/1999
Operation 'Bank' was the investigation by SERCS (Barkingside) into the activities of Clifford
Redbourne and his associates, who were all suspected to be concerned in drug importations.
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Redbourne and others were arrested following a seizure of 400 kilos of cannabis resin. However,
the trial collapsed following the disappearance of the surveillance logs (known as the Hainault
logs).
Operation 'Diary' was in effect the re-investigation of 'Bank', and resulted in the arrest and
eventual conviction of Redbourne. Robert Kean was an additional subject of this operation.
Details of this operation, including the details of the targets, were passed to someone at Ilford
police station — believed to be Morgan. Furthermore, corrupt contact was identified between
Redbourne and a former police officer Duncan Redpath. More importantly corrupt contact was
suspected between Kean and Morgan. This intelligence was progressed further in operation 'Isis'.
Operation Isis -1999
CIB operation 'Isis' began by consolidating the intelligence in relation to what was known from
Operations 'Bank' and 'Diary'. Having been successfully developed, Operation Isis and the
intelligence developed from operation 'Crow' were then passed to the Anti-Corruption Group and
split into two further operations. Operation 'Foxhound' continued to monitor the activities of
Duncan Redpath, and 'Greyhound' the activities of Martin Morgan, both with a view to obtaining
evidence of any corrupt relationship between them, and Redbourne and Kean.
`Greyhound' focused on the relationship between Morgan and a number of organised criminals
who had all at one stage been his registered informants, in particular Evangelos Panayiotou,
Theodosis Chrysostomou, Joseph Annerson, and of course Robert Kean. The intelligence at that
time i.e. 1998 and 1999 suggested that Morgan enjoyed a close relationship with the first two
subjects, although what the precise basis of this relationship was, remained unclear.
However, the NCS operation 'Diary' was concentrating on the activities of Clifford Redbourne
and Robert Kean who were both prolific importers of cannabis into the United Kingdom from
Spain. Because of intelligence sources available to the NCS, it became evident that Kean and
Redbourne's money launderer, Ashley Sansom, had stolen a considerable amount of cash that
was to be laundered. The intelligence was that, should they find him, the probability was that
Sansom would be murdered.
With the intervention of the DPS, Sansom was taken into protective custody and an integrity test
developed to monitor the actions of several serving officers including Detective Constable Martin
Morgan, who had been tasked to locate Sansom on behalf of Kean. The conclusion was that
Kean, Morgan, and others burgled a hotel room, which they believed to be Sansom's, and awaited
his return, presumably to force him to return the stolen money.
Following their arrest in April 2000, those concerned are currently standing trial at the Central
Criminal Court for a revised offence of conspiracy to falsely imprison Ashley Sansom. However
during the period prior to the trial it became apparent that Morgan's corruption with Kean has
spanned many years and involved substantial drug importation's. Morgan's lifestyle and his
personal financial affairs do indicate a separate and unidentified source of income. In fact, soon
after his arrest Sansom described in detail a number of importations involving Kean, Morgan, and
a number of other police officers — all associates of Martin Morgan.
In April 2001, this intelligence was developed in conjunction with separate and independent
information from NCIS controlled intelligence sources indicating that Morgan was currently
involved in Robert Kean's drug importation's. The commodity to be imported had been
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`upgraded' to more lucrative consignments of cocaine, rather than cannabis resin. This
intelligence was developed to a point by the IDG, who then sought the assistance of NCIS to
whom Kean was flagged as a core nominal. A strategy was agreed to progress the operation
jointly between the Directorate of Professional Standards, National Criminal Intelligence Service,
National Crime Squad, and the Security and intelligence services.
Strategy
NCIS and the NCS were provided with the current intelligence picture and objectives as they
stood at the time:
"Intelligence
• Kean and Morgan are due to stand trial with others in November this year. Kean still has
access to corrupt police officers.
• Kean is suspected to be in regular contact with William Kelleher. Kelleher has historically
controlled a network of corrupt police officers, and recent intelligence suggests he, and
others, have been infiltrating a City of London Police crime squad
• Kean is now involved with other criminal associates, including Martin Morgan, in the
importation of cannabis with Kean in the past.
• Morgan is still actively compromising current police operations.
Objectives
• Pro-actively target Kean, Morgan, and Kelleher to evidence their continued criminal
association and gather evidence to enable a prosecution, primarily drugs importation, or,
other identified criminality, to succeed.
• Seek to identify and evidence the continued association between Kean, Morgan, Kelleher,
and 'other unidentified corrupt serving police officers'
The arrest of Kean may result in his co-operation to (I) assist the crown as a prosecution witness
and, (ii) provide incriminating intelligence concerning known criminal associates, corrupt
serving officers, and the identity of other unknown corrupt police officers.
Should Kean fail to co-operate, this could imply the beginning of an attempt to undermine the
prosecution case. This is likely to involve Kean activating his known contacts within his network
of serving and retired police officers with the appropriate technical facilities in place the DPS
should monitor and gather intelligence concerning corruption and other serious criminality, and
when appropriate, responded to."
Memorandum of Understanding (Operations: Zloty, Radial, and Summer)
A strategy was agreed between the DPS, NCIS and NCS, to progress the joint operation by
focusing on Kean and Morgan's criminality, in particular the intelligence that was available,
although now historic, that both with others were concerned in the importation of cocaine. This
task was to be the responsibility of the NCS at Newmarket. The DPS would continue developing
the intelligence picture concerning the 'Zloty' network in order to identify, which subjects needed
to be monitored as Kean and Morgan's criminality became increasingly clear.
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Historically, the intelligence concerning Kean pointed to the fact that Kean nearly always ensures
that at the time any of his importation's he would be overseas, generally in Spain. Due to his skill
and expertise, and the location of his principle residential premises the NCS were tasked to proactively
target both Kean and Morgan who are of course close criminal associates. However, due
to Morgan's surveillance capability and inside knowledge of police techniques, the operational
deployment was to remain the responsibility of the covert DPS team — 'Croft'.
Both NCIS and the NCS sought the assistance of the NCIS (SLU) and NCIS (OSU), both of
whom, within a short period, provided a steady flow of high-grade intelligence concerning both
Kean and Gary Richman. Richman, himself a career criminal and accomplished money launderer,
had in effect assumed the role vacated by Ashley Sansom. NCIS (SLU) in turn was tasked to
secure the deployment of a covert facility capable of providing an audio product from within
Kean's apartment situated in Mijas Costas, Malaga, Spain.
The available intelligence further identified William Kelleher as another immediate target, who
would remain the responsibility of the DPS. Kelleher, who retired from the MPS in 1995 is
Morgan's uncle and thoroughly corrupt. During his service with the MPS he enjoyed corrupt
relationships with numerous criminals including Theodosis Chrysostomou and Robert Kean.
Historic intelligence indicates that Kelleher was actively involved in Kean's drug importations.
During the course of one such importation, Kean was seen by Customs and Excise to visit
Kelleher at his home address — Kelleher was at the time a serving officer stationed at Ilford police
station.
A further strategy was the development of intelligence that identified that the Nightingale public
house in Wanstead remained a favoured meeting place for the majority of 'Zloty' targets, as well
as serving officers due to its close proximity to Snaresbrook Crown Court. The licensee, Noel
McMahon, himself a notorious 'corruptor' of police has remained a trusted confident, and low
key money launderer for a number of corrupt police officers — most notably Martin Morgan,
William Kelleher, and John Redgrave.
Despite the intelligence picture concerning this particular premises spanning many years, little or
no technical deployment has successfully been achieved, and indeed appeared beyond the current
capability of the DPS, or any other police departments. To ensure maximum effectiveness in
relation to intelligence gathering, this task was devolved to the Security Service for
implementation.
Clearly, with numerous agencies involved, the relevant and timely dissemination of intelligence
required constant monitoring and was to be the responsibility of NCIS. Not only did this include
intelligence generated by the various agencies, but also:
(i) To act as a clearing house for all intelligence,
(ii) To monitor and ensure that no 'blue on blue' scenario occurred,
(iii) To disguise the presence of the DPS within this operation,
(iv) To prioritise access to NCIS (SLU) and NCIS (OSU) should the need arise. This
arrangement proved to be a successful concept, and benefited the operation with
immediate results, in particular in relation to the suspected drug importation.
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Operational Developments:
National Crime Squad (Newmarket)
Within a short time, the Newmarket office, secured the assistance of NCIS (OSU) in respect of
Kean and Gary Richman. It soon became clear that both were engaged in arranging an
importation that was to take place sometime in September 2001. The initial strategy the NCS
considered was a technical deployment in Kean's apartment in Spain. Prior tasking of sources
known to the IDG-DSU had identified the precise location of the premises, and a suitable
listening post nearby. This tasking was developed further by the Secret Intelligence Service via
the NCIS (SLU) to undertake a feasibility study. Due to a number of reasons, the deployment was
never effected, and consequently a valuable opportunity for intelligence gathering lost.
Robert Kean
Kean remains committed to his core criminality of drug importation. Whether he has progressed
to class A drugs, such as cocaine, has not been verified. What was clear however was that his
latest venture appeared to be an importation where the concealment would probably be concealed
in metal pipes or bales. Kean's new right hand man, Gary Richman, had spent much of his time
travelling throughout Europe arranging the logistics of the importation on Kean's behalf. His
most important trip was to Genoa, Italy, where he met an Albanian national, Sergio Paloko. The
meeting monitored by the Italian Security Service was to discuss the purchase of the metal in
Albania.
A consignment of metal crossed the Italian border from Albania at Trieste. Unfortunately, the
Italian authorities, now aware of the British investigation, intercepted the consignment,
presumably in the hope of seizing whatever drugs they assumed had been concealed. Intelligence
confirmed that the commodity was in fact, as the initial intelligence suggested cocaine. The
Italians set aside ten days to find the drugs but failed to find them and an Italian Magistrate
ordered the release of the lorry. The lorry continued its journey to the Netherlands where the
metal remains. This development implied that the drugs currently in the Netherlands, under the
control of a man called `Shafto' from Liverpool appeared to be part of a separate importation.
Clearly, the seizure of the lorry caused some alarm amongst Kean and the other investors. Kean
declined `Shafto's' offer of arranging the importation of the 'Dutch' drugs, in order to monitor
the situation in Italy. The final destination in the United Kingdom is believed to be a scrap metal
yard belonging to Riley Smith, who is another prolific drug trafficker and long term associate of
Keans.
Currently it is not known who will drive the metal containing the drugs into the United Kingdom.
Whether that responsibility lies with the current driver, whose identity is unknown or possibly
Michael 'Skinny Mick' Adams is not known. Another interesting development is the involvement
of another criminal, Christopher Caunter. He has been tasked by Kean to purchase a van for the
purpose of channel crossings to coincide with the importation. Precisely what purpose this van
will be put to, is not clear. Caunter has used his own van for an abortive journey to Belgium,
which was to coincide with the anticipated arrival of the metal, before its unexpected seizure by
the Italian authorities.
At the time of writing this report the importation is still delayed. Historically, Kean ensures that
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at the time of any of the criminality he arranges he is out of the country believing that this gives
him an instant alibi. As far as financial investments are concerned, Kean's share stands at
£100,000, Gary Richman with £75,000, and other unknown investors with £75,000, making a
total of £250,000. Should the consignment prove to be cocaine as the initial intelligence
suggested, then this would equate to a load of circa one hundred kilograms.
Further intelligence concerning corruption is a request received by Kean from a long-term
associate named Joseph `Smokey' Gunning, asking him to establish whether he was wanted in the
United Kingdom. Gunning, who was in Spain at the time, is one of the principle suspects for the
murder of Ricky Raynor that occurred on 25 th May 2001. Gunning has previously stood trial for
drug trafficking offences investigated (Operation Bank) by the National Crime Squad at Hainault.
The trial collapsed following the disappearance of two crucial surveillance logs, which
intelligence identifies as the handiwork of DS Paul Kelly and DS Michael Scrutton. Whilst
Gunning is associated to Kean, Kelly is associated to Morgan. Again, in this case, it would appear
that Kean was the conduit between Gunning and corrupt police officers.
An audit trial of the PNC revealed that within a period of days a number of checks were carried
out on Gunning's file, presumably to ascertain whether he was wanted or not. The licensing
officers, PC's Peggy Slater and Deirdre Smith carried out these checks at Bethnal Green police
station. Slater has historic telephone links to Kelly, who incidentally was serving at Bethnal
Green prior to his early medical retirement.
Within a few hours of these checks, Kean informed Gunning that he was not wanted, which was
followed by Gunning's return to the United Kingdom. There is a strong possibility that Gunning
may be arrested for this murder in the near future, although at this stage he is unlikely to be
charged. What is alarming is the ease and speed with which Kean is capable of penetrating the
MPS. In summary:
• Kean remains committed to international drug trafficking, although he has now progressed to
class A drugs — cocaine
• Kean has maintained his links with serving police officers
• Kean still has access to as yet unidentified serving police officers
• Kean is capable of penetrating the MPS at short notice
Gary Richman
Richman, who was known to the DPS prior to operation 'Zloty' has clearly assumed the role
vacated by Ashley Sansom. Richman, himself a drug trafficker, has wide ranging knowledge of
finance and banking, and is undoubtedly proving to be a useful partner and confidant for Kean. It
is he who travelled to Europe, and has been instrumental in organising the logistical elements of
Kean's importation. There has been no clear indication that Richman associates with police
officers, other than a meeting consisting of Richman, Kean, and Morgan at Kean's home address
situated in Norfolk in August 2001. The interpretation of this meeting is that it was coincidental
rather than pre-planned. In summary:
• Identified as an international drug trafficker
• May possibly have links with a private security company named 'OPUS'
• No direct association with serving police officers
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Directorate of Professional Standards
The Intelligence Development Group continued the development of intelligence and provided a
covert research service to all other agencies involved. This allowed for an overview of all
intelligence, and ensured that all eventualities in terms of the corruption picture were explored.
As operation 'Zloty' progressed, extensive use was made of the 'Croft' surveillance for two
reasons;
(i) the geographic location of Morgan's home address and,
(ii) his knowledge of police personnel and own surveillance capability.
Furthermore, as 'Zloty' was confined to a developmental operation, as an operational picture
emerged, a renewed and dedicated evidential operation was commenced within the DPS known
as 'Pyramus'
Martin Morgan
Morgan has been the core target of operation 'Zloty' and, as an evidential stage developed, he
progressed to operation 'Pyramus'. Within days of deploying surveillance, Morgan's continued
association with Kean was confirmed. Of particular interest, was Morgan's use of a van
registered to Kean. Morgan continued to use the Nightingale in Wanstead, which remained a
popular venue with many 'Zloty' subjects, and other serving officers. Intelligence identified that
he associated with Paul Goscomb, Sean McElhatton, Mark Carroll, Bill Kelleher, and Robert
Kean.
Morgan appeared to be engaged in a number of different 'lawful' activities, such as debt
collecting and building work. The two most important events monitored by the IDG were
Morgan's unexpected trip to Jersey, and a meeting he attended with Kean and Gary Richman.
Morgan's trip to Jersey was unfortunately not covered by DPS surveillance, and perhaps
opportunities to identify further assets were lost. It must be borne in mind, that despite the
intelligence that Morgan has been one of the most active and successful corrupt officers in the
MPS, no substantial assets have as yet been identified for him. It is strongly suspected that he has
assets in Jersey, and as other sources of intelligence reveal, Switzerland.
A meeting was evidenced between Morgan and Kean, which took place in a supermarket in
Norfolk. This appeared to be heated and Kean became increasingly aggressive towards Morgan.
The interpretation is that this meeting may have been connected to their imminent trial. Other
intelligence sources have confirmed that Kean is upset that his role as an informant was revealed
by Morgan, and is believed to form the main thrust of his defence.
Following their meeting, they returned to Kean's home address where Gary Richman joined
them. It is unclear if this was a specific meeting, or a coincidence, but both Morgan and Richman,
were seen loading boxes from Kean's garage into Richman's car. So far there has been no
specific intelligence to identify Morgan's true criminality other than two instances.
There is reliable intelligence, albeit subject to individual interpretation, that Morgan is at the very
least aware of Kean and Richman's planned importation. Historic intelligence revealed that
Morgan has been involved as an investor in many of Kean's previous importations. There is also
a suggestion that Morgan may be involved, no doubt corruptly, with a man, known only at this
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stage, as `Mehmet'. In short the intelligence concerning Morgan can be summarised as follows:
• Morgan continues to associate with serving officers, and frequents the 'Nightingale' and
`George' public houses, Wanstead
• He is believed to have access to funds in Jersey
• He is involved in Kean and Richman's imminent cocaine importation
• He is believed to have maintained his links with organised Turkish and Greek criminals.
Paul Goscomb
Like Morgan, Goscomb appears to be working as a builder. A surprising development was a
clandestine meeting that occurred without the knowledge of Morgan, between Goscomb and
Kean. The reason for this meeting was not identified, however was considered sufficiently
important for Kean to travel to Wanstead in order to meet Goscomb. Again, this may relate to the
trial, or may indicate a separate relationship that Kean is attempting to encourage. The
intelligence picture as it stands on Goscomb is:
• Goscomb maintains his association with serving officers and 'Zloty' subjects
• Meets Kean, without the knowledge of Morgan
• Works as a builder on an irregular basis
Sean Patrick McElhatton
Morgan still considers McElhatton his most trusted friend and associate. Recent developments
have stimulated some activity between these two, in particular pressure from Operation
Greyhound for McElhatton to become a prosecution witness. It would appear that McElhatton is
acting as a conduit between another core nominal, Gordon Livingstone, and Morgan.
Livingstone, who was suspended during the course of operation 'Ethiopia', must be considered a
considerable threat to the MPS, if he transpires to be a close associate of Morgan.
Intelligence in 1995, implied that Livingstone was considered corrupt and operating at the same
level as Morgan, Kelly, Redgrave, and others. Livingstone has a deep hatred for the DPS, who he
considers responsible for the break-up of his marriage and the end of his career within specialist
detective duties. He will, if necessary, take any steps to disrupt the activities of this branch.
Mark Carroll
Although known to the IDG because of operation 'Centaur', Carroll was not initially thought to
be of significant interest to operation 'Zloty'. He was returned to uniform duties because of an
investigation concerning serious evidential irregularities, and his performance whilst giving
evidence at a trial, which coincidentally involved a number of other 'Zloty' targets. He has now
risen to prominence within the core 'Zloty' network, and appears to have been tasked to carry out
certain chores on their behalf.
Security Service
The assistance of the Security Service was sought via NCIS (SLU) on behalf of the NCS
(Newmarket) and the DPS. The Security Service agreed to support the NCS in relation to
surveillance and other operational requirements, whilst providing technical support in relation to
the 'Nightingale' public house, and William Kelleher.
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William Kelleher
Kelleher is still a committed `networker', who according to Kean has remained committed to
their relationship. In fact they are both open about their friendship since they believe that any
attempt to continue in a covert way would appear more suspicious. Kean had been invited, and
was expected to attend Keans fiftieth birthday in August, but failed to attend. In fact, there was
further intelligence that another mutual friend, a police commander had also been invited, this
person remains unidentified.
Kelleher's relationship with serving City of London police officers has been confirmed, in
particular his association with Paul Tilbury, a detective constable with the Crime Squad at Snow
Hill police station. Recently, Kelleher invited Tilbury to a Tailor's Guild Banquet in the City,
which was preceded by a meeting in a City pub, attended by Martin Morgan and John Edwards, a
reporter with the Daily Mirror. Kelleher's continued association with the press is cause for
concern, since the motive is likely to be corrupt and solely for furthering their own corruption.
Another example of Kelleher's network is the recent retirement lunch of DCI Jim Dean. Dean
himself has long been considered corrupt, and has associations with active core nominals. The
lunch was attended by a number of both serving and retired officers, and was seen as an ideal
environment for Kelleher to network as a 'corruptor'.
Finally, intelligence gathered identified a serving police officer, DC Damien Crilley, who is
known both to Kelleher and Noel McMahon. The interpretation of this intelligence is that this
relationship is corrupt, and that Crilley has been involved in some form of criminality of which
both Kelleher and McMahon are aware. The intelligence summarised is:
• Kelleher has retained his contacts with core 'Zloty' targets
• He is associating with Robert Kean
• He has retained contact with the press
• He continues to entertain City of London police officers
• He appears to have associations with serving MPS officers, which are believed to be of a
corrupt nature
The Nightingale Public House and Noel McMahon
Despite the lack of initial intelligence, the Nightingale has proved to be a popular venue for many
officers, serving and retired, and in particular 'Zloty' subjects. The deployment of technical
equipment within the pub is being pursued by T6, the Serious Crime Department, with some
progress already being made. McMahon, the licensee, continues to enjoy the company of police
officers, and is considered a serious threat to the MPS.
Strategic and Operational Assessment:
The IDG have implemented a number of strategies which have already yielded high-grade
intelligence, some of which has now been disseminated to the Anti-Corruption Group (Operation
Pyramus) for evidential progression. Other elements are now progressing at developmental stage
within the IDG i.e. Operations Zero, Zepher, Zygal, and New Orleans. Operation Zloty will
however continue to exploit all the various sources of intelligence until the 'Zloty' network is
finally dismantled and no longer poses a credible threat to the MPS. The IDG's continued strategy
SECRET 112
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is to ensure that:
• long-term intelligence gathering continues irrespective of short-term operational successes
• similar or other unconnected areas of intelligence obtained as a result of the existing diverse
intelligence sources are covertly developed
• a policy of sterile corridors to prevent (i) contamination and (ii) compromise is maintained
Operation Sheba
This operation is a response to an intelligence disclosure from the NCIS (SLU) concerning the
relationship between a major importer of cocaine and a serving police officer, Detective
Constable Paul Auger. NCIS (SLU) have liased with Nottingham Serious Crime Squad, and have
identified that Auger, who is attached to SO1 (3), is in regular contact with their target currently
residing in Spain. There is at this stage no further intelligence to explain this relationship, and is
still at an early developmental stage within the IDG.
There has been a meeting between the IDG and Nottingham, who have highlighted a number of
operational compromises, however they have chosen to continue their operation without the
assistance of the IDG. However, intelligence reveals that Auger and Martin Morgan have worked
together in the past. Despite Nottingham's reluctance to engage any further, due to Auger's
current posting and his links with Morgan, Operation Sheba will continue monitoring the
intelligence available to NCIS (SLU), and conduct detailed analysis of all relevant telephone
billing that has been identified.
SECRET 113
SECRET
The Camp Syndicate
Operation Gerah
SECRET 114
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The Camp Syndicate
Background
Kevin CAMP and John CAMP are brothers who own Topguard Security, High Road,
Loughton, Essex. Their business partner is David BUISSON. TOPGUARD Security
provides security staff for major sporting and entertainment events, predominantly
boxing. (Detailed profiles of all these subjects are contained within Appendix A
below)
Kevin CAMP and David BUISSON are high echelon criminals within the North East
London and Essex areas. They are actively involved in the importation and
distribution of controlled drugs and protection.
In 1998 the CAMP brothers and BUISSON were the subjects of targeting by 3 Area
Organised Crime Group for drugs importation/supply. They were flagged to this unit
under Operation Ebbw Vale, with DI SMALES as the operational head. It became
obvious throughout the operation that the subjects were aware that they were subject
to police surveillance. There could have been a number of reasons for this, i.e. poor
surveillance, informants playing both sides, etc. However a series of events shed more
light on the potential source of the compromise.
Officers from SO 6 arrested Jackie CAMP, a family member, around this time for a
scam based around the Jewish Cemetery in Essex. The WDC from SO 6, who was
investigating this scam, rang DI SMALES and told him that during a search of Jackie
CAMP's premises, a full list of Topguard Security's employees had been found and it
included details of serving police officers. DI SMALES advised the officer to contact
CIB 3, which the officer did.
On 31 St August 1999 the following information was received from DI KNUCKEY at
SO6.
`It is with reference to a security firm by the name of Top Guard based at 169 High
Road, Loughton, Essex. It is alleged that a suspended police officer is working for
them and that this company is of interest to CIB3 and 3 Area OCG.
On 15/10/98, Team 6 at SO6 searched the premises of Jackie CAMP, 27 The Vale,
Woodford Green, Essex IG8 9BX, whose brothers or brothers in law run the security
firm. From this address they obtained a five paged computerised printout of contact
names and addresses dated 01/09/98, on this list were the names of two police officers.
They are as follows:-
Eric GOOD (DPG)
17 Charteris Road
Woodford Green
Essex IG18 OAP
Home Tel: 0181 504 3997
Work Tel: 0171 321 8146
SECRET 115
SECRET
Simon PINCHBECK (Police Surveillance)
57 Nevill Way
Loughton
Essex IGIO 3BG
Home Tel.: 0181 502 3127
Mobile: 0961 301407'
Operation Ebbw Vale was informant led, the informant being jointly handled by PC
Steve AMBROSE (3 OCU) and a member of the Enfield DIU. During the time of the
operation a home beat officer from Enfield, PC Julian CONNOR, came into the DIU
at Enfield enquiring how to do an INFOS check. The informant co-handler happened
to be the person who dealt with CONNOR's enquiry, once he had explained the
INFOS search he asked CONNOR who the subject of the search was to be, CONNOR
stated that it was Kevin CAMP. The co-handler did not show any interest to
CONNOR but immediately telephoned DI SMALES to forewarn him that a check was
going to be done.
PC AMBROSE stated that he flagged Kevin CAMP in mid 1998. As a result of this
flaging he was contacted when an INFOS check was made on CAMP. This was on
18' August 1998 and he was informed that PC Julian CONNOR at Enfield had made
the check. PC AMBROSE informed his supervisor DI Tim SMALES about his
concerns around CONNOR, as he had background knowledge of him and believed he
may have an association with CAMP via a boxing connection.
PC AMBROSE met CONNOR to discuss his interest in CAMP, CONNOR stated that
CAMP was a 'nice fella' and that he was expecting a big security contract and could
do without any police interest in him at the moment, he also stated that 'if you don't
touch him he'll help you'. It was obvious that CONNOR was a close associate of
CAMP's and that the search was purely to assess police interest in CAMP at the time.
PC AMBROSE refused the offer from CONNOR and did not confirm or deny any
police interest.
A couple of weeks later a member of the 3 OCU team investigating the CAMP's and
BUISSON received a telephone call from a suspended PC, Simon PINCHBECK.
PINCHBECK stated that he wanted to talk to someone about Kevin CAMP as he
thought he was being unfairly targeted. The 3 OCU team member referred
PINCHBECK to DI SMALES. DI SMALES rang PINCHBECK and asked him what
his interest was, PINCHBECK stated that he knew Kevin CAMP and that he was
expecting to be involved in a large security contract and that police interest could
jeopardise the contract. DI SM ALES did not confirm or deny any police interest.
On 26th June 2000 DI SMALES was out shopping with his wife in Loughton when he
saw BUISSON in a silver 3 series BMW vrmW3DCB. DI SMALES' wife noticed his
interest in this vehicle and the occupant and commented that the occupant regularly
had coffee, most mornings, with Simon PINCHBECK in a coffee shop in Loughton
High Road, called the Café H'Art. PINCHBECK is known to DI SMALES wife as
they both train at the same gym, the David Lloyd Centre in Chigwell.
SECRET 116
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In August 2000 intelligence was received from a reliable source, which identified
members of the CAMP syndicate as:
1. Kevin Eric CAMP — Initially receives the drugs and heads the syndicate
2 'Barry' — Associate of CAMPS – role and further details not known
3. Mark WHEELER — Arranges the distribution of the drugs
4. Steven WHEATE — Distributor
5. Tommy TOWNSEND — Distributor
6. Ray HALL — Distributor
7. Darren COHEN — Distributor
8. Martin GROOM — Runner/user
9. Bradley RIX —Dealer
10. Paul McSWEENEY — Dealer
The source went on to provide the following intelligence regarding Kevin CAMP:
`He runs a company called TOPGUARD SECURITY that specialises in supplying
doorman for venues and events, as well as personal VIP protection to celebrities and
pop groups such as `Oasis' and `The Verve'. This company currently employs a
number of Eastern Europeans.
He has recently lost some of this business to a rival company called HEADLINES
which is owned by Steven HEAD (N/T CRO) who resides at 13, Rushdean Close
Brentwood Essex (Tel: 01277211779) HEAD apparently has commercial premises in
North Weald and directory enquiries show a company with this name in North Weald
with a number of 01992 524924. As a result of losing this business (which includes
work for the boxing promoter Frank WARREN), CAMP has made a number of threats
of violence towards HEAD and his company.
CAMP is also involved in major drugs trafficking of class A and B drugs, but
primarily cocaine and was the subject of a 3 OCU Drugs Squad operation run by DC
Steve AMBROSE (0973 860992) at JX. CAMP has access to a concealment at a
Farm in the North Weald area of Essex. This farm was apparently searched by Police,
possibly in 1998, but nothing was found.
CAMP is apparently receiving a consignment of drugs around the weekend of 12
th
August 2000. No further details are known at this time. CAMP is very aware of
surveillance and has a contact at The Sun newspaper who can obtain X-directory
numbers and assists CAMP with any checks he needs to do. '
SECRET 117
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This intelligence reinforces the assertion that CAMP is well-networked and engaged in
organised criminality. Source intelligence is also in existence, which shows Topguard
door staff involved with the importation of drugs from Holland and then arranging
their distribution within the clubs they provide security for.
The source has been approached by a man called GARY WHITE who is currently
awaiting extradition to Amsterdam in connection with a murder there ( source states
that WHITE did not commit the murder but believes he witnessed it and assisted in the
disposal of the body). This man is IC 1, approx. 30 years and comes from BRISTOL.
He has the top of his right index finger missing. He is connected to the ' Top Guard '
security firm (which handles the protection for a number of professional boxers) In
particular, he has told the source that he has connections with an Ecstasy factory in
Amsterdam for which he controls the distribution network in this country.'
Operation Gerah
As a result of this intelligence Operation GERAH was commenced by the IDG and
soon identified that CONNOR was still heavily associated with CAMP. When the
boundaries changed and Essex took over some former MPS stations, CONNOR had to
establish contact with Essex Police in order to continue his intelligence gathering on
behalf of the syndicate.
In February 2001 DC Graham MOORE, from the Essex Police Intelligence Unit at
Loughton Police Station, was contacted by CONNOR, below is DC MOORE's
account of their conversation:
" I returned a phone call to Enfield Police Station 0208 345 1225 and spoke to a
person called PC Julian CONNER. Conner informed me that he had a source into the
country club ( Epping Forest Country Club) which the Police did not know about.
Conner offered no information about the incident ( there was a stabbing at the
Country Club around the weekend 27-28/01/2001) but was keen to find out the
following ;
How bad were the injuries to Lee MANNING (the victim)? Were they life
threatening?
He told me that bad people go to the club and asked i f I knew who they were ?
When I offered no answers to any of his questions he told me that Roy SHAW went to
the club. I asked who SHAW was but he did not answer.
Originally he said he had never been to the club. Later in the conversation he declared
that he had been to the club.
He clearly was not giving any information.
He failed to answer any question I put to him and was only interested in what I might
tell him "
DC Moore stated that there were two very interesting points about the above
information. Firstly, when the stabbing occurred the victim supplied a false name.
Only members of the investigation team knew of his real identity, Lee MANNING.
CONNER must have discovered this from other persons outside of the Police Service
as no officers were permitted to give out the victim's true identity.
SECRET 118
ET
Secondly, in relation to the name Roy SHAW, again only members of the
Investigating Team were aware that SHAW attended the Country Club after the
incident in an attempt to interfere with the investigation. Again CONNER must have
obtained this information from a non-Police source. At the time of this information
Topguard Security was employed at the Epping Forest Country Club to provide door
security.
Potential Compromise
On Thursday the 4th January 2001 PC Julian CONNOR contacted DS Ray ROBBINS
(DS at East Ham) at his home address by phone. This phone call was made in the early
evening. DS ROBBINS is a very close friend of DS John PRESCOTT (IIC
Surveillance Team Leader).
PC CONNOR stated to DS ROBBINS that he had heard that CIB3 were currently
conducting an investigation into PC Tommy PAYNE. He stated that, as he lived with
PC PAYNE, he would like to know what CIB3 were doing so that he would not be
involved. He said that both he and DS ROBBINS knew someone from Liverpool who
would be able to tell them. The obvious link according to DS ROBBINS would be DS
PRESCOTT.
DS ROBBINS told them that he knew whom he was referring to, but that DS
PRESCOTT never told him what he was doing. PC CONNOR then stated that Tommy
PAYNE had entered the room and he would like to speak to him. PAYNE stated that
he had been told by several sources that CIB3 were investigating him. He said those
sources stated DS PRESCOTT had informed them about the CIB 3 investigations.
PAYNE stated that he expected DS PRESCOTT to pass any information on to him to
assist him.
DS ROBBINS said he couldn't help and that DS PRESCOTT never divulged what he
was doing. DS ROBBINS stated that after initial pleasantries the conversation became
tense. PAYNE, CONNOR, ROBBINS and PRESCOTT all served at Enfield together
and are all Freemasons.
Current Situation
Operation GERAH has been passed to the Anti-Corruption Group for investigation
under the auspices of Operation PIERROT. Intelligence continues to be received
regarding both CONNOR and PINCHBECK.
In September 2001 intelligence was received that PC Julian CONNOR recently spoke
to Loughton Police station making licensing enquiries regarding the Epping Forest
Country Club and also asking if there were any current operations targeting these
premises. The officer at Loughton was very suspicious of CONNOR's interest. The
Enfield officer supplying this intelligence expressed an opinion that CONNOR
sometimes works on the door at the Epping Forest Country club and other clubs.
SECRET 119
SECRET
On or around 1 1 th October 2001 DC Williams (Essex Police) was approached by a
male, uniform PC in the front office/portacabin area of Loughton Police station. The
PC engaged DC WILLIAMS in conversation and said something along the lines of the
following. "Your old mate Simon PINCHBECK from Barkingside was asking after
you…" As DC WILLIAMS did not recall any officer of that name he did not give the
matter any further thought until he asked DC MOORE if he knew him, and DC
MOORE explained his significance.
DC WILLIAMS is the Investigating Officer for the stabbing at the Epping Forrest
Country Club, and as PINCHBECK is an associate of PC CONNOR and a possible go
between for the suspects the officer deemed the approach as a form of veiled threat.
The Operation Tiberius team have been informed that PC CONNOR is due to be
arrested imminently, due to an ongoing sexual relationship with a female drug
supplier. It would appear that he is accessing Operation Crackdown and Crimint
material regarding her and passing that intelligence to her.
The CAMP syndicate are believed to be of interest to Essex Police Major Crime Unit.
SECRET 120
SECRET
Appendix A
Subject Profiles
Kevin CAMP identified as:
Kevin Eric CAMP
CRO: 72227/83Y b. 27/06/1964
8 Coteford Close,
Loughton
Essex IG10 2NT
CIBIC Database shows no trace.
Quick Name & Address shows Kevin and Alison CAMP at this address.
Experian research shows:
Kevin and Alison CAMP residing at 8 Coteford Close, Loughton, Essex IG10 2NT.
Associations between Mrs Alison Mira CAMP and Kevin Eric CAMP through a bank
on 12/05/2000 an FLA Member proposal on 26/07/1996.
Address links between 8 Coteford Close and 1 Dunmow Close, Loughton, Essex IG10
2NT as a previous address for Alison CAMP in October 1995.
Alison CAMP is shown as a director of the following company, she was appointed as
director on 23/10/1998 and her date of birth is shown as 21/08/1969:
Topguard Sports and Leisure Limited
Registered No: 03216297
Incorporated 25/06/1996
Latest Accounts 31/05/1999
Registered Office: First Floor Suite, Enterprise House, 10 Church Hill, Loughton,
Essex IG 10 1LA
Previous Office: 208 Kenton Road, Harrow, Middlesex HA3 8BX.
Company Secretary: Keith CHITTOCK 38, Rutland Road, Chelmsford, Essex CM1
4BJ.
Kevin and Alison CAMP are shown as directors of the following dormant companies:
Topguard Training Schools Limited
Registered No: 03322253
Topcleaning Limited
Registered No: 03453032
Hammer Security Limited
Registered No: 03367696
SECRET 121
„ZRET
INFOS shows Kevin and John CAMP and BUISSON as being the subjects of a 3
Area OCU operation, Operation EBBW VALE, from 01/06/1998 until 31/01/2000. All
were suspected of the organised supply of cocaine in the London and Essex areas.
CRINIllNT research confirms them as subjects of Operation EBBW VALE.
John CAMP identified as:
John George CAMP
CRO: 122609/97C b. 23/08/1966
38 Endeavour Road,
Cheshunt,
Hertfordshire EN8 OLN
CIBIC Database shows no trace.
Not confirmed via Quick Name & Address.
Experian shows no trace.
CRIMINT shows details as above and confirms John CAMP as a subject of Operation
EBBW VALE.
INFOS again confirms these details.
Topguard Security identified as:
Topguard Security Limited
169 High Road
Loughton
Essex
Experian details shown above.
BUISSON identified as:
David Christopher BUISSON
CRO: 56701/87Y b. 09/07/1969
2 Daws Bridge Cottages,
Hobbs Cross Road,
Theydon Gardon,
Epping,
Essex CM 16 7PA
CIBIC Database shows no trace.
Quick Name and Address shows BUISSON resident at his parents address at 203
The Broadway, Loughton, Essex.
SECRET 122
iRET
CECI E3 la 11 shows no trace of BUISSON.
CRIMINT and INFOS confirm his role as a target of Operation EBBW VALE.
PC Julian CONNOR identified as:
PC Julian Tristan CONNOR
Wt No: 169065
PC based at YF (Enfield)
b. 01/12/1954
doj. 19/07/1976
CDS shows 5 previous complaints between 1994 and 1996 all dealt with informally or
withdrawn.
CIBIC Database shows no trace.
Quick Name and Address shows a Julian T Connor resident at 25 Browning Road,
Enfield, Middlesex EN2 OEW.
Experian shows:
Julian T Connor and Peggy A CONNOR resident since 1994 to the current register at
25 Browning Road.
Associations between Julian and Peggy CONNOR on 07/09/1998 on an FLA member
proposal, 23/02/1998 on an FLA member proposal, 16/09/1999 with a bank and on
05/08/1997 with a mail order telephone request.
In February 2000 Julian T CONNOR moved to 1 Burlington Road, Enfield Middlesex
EN2 OLL.
CRIMINT audit trail at YF shows the following search carried out on Kevin CAMP
by PC CONNOR:
date: 19980901
time: 131327
localhost: yf-ws011
userid: P169065
type: Search
hits: 0
query string: KEVIN CAMP
This search was conducted during the first few months of Operation EBBW VALE
and ties in with DI SMALES allegation.
SECRET 123
SECRET
PC Simon PINCHBECK identified as:
PC Simon Peter PINCHBECK
Wt No: 169291
PC based at YF (Enfield)
b. 28/10/1957
doj. 23/08/1976
CDS shows 10 previous complaints between 1995 and 1998 all dealt with informally,
unsubstantiated, incapable of investigation or not proceeded with.
CIBIC Database shows PINCHBECK as subject of 5020-in-3553 dated 30 August
1999 from Dl KNUCKEY at SO 6, reproduced below:
Experian shows:
Simon and Lynda PINCHBECK residing at 57 Nevill Way, Loughton, Essex and 9
associations between them at this address between 1995 and 2000.
Simon PINCHBECK moved from 57 Nevill Way in May 2000 and moved to 135
Grosvenor Drive, Loughton, Essex IG10 2LB and an association between Simon
PINCHBECK and Mrs L PINCHBECK on 07/05/2000 regarding a joint bank
account..
Simon P PINCHBECK, b. 28/10/1957 with an occupation shown as a security officer,
is shown since 12/02/2000 as a director and company secretary of:
TORNSTORE Limited
Registered No: 03718962
Date Incorporated: 24/02/1999
Registered Office: Weston Kay, 73-75 Mortimer Street, London W1N 7TB.
Previous Office: 6-8 Underwood Street, London NI 7JQ (17/02/2000)
Co-director is shown as:
Trevor CORD
born: 10/07/1955
Occupation: Electrician
Date Appointed: 12/02/2000
Address: Oak Farm, Ongar Road, Abridge, Rom ford, Essex RM4 1 UL.
CORD is also a director of Dowsett-Cord Limited – Registered No: 01443069.
CREVHNT and INFOS do not show any association between CAMP, BUISSON and
PINCHBECK.
SECRET 124
The Chrysostomou/Panayiotou
Syndicate
DC Alan Cammidge
Internal Investigations Command
125 SECRET
SECRET
The Chrysostomou/Panayiotou Syndicate
Chrysostomou
Background
It should be noted that CHRYSOSTOMOU's syndicate has been referred to by
informed police sources as needing to be thought of as the `KRAYS' of the Greek
community in North London. In the 1970's he was the leader of a violent ruthless
Greek gang engaged in murder and arson.
Theodosis CHRYSOSTOMOU
Born: 01/07/1942
IC Code: 2
NIB: 807221/65P
Home Address: 52 Bramley Road, Southgate, London N14 4HS
Telephones: Home — 020 8441 4740
Mobile – 07771 656667
Informant Status
At various times Chrysostomou has been registered as an informant, the details of
which are contained below:
Date: 09/11/1989
Alias/Nickname
Peter ROOTS
Police Officers
DI OCONNELL (Con) NH. DC McLEARY (Han) NH PC SHINGLER (Co Han) NH.
Date: 12/04/1991
Alias/Nickname
Peter ROOTS
Police Officers
DCI ATKINS (Con) 9 RCS, DC McLEARY (Han) 9RCS, DS RICE (Co Han) 9 RCS
Report dates
31/01/1992. PI Heroin (Drugs) P192144
30/05/1990 reward £1 500. Met drugs reference 901340.
SECRET 126
SECRET
COMMENT: It would appear that CHRYSOSTOMOU was an informant recruited by
McLEARY who then took him onto the RCS.
Date: 31/07/1992
Alias/Nickname
Harry KNIGHT
Police Officers
DCI PEARCE (Con) YE, DC MORGAN (Han) YE, DC McELHATTON (Co Han)
YT
Reports
20/07/1992 P1 Murder Firearms P1921313
COMMENT: It also appears that MORGAN jointly registered him at YE and that a
Peter ROOTS also had a file there.
Criminality
In the early 1990's CHRYSOSTOMOU was of interest to 5011. He was well known
in the Cypriot and Turkish community. He, along with a Andreas ANTONIADES, ran
a café at 441 Green Lanes London N4. Which was suspected of selling drugs and
gambling and holding firearms on the premises.
On 28th March 1991 information was received by DS CROWLEY, SO1 (4) D Team
North, and DC ATKINS, 5011, that CHRYTSOSOMOU and Brian HARDING were
involved in the large scale supply of heroin. Operation DASH was mounted between
March 1991 and November 1991 on CHRYSOSTOMOU, ANTONIADES and John
FACONTIS. This operation ended in failure, however on 27°
January 1994 DS Paul
KELLY arrested FACONTIS for possession of drugs with intent to supply, although
no result is known.
Operation HYDRA followed Operation DASH and then in 1999 became Operation
BIANCA run by DS AHEARNE at the source unit at JX under the overall control of
DCI Jim DEAN. By now there was another informant with PI status involved in this
operation, known as Steve JONES (Joseph ANNERSON) who was another of Martin
MORGANS and Sean McELHATTONS informants.
Operation BIANCA was compromised when for unknown reasons DC Martin
MORGAN and DC Sean McELHATTON turned up on a live surveillance plot, which
led to the operation being blown out.
SECRET 127
SECRET
Corruption Intelligence
OPERATION BUTTERMAN – 1994
Operation Butterman — 1994
The 'Lewandowski' intelligence:
Former DC Ray Lewandowski reported that Morgan and initially Sean McElhatton
had stolen a kilo of cocaine, which they hoped to sell for between £12,000 – £15,000
and had approached the proprietor of a café, called the 'Sportsman Club', Seven
Sisters Road. The proprietor whose name was unknown to the source at the time, in
turn approached a Greek called Philip Neophytou known as 'Fivos', who then asked
Lewandowski. He, i.e. Lewandowski, told 'Fivos' that Morgan could be trusted,
however he recommended the drugs be tested to establish it's purity.
What then happened is confusing. CIB clearly encouraged Lewandowski to monitor
the situation and confirm the venue to assist the proposed surveillance, which is
documented by an operational policy decision dated 22 April 1994. From the
documentation that follows it would appear that CIB did not cover the meeting, in
late April 1994, between Morgan, McElhatton and the proprietor of the café.
Apparently this was because Lewandowski was unable to be specific regarding
which venue was to be used, albeit he stated that 'Fivos' was to purchase the cocaine
from Morgan for £12,000. The last piece of intelligence that was given by
Lewandowski was that the venue was in fact 360, Green Lanes, a venue believed to
belong to Theodosis Chrysostomou. Lewandowski left the United Kingdom around
June 1994 for Australia where he has remained to date. There is no other material to
suggest that there were any further developments regarding this particular CIB
operation.
The 'Lee Paul' intelligence:
IDG records indicate that in late 1993 – early 1994, Morgan and Paul Kelly were
covertly photographed entering a café owed by Theodosis Chrysostomou, namely
the International Sports Club, Green Lanes. Present at this meeting was the source
'Lee Paul', Chrysostomou, and the two police officers. It would appear that this
meeting is entirely separate from that described by Lewandowski for a number of
reasons. Firstly, a tape has been recovered amongst papers relating to 'Lee Paul' and
operation 'Briard', marked 'Source A – '27.01.94 tape 17'. It appears to be the
recording of 'Paul's' debriefing, in which he talks about a meeting he had with
Chrysostomou and two police officers. Secondly, as outlined in the following
paragraph, this meeting was not about a particular deal, but their 'business' in
general terms.
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Itemized Billing information
CHYSOSTOMOU's mobile telephone number is 07771 656667
Between 15/03/99 and 21/04/99 incoming calls are shown from Martin MORGAN to
CHRYSOSTOMOU.
Historically it maybe worthy of note that MORGAN received a pager message in
1995, which read "Ring Mr. GEORGIOU, Chief Superintendent of Larnaka on 0181
8810492 or 441 4749. The first number relates to CHRYSOSTOMOU's son
Christakis. The second number is CHRYSOSTOMOU's home address.
Property Purchase
On 27th January 2000 CHRYSOSTOMOU contacted his solicitor, Mr. A NICOLAOU
at 393 Green Lanes Harringay. He wished to purchase a property at 40 Deynecourt
Gardens London Ell for £140,000 and required a loan of £80,000 to make the
purchase, with Catherine Gale MORGAN, who is Martin MORGAN'S wife. The
vendor was a Mr. FULLERTON, a friend of MORGAN'S who drinks with him in the
NIGHTINGALE public house. On 10 th April 2000 CHRYSOSTOMOU attended his
solicitor's office and aborted the purchase, this coincided with the arrest of MORGAN
on Operation GREYHOUND.
Source Information
Correspondence docket CIB/2140/99 refers to an informant named JOHN DIXON.
(Previous name given was LEE PAUL), who is the subject of Operation BRIARD, and
still wanted by Operation TRINITY on drug related offences and is avoiding
extradition by living in Northern Cyprus. DIXON was seen in Cyprus, by officers
from the IDG, as he had indicated that he could assist in serious corruption matters.
DIXON stated the following:
A meeting was held between DC Martin MORGAN, DC Paul KELLY, and Theo
CHRYSOSTOMOU and himself in a cafe when drug recycling and transactions were
discussed.
DIXON had identified a block of flats in Cyprus in which DI John REDGRAVE,
(Operation CORNWALL/ZLOTY) owns a flat along with Theo CHRYSOSTOMOU. He
goes on to state that a senior police officer also owns a flat in this block.
This informant is obviously reiterating the intelligence that he gave in 1996, but it is
interesting to note that he is willing to stand by the information, some 3 years later.
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Race Horse Connection
Martin MORGAN, Sean McELHATTON, CHRYSOSTOMOU and Evangelos
PANAYIOTOU appear to have a financial interest in two racehorses purchased at
Newmarket blood sales on 27 th October 1999. George STEPHENSON is a shopkeeper
from Berwick Upon Tweed, who appears to have acted as an advisor in the buying of
these horses. Further checks made on LIVINGSTON Trading Company also known as
SHAH, DULLAH & Co reveal that a horse called 'Theo's Lad' believed owned by
CHRYSOSTOMOU is registered there. The other horse is called 'Valuable Gift' and
trained by Dick ALLEN.
Summary
The intelligence held on Chrysostomou reveals an incredibly close relationship with
Martin Morgan, which has led to his invulnerability to prosecution over the years. It is
the opinion of Operation Tiberius that Morgan is now out of favour with
Chrysostomou. However it is also their opinion that Chrysostomou will elicit the use
of other law enforcement contacts, whether long established or newly recruited, to
maintain his air of invincibility.
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Panayiotou
Background
Evangelos PANAYIOTOU
NIB: 80722/65P
CRO: 103162/65F (in the name of Anorias PANAYOTOY)
IC Code: 2
Approximate age 60years.
Telephones: Mobile – 07771656667
Home – 01753892401
Home Address: Farnham Lodge, Britwell Road, Slough SL2 2NQ
Previous Addresses:
52 Bramley Road,
Southgate,
London,
N14 4HS
North Lodge,
Lower Road,
Chalfont St Peter,
Gerrards Cross,
Buckinghamshire.
Business premises
London Gold
35 Greville Street,
London, EC1N 8TB
New London Gold Ltd
Everlast House,
1 Cranbrook Lane,
New Southgate,
London,
N11 1NP
131 SECRET
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A search of various indices shows that Evangelos has six (6) aliases, and eight (8)
different dates of births. To understand the mixed data that exists around this family it
should be understood that the family are made up of four brothers.
Evangelos PANAYIOTOU
Shown above
Christopher PANAYIOTOU
DOB 06/11/1953
N/T NIB
Addresses
30 Rivet House Coope Road
London SE1
167 Werst Heath Road
Hampstead NW3
John PANAYIOTOU
No other details known
Address
Casa Blanca
Windsor Road
Gerrards Cross
Bucks.
Peter PANAYIOTOU
DOB 19/06/1950
N/T CRO
Address
34 Amery Road
Harrow
The four brothers are concerned in the following joint business ventures:
Chauffeur Hire Ltd
Veganmix Ltd.
20-21 Rodmarten Street
London W1
Tel 0714934851
Browns Nightclub.
Great Queens Street
London W2
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London Gold
35 Greville Street
London W
It is unclear at this stage whether the New London Gold Ltd is a family venture.
SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE HELD
Evangelos was sentenced to two years imprisonment on 8 th December 2000 at
Southwark Crown Court after undercover officers went to Browns Nightclub Covent
Garden and mounted an operation. As a result the officers identified drug dealing
within the premises and arrests were made. PANAYIOTOU was arrested as the owner
of the club with others. When his home address was searched firearms and a quantity
of ammunition were found. This case was reported in the Daily Express newspaper on
Saturday 9
th December 2000. It became news worthy because a number of 'soap stars'
used this club and were caught up in all the action.
Research on Martin MORGANS billing reveals that on the 7
th April 2001 a single call
was made to
Mrs. K. PANNAYIOTOU
Farnham Lodge,
Lower Britwell Road,
Slough S12 2NQ.
This telephone reference has appeared in a number of IDG operations.
Operation CORK in 1998.
Operation CROW in 2000
Quick address reveals that Evangelos and Kathleen PANAYIOTOU live at this
address with a James BAKER. Experian shows them moving to this address in 1999
from North Lodge, Lower Road, Chalfont St Peter, Gerrards Cross, Buckinghamshire.
Previous telephone references for this address have appeared in a number of IDG
operations.
Operation GREYHOUND in 2000
Operation CROW in 1999
Operation BATHFORD/BRADFORD 1999
Evangelos is shown as a director and occupation as jeweller. He was appointed
Director of New London Gold Limited on 16/10/2000 along with a Mr. DEMETRIS
DOB 24/08/1942, of 41 C Hanover Gate Mansions, Park Road, London, NW1 4SN.
New London Gold Limited is shown as having It's registered office as of the
18/10/2000 at Everlast House, 1 Cranbrook Lane, New Southgate, London, N11 1NP.
SECRET 133
The KAAN Syndicate
Operation Baseline
DC Narmella Soltani
Special Intelligence Section
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The KAAN Syndicate
Background
The Metropolitan Police are currently investigating a large-scale importation and
distribution of heroin valued at £10,000,000. This investigation is being conducted by
S011 SlS under the operational name of BASELINE as a multi agency operation.
On 31-d September 2000 a serious assault occurred on Paul KING and William
BANKS-NASH aka Billy NASH at 55A Heathwood Gardens, London, SE7. This
assault resulted in Billy NASH having 3 fingers cut off with a machete and Paul KING
suffering significant finger injuries with a pair of garden shears. The assault was
reported at Plumstead police station and it soon became apparent that the motive for
the attack was related to the theft of 87 kilos of heroin. William BANKS-NASH did
not want to assist the police regarding the investigation and has since disappeared.
On 6th September 2000 Paul KING attended Plumstead police station and he informed
them of his role in the importation of 102 kgs of heroin into London. The heroin was
imported in a foreign registered camper van, which he met at South Mimms Service
Station on the M25 motorway. He loaded the heroin into his car and deposited it in
the basement of his flat at 55A, Heathwood Gardens, London, SE7. He was then
responsible for delivering the drugs to various customers, one of whom was Billy
NASH. The importation was orchestrated by Mehmet YUSUF and Soner KAAN.
On the 31' August 2000 three people attended 55A, Heathwood Gardens and stole the
remaining 87 kgs of heroin from Margaret FROST aka Peggy, the girlfriend of Paul
KING. As a result of the theft, KING and BANKS-NASH were summoned to meet
Soner KAAN. Mehmet YUSUF was also present. KING was taken to the cellar in his
flat by three to five males. There he was brutally interrogated regarding the theft and
an attempt was made to sever his fingers with a pair of garden shears, causing serious
injuries. NASH was also interrogated and had 3 fingers chopped off with a machete.
One of the fingers was given to KAAN so he could take it back to Northern Cyprus.
Since then the henchmen, who committed the assaults, have been identified as Dale
Golder (the son of Graham Golder, a disgraced former MPS detective sergeant) and
Patrick Pasipanodya — known as 'Black Pat'.
Patrick Pasipanodya was the victim of a contract killing in August 2001. The
method was a `driveby' shooting with an assassin on a motorbike. He was shot twice
in the head. This is now subject of operation Strethall, a 2 Area (North) murder
enquiry. Whilst researching Graham Golder, enquiries reveal that he has approached
the murder enquiry and offers to provide information. He is now registered as a
source this situation is the subject of a covert IDG development operation. The
intelligence, both current and historic suggests that Golder senior is attempting to
not only compromise the enquiry, but to negate his son's involvement in serious
criminality.
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Due to these events it was clear that Paul KING required police protection. As a result
of KING's admissions, Soner KAAN and Mehmet YUSUF were arrested and
subsequently charged with the heroin importation and assault. Paul KING was also
charged and pleaded guilty, with the intention of him giving evidence against the
others.
On 19th March 2001 at Woolwich Crown Court Mehmet YUSUF pleaded guilty and
offered to give evidence against Soner KAAN. Within the strict time restraints
imposed by HHJ Carroll, YUSUF was debriefed in detail regarding the assault and
theft of drugs.
The trial of Soner KAAN commenced on 11 th June 2001 at Woolwich Crown Court
and resulted in him being convicted of both the assault and drug importation on 4th
July 2001. He later received 18 years imprisonment. Both Mehmet YUSUF and Paul
KING gave compelling and damning evidence against Soner KAAN.
To date, it is clear from the debrief of both Paul KING and Mehmet YUSUF, that they
have been concerned in many other heroin importation's and the subsequent
distribution of them within the London area. YUSEF is also identifying other key
players who had an involvement in these enterprises.
KING's debrief is only expected to last a couple of months, as it is felt the information
he can provide is limited. His role was to act as minder for the drugs and as a lowlevel
courier. YUSUF's debrief could last several months, as he organised the
distribution of all the heroin after it's arrival in the UK and would answer directly to
KAAN.
On 18th July 2001 on a production order KAAN was taken to Walworth Road police
station where he was seen by SIS officers in an attempt to recruit him as a potential
witness of truth, or to debrief him on an intelligence basis only. From speaking with
KAAN it was apparent that he had a lot to offer but, as would be expected, he was
`sitting on the fence' and needed time to consider his position.
Intelligence Picture – Corruption
Potential corruption in respect of a serving police officer.
The SIS are currently de-briefing YUSUF and KING. It is apparent from the debriefing
of YUSUF that he has been concerned in two other importations of Heroin in
excess of 100 Kilos on behalf of KAAN and money laundering offences. To date
approximately 30 persons have been identified, they will be arrested at the conclusion
of the 2 debriefs.
It was decided that DS Hogette and Mr Jack Kelly (ex Met DC) would visit Sonar
Kaan with the intention of implementing the recruitment process. It was known that
Kaan was a registered informant to HMC&E together with the DEA. In his trial he
also claimed he gave information to the Cypriot police but this was not verified. It
was also established that Kaan had given evidence before in a drugs prosecution in
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respect of the DEA and Customs. In view of his lengthy impending sentence and with
the above facts it was decided to visit Kaan.
On 18th July 2001 Kaan was removed from Belmarsh Prison and taken to Walworth
Road Police Station.
First interview from 12.46pm to 1.21pm
After the formalities, Kaan claimed he was an informant for Customs and DEA. He
denied having any connections to Metropolitan Police officers.
His Customs handlers in Cyprus were John Huston and a woman called Bethan
(believed Bethan Boreham-West DLO). His handlers in England were Ian Goodman
and Janet Smith. He claimed the relationship ended because he failed to act within the
strict instructions he was given.
He claimed that Mr Kerry Brookes DEA was his handler. He had worked for them
since 1986 or 1987. He confirmed he gave evidence for the DEA and Customs.
Second interview from 1.50pm to 2.26pm
The debriefing process was explained to him.
Kaan was not sure whether he wanted to give evidence or be debriefed on an
intelligence basis only. Kaan stated that he was aware that Ibrahim Karagozlu had
corrupt contacts within the police. He denied that he had any corrupt contacts himself
with the police.
He stated he knows of a Customs officer who took money off of him when he was
paid a reward for information. This was 1997-1998. It was one of his previous
handlers in Cyprus.
He stated he knew people who had corrupt links with police officers.
He denied any corruption within the DEA and claimed the agents acted with the
utmost professionalism at all times.
*********He denied being concerned with heroin importation's.*****************
He was told that in the debriefing process he must tell the truth. He would not discuss
his heroin conviction of 102 kilos as he intended to appeal against the conviction. He
intimated that Mehmet Yusuf had stolen the drugs on 31S
t
August 2000. This resulted
in the assault that took place.
Third Interview from 3.43pm to 4.29pm
It was put to Kaan that he was concerned in police corruption because before he was
arrested attempts were made to get the charges dropped in respect of Memhet
Yusuf.(Yusuf arrested on 7th September 2000).
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Kaan stated he had a meeting with a person called Ron on 9th September 2000. This
person was introduced to him through a man called Ray. While Kaan was with Ron,
Ron phoned a police officer. Ron was going to ask the police officer to look into the
matter of Memhet Yusuf's arrest.
Ron told the police officer Memhet Yusuf's name and what station he was detained at.
Kaan stated that the mobile phone number that called the police officer in his presence
ended in 007. This full mobile number is in Kaan's case papers under the name of
Ray (07802843007 subscriber shows Dale Golder. He is concerned in the GBH on
Banks Nash and Paul King. Itemised billing shows 66 calls to DS Dale Wilde over a 6
week period).
Kaan was told that we did not believe everything he was saying and he was not being
completely truthful. He was returned to prison and whilst at the entrance gates to
Bellmarsh Prison the following conversation took place which has been recorded in
the 112 (Serial No.0009101)
Kaan said "Do I have to give evidence on everything as there are some matters I
would be willing to and other I wouldn't."
Hodgetts said "We can't make that decision but if you have valid reasons they will be
taken into account by senior people."
Kaan said "I will be willing to tell you the truth about the corruption. I never met
whoever it was myself, but they and I thought it was a civilian they were going to pull
the papers."
Hodgetts said "We have only seconds before we go into reception. I will write out a
note and if you are willing you can sign it. Contact us when you are ready."
Comment
The reader must be very careful with the contents of Sonar Kaan's interviews. He is
clearly being economical with the truth. He stated that Ray/Ron made the call to the
police officer on 9th September 2000. It was the intention to pull the papers on the
Mehm et Yu suf arrest.
Involvement of DS Dale Wild
DS Dale Wild is currently posted to the Source Unit at Marylebone, although he is
long term sick with a back injury. In September 2000 Wild handled an informant with
DC Johnathan Lightfoot, who gave information about the assaults and in particular
Soner KAAN's role.
• On 6th September 2000 the informant gave his first indication of knowledge of
the assaults. The contact sheets for this contact are dated 20 th September 2000.
• On 9th September 2000 the informant states that Soner KAAN was arrested at
the airport over the weekend and stated that KAAN was innocent of all the
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.FRET
matters he had been arrested for. The contact sheet is dated 27 th September
2000.
• Soner Kaan was arrested on 11
th
September 2000 at Heathrow airport for the
assaults and conspiracy to import heroin.
• On 12th September 2000 DS Dale Wild who has access to 07970095074 and
police extension 49449 contacted the Custody Suite at Greenwich.
• Over a number of days he attempted to make contact with the investigation
team. After a number of conversations with investigation team members, DS
Mellerick made a request to meet Wild's source on 3r d
October 2000
• On 4
th October 2000 DCI Lee was informed of the request for DS Mellerick to
meet DS Wild's source. DS Wild instructed to arrange meeting and locate
source.
• 11 th October 2000 DS Wilde reports he saw Micky (the informant). Micky
does not want to meet the Investigation Team regarding the assault. See source
2 dated 11 th October 2000 which has been date stamped 19 th October 2000.
Comment
The phone used by Dale Golder, who is suspected of the assaults has phoned Dale
Wild 66 times over a 6 week period coinciding with the assaults.
Dale Wild has been the subject of protracted IDG (Operation `Tael') project as he is
suspected of organised cheque frauds. His relationship with informants is also
suspected to be corrupt. It is anticipated that this long-term operation will identify
further links between Wild and other organised criminality.
The information reports supplied by DS Wilde and DC Lightfoot appear to have prior
knowledge of Kaan's arrest at Heathrow. The information they supply is confusing
and misleading. It would appear "the source" was attempting to water down the
prosecution and arrest of Kaan stating Mehmet Yusuf was the principal.
Documented intelligence held within S011 and other agencies indicates that Kaan is a
principal player in the heroin market and it is firmly believed the mastermind behind
the corruption approach to DS Wild and without doubt the organiser of the assault and
heroin importations.
This corruption picture may change/develop as it is the intention of Operation Baseline
to further charge Sonar Kaan with 2 further importation's in excess of 100 kilos of
heroin and subsequent money laundering offences. An attempt will be made to recruit
Kaan again, but, as can be seen by the remaining members of the syndicate, the main
business of the KAAN syndicate is still intact, including their corruption network.
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Appendix A
The Remaining KAAN Syndicate
KAAN, according to SIS intelligence is a high profile importer of Heroin . He is also
involved in the money laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking. KAAN and his
brothers (NCIS Core Nominal) Project PENSION are considered in the upper echelon
of organised crime.
Operation Baseline — Target List
Principles:
• Erol TARPAZ — Had similar role to YUSUF but fell out of KAAN's favour.
• William BANKS-NASH, born 14/05/1955, CRO 20357/68V, believed to be
currently residing with Kerry NEWBURY born 24/09/1974 and their daughter,
Chelsea born 08/03/2000. — Billy Snr was a courier, stored and delivered.
• Susan BANKS-NASH, born 05/04/1952, address 134, Meadowside, Eltham —
Body packed money to Ibrahim in Turkey. Stored and delivered drugs.
• William BANKS-NASH, born 21/04/1979, CRO 122373/96P, gives address
108, Barringer Square, SW17 (mothers address). — Laundered money through
Soner's wife's account. Delivered drugs.
• Barry SHOARE a.ka. SHAW, address 45, Campfield Road, SE9 — Courier
may have brought drugs in from abroad. Skimmed off drugs off YUSUF's
stash, delivered drugs.
• Ibrahim Ali Esat KAAN — Supplied his brother Soner, he is the wholesaler
based in Turkey.
• Murat KOCKAYA — Partner of Ibrahim, based in Turkey.
Multi Kilo Customers:
• Mustafa ARIF, (possible born 03/05/1953, CRO 64230/75D) — Multi kilos to
Jimmy in Scotland.
• Fevzi EREN, born 03/04/1952, 48, Bounds Green Road, London, N22 —
Supplied false passports to YUSUF. Took samples.
• Mustafa HIKMET @ Ricky, born 13/09/1950, CRO 18997/69Y, (Possible
address 1 st floor flat, 39, Gauden Road, SW4) — Met YUSUF in prison he put
YUSUF in touch with is brother Hassan.
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• Hassan HIKMET, born 29/10/1951, CRO 18995/69W, address 61, Larkhall
Rise, Clapham, SW4 — 5 kilos
• Turker YUSUF, – Passed £400k to YUSUF for laundering & had 5 kilos.
• Will WHITELEY, born 15/05/1962, CRO 118130/78K, address 19, Mundon
Road, Maldon, Essex. — Ripped off YUSUF & KAAN for 30 kilos, he got
beaten up probably by the Machete Man.
• Tony FLOURENTZOU a.k.a. Tony the Greek, born 30/04/1961, CRO
12241/79V — Arrested for Living Off Immoral Earnings, had 5 kilos.
• Christopher CARTER, born 30/04/1948, CRO 74510/63Z, address 15, The
Green, Hatfield Peverel, Chelmsford,Essex — Supplied the Irish had V2 kilos
• Zafer KADI @ Eddie, born 12/03/1965, CRO 100949/90N, address 44, Tariff
Crescent, Pepys Estate, SE9 — Had 1 kilo but YUSUF and KAAN suspected
him to be an Informant.
• 'Ray from the East End' — Contact of KAAN's, had 13 kilos. It is believed that
KAAN got the men who assaulted KING and NASH from him.
Concerned in Assault:
• Patrick PASIPANODYA, address 134, Farmilo Road, E178JR (Believed to be
machete man, now deceased — murdered Op Stretford refers)
• Dale GOLDER, born 28/09/1972, address 2, Holley Cottages, Bell Common,
Epping (Believed to be second assaulter)
• Believed another 3 IC3 males were there, two outside in the road and one
outside in the hallway.
Others:
• Karlo KSENJI, – brought in 44%2 kilos for Importation 2 with her boyfriend.
She is in custody in Solvenia.
• Nurcin KAAN, Soner's wife, – her account was used to pay in money believed
to be from drugs. She helped deliver a false passport to YUSUF.
• 'Robert', – brought in the 102 kilos for the third Importation.
• Gary HENRY, K1NG's brother in law — Heroin dealer.
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I
Chapter 2
New Intelligence
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New Intelligence
Paul Kelly
Operation Tiberius Analysis
The Operation Tiberius team have identified Paul Kelly as a major conspirator within
the Zloty network and especially the linked series of compromised murder
investigations. All the information contained in the following report has been gleaned
from the IDG intelligence database and can be individually sourced.
Background
Paul Kelly has been the subject of CIB interest since the inception of CIBIC in 1995.
Kelly has been a member of the Redgrave and Morgan network since his posting on
the Regional Crime Squad from 1986 to 1990. Below is detailed Kelly's personal
details and service history:
Place of Birth: Dublin, Eire.
Date of Birth: 12/03/1956
National Insurance No. YW181759C
Marital Status: Co-habiting — no further details
Home Address: 9, Larch Way, Dunmow, Essex, CM6 1 WN
Telephone Numbers: 07710104138 (mobile)
01371872713 (home)
Service History
PC 1975 – 1979 'G' District Uniform duties
PC 1979 – 1985 'K' District Uniform duties
DC 1985 – 1986 'G' District Detective duties
DC 1986 — 1990 C12 (Regional Crime Squad) Pro-active
detective duties
DS 1990 – 1993 J1_, (Leytonstone) Detective duties
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DS 1993 – 1997 SO9 Pro-active
detective duties
DS 1997 – 2001 HT (Bethnal Green) Detective duties medically
retired
02/03/2001
Kelly has always been considered to be one of the most corrupt officers serving in the
MPS and since his retirement that threat has not diminished.
Main Intelligence
Kelly served on the National Crime Squad at Hainault between 1993 and 1997. In
1996 Kelly was in charge of the day to day running of Operation Bank, an operation
targeting a drug importation team. The list of criminal suspects included:
Frederick DAVY
Joseph Anthony GUNNING
Stephen LEVY
Michael Dennis EVANS
Arthur Marshall REDBOURNE
All the above were arrested in March 1996 and later appeared at Snaresbrook Crown
Court for trial. The trial collapsed and no evidence was offered against all of the
defendants. The reason for the collapse of the trial was the disappearance of vital
surveillance logs, which coincidentally had been requested by the defence for ESDA
testing. Substantial intelligence is held by 1DG from the time of the trial to the present
time, which indicates that the defendants each paid £15,000 into a fund to pay for
police officers to destroy the logs. The two officers who carried out the destruction
were DS Paul Kelly and DS Michael Scruton. (Compromise 1) The other criminal
suspects, who were not arrested, included Robert Kean, Clifford Redbourne and
Kenneth Beagle.
The Tiberius terms of reference include the investigation of allegations of police
corruption compromising a linked series of contract murder enquiries. Paul Kelly has
proved to be the common link between these enquiries. Two contract murders in
particular indicate Kelly's ability to compromise operations:
• Operation Sandridge is the investigation into the murder of Kenneth Beagle on
1 st November 2000. The main suspects for arranging the murder are Robert
Kean, Clifford Redbourne and Michael Adams, all Zloty subjects, the motive
being a failed drug importation. Paul Kelly approached the murder
investigation team in November 2000, whilst he was on sick leave, and tried to
elicit information. (Both Kelly and Martin Morgan had handled Beagle as an
informant prior to his death) Coincidentally a good friend of Kelly's, DS John
Williams, was part of the investigation team and sought authority to meet
Kelly to find out if he could help the enquiry. John Williams is an Active
Corrupt Nominal within the CIBIC database and has been the subject of at
least three corruption enquiries. Unfortunately this meeting was authorised, so
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legitimising Kelly's access into the murder enquiry. Shortly after the meeting
between Kelly and Williams, CIB received intelligence that Kean knew that
the investigation team considered him a suspect. (Compromise 2)
• Operation Spaldwick is the investigation into the murder of Ricky Rayner on
5
tn May 2001. Rayner's murder was a case of mistaken identity, the victim
should have been Tommy Agombar. The main suspects for organising the
murder are Joseph Gunning and Martin Davey, again this is a drug importation
related dispute. Gunning is aware he is a suspect for the murder and until
recently has been resident in Spain. On 12 th September 2001 Gunning rang
Kean and asked him to ascertain if he was shown as wanted for the murder or
any other offences on the police computers. Kean stated that he could not
contact his source until Friday, but would come back to him. On Thursday 14 th
September Martin Morgan visited Kean. On the morning of Monday 17
th
September 2001 Tiberius has evidence of telephone contact with Morgan from
Kelly's home telephone, later that afternoon PC Peggy Slater from the
licensing office at Bethnal Green conducted PNC checks on Gunning. Later the
same day Kean gave Gunning the all clear. (Compromise 3) Intelligence held
by IDG shows contact between Paul Kelly's home telephone number and
Peggy Slater's home telephone number in June 1999. Paul Kelly spent the last
4 years of his service at Bethnal Green. The inference is that Paul Kelly has
used a contact he cultivated at Bethnal Green to conduct the check for Kean,
probably through Morgan.
Itemised Billing Analysis
• Telephone analysis of Kelly's mobile telephone (07710104138) and home
landline (01371872713) itemised billing has identified regular contact with
Stephen Hobbs. Hobbs is the SIO for Operation Spaldwick and is a corrupt
nominal within the IDG databases, there are serious concerns over Hobbs'
integrity and he would appear to be a perfect conduit for Kelly to access the
murder enquiry on behalf of Gunning.
• The analysis carried out on Kelly's mobile telephone billing (07710104138)
and home landline (01371872713) has identified contact with the following
Greyhound/Zloty/Tiberius nominals:
■ Stephen Hobbs Tiberius
■ Sean McElhatton – Zloty
■ Martin Morgan – Zloty/G'hound
• Michael Scruton – Tiberius
■ Bill Kelleher – Zloty/G'hound
■ Patrick Kelly Tiberius
• Alan Millner – Tiberius
■ Stuart Faure – Tiberius
• McElhatton, Morgan and Kelleher will be known to the reader, through
previous applications under Operation Zloty/Greyhound. All three are
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suspected as conduits for the Zloty networks access to MPS databases, Morgan
in particular is suspected of utilizing Kelly's contacts.
• Michael Scruton is a former DS who was suspected with Kelly of stealing the
surveillance logs during Operation Bank. Billing for Scruton's home phone
still shows contact with former Det Supt Norman McNamara, who was the
original SIO for the CIB 2 investigation of the missing logs.
• Patrick Kelly is Kelly's brother, who is a serving Detective Constable on SO 6.
There are serious concerns over a cell of officers at SO 6 including Kelly, Jim
Gillan, John Hester and Gary Lyons, who are associated with the Zloty
network.
• Alan Millner is an associate of both Kelly and Hobbs and is a serving
Detective Constable on 6 AMIT SO 1(3), he has previously served on the
Flying Squad at Rigg Approach and is the subject of general taint.
• Stuart Faure is a former CIB 2 DS who has previously asked Martin Morgan to
read case papers relating to a criminal associate, so that the associate could
decide on his plea at court.
• The analysis carried out on Kelly's mobile telephone billing (07710104138)
and home landline (01371872713) has identified contact with the following
mobile telephones:
■ 07719442475
■ 07770210350
■ 07785307998
■ 07803266647
■ 07961412873
■ 07968067886
None of these mobile phones have known subscribers and have multiple calls to them
from both telephones.
Proactivity
A. strong intelligence case and liaison with NCIS has led to the acquisition of a high
grade intelligence source against Kelly. The source has provided information
identifying Kelly's continuing association with Martin Morgan, Sean McElhatton and
Bill Kelleher.
Successful applications have been made for the deployment of:
• directed surveillance
• a Q-logger facility
• a tracking device
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All of these facilities have proved useful and have supported the assertion that Kelly is
still a member of the Zloty network. Authority is currently being sought for the
deployment of a data-grabbing facility against Kelly to identify any undeclared mobile
telephones he may be using.
The Tiberius team feels that the current intelligence against Kelly could be quickly
developed to a point where evidential opportunities would become available to:
1. identify his current contacts within the MPS
2. identify the full extent of his criminality with the Kean Syndicate
3. identify his true position within the Syndicate
In a short space of time dedicated intelligence gathering has revealed a wealth of
intelligence that will prove essential to eradicating the Kean network.
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Fred Cutts
Operation Tiberius Analysis
As yet Operation Tiberius has only conducted an intelligence trawl and itemised
billing analysis in relation to Cutts. However substantial intelligence has been amassed
indicating that he is a conduit between organised crime, in the shape of the Bowers
Syndicate, and law enforcement.
Cutts is still heavily networked throughout the MPS, as evidenced by his personal
invitation to Jim Dean's retirement lunch. Analysis of his home billing for an eight
month period has identified some 99 calls to law enforcement telephone numbers.
These law enforcement numbers include:
• Various MPS extensions
• Ministry of Defence Police
• HMC & E
More importantly, the Operation Tiberius team believe that they have identified the
mobile telephone that Cutts is using for his criminality with the Bowers Syndicate.
The biliing for this mobile telephone is interesting for a number of reasons:
• There are 900 calls made from it in 3 weeks
• it does not mirror his home billing, which is unusual for a normal person
• it shows regular contact with the principle members of the Bowers syndicate
• there is contact with telephone numbers in Spain
• there is contact with telephone numbers in Holland
• there is contact with two subjects from Operation Magician
• there is regular contact with a telephone used by the principle of an SIS
operation targeting Colombian cocaine traffickers
• there is regular contact with Paul Bowers' criminal usage mobile telephone
• the bulk of the calls are to mobiles and most of those are Prepay mobiles with
no subscribers
Allied to the intelligence already held by the SIS and IDG, this intelligence builds a
persuasive case for the combined targeting of Cutts and the Bowers Syndicate.
The Tiberius team feels that Cutts could be quickly developed to a point where
evidential opportunities would become available to:
1. identify his current contacts within the MPS
2. identify the full extent of his criminality with the Bowers Syndicate
3. identify his true position within the Syndicate
4. identify any assistance he may be providing to the Palmer Syndicate
However, in line with the suggested proactive strategies above, Cutts should not be
developed in isolation but as a key member of the organisation, using the single
investigative unit strategy.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Analysis,
149 SECRET
Si Z•RET
The Scope of the Problem
As can be seen from the profiles and intelligence above, all these syndicates are
amongst the highest echelon criminals, not only in North East and East London, but
Pan London and in some cases nationally. All of them have identified the benefit of
having sources within law enforcement and in particular within the MPS. In most
cases the full scale of the syndicates' criminal networks has not been identified, this
means that the organisation could have unknown conduits controlling unidentified,
corrupted MPS staff.
Organised Corruption Methodology
It is clear that the main members of a network will not generally deal with the
corrupted officer directly, in most cases there will be an associate who is tasked to
seek the information on behalf of the syndicate, the conduit.
It is also often the case that the syndicate will employ sterile corridors. Meaning that,
only the conduit will know who the corrupted officer is and often the corrupted officer
will not know whom the final customer is. The sterile corridor serves a number of
purposes:
• Prevents the corrupted officer knowing who the final customer is, where if he did
know, he may refuse to carry out the corrupt act
• Keeps the principles distanced from any corruption investigations
• Prevents the organisation getting the reputation of working with the police. There
is still distrust and distaste towards corrupt police officers, even from the criminals
themselves
• Lessens the chances of direct infiltration of the organisation by undercover
officers, etc.
Examples of this theory are:
• The Hunt Syndicate
–
Customer
• Mark Wright Conduit
• Ray Ahearne
–
Corrupted
• The Palmer Syndicate Customer
• David Kent
–
Conduit
• Kent's Source
–
Corrupted
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• The Adams Family Customer
• Derek Keene Conduit
• Nigel Waldron Corrupted
• John Smith Corrupted
• Bob Yeomans Corrupted
These sterile corridors make the identification of the corrupted officers very difficult.
In America, the five year long FBI taskforce investigation of the Gotti Mafia
organisation was plagued by compromises. The head of the taskforce compiled a
secret file, over the course of the investigation, containing the small snippets of
intelligence that they uncovered, suggesting the existence of a 'mole' in their
organisation. However it was not until the very end of the enquiry that they got lucky
and identified the conduit, which led to the 'mole' being identified, a New York police
officer employed within the taskforce, and prosecuted.
As with all rules there are exceptions, Martin Morgan's relationships with Robert
Kean and Theodosis Chrysostomou, are clear examples of the principle in an
organisation having direct contact with the corrupted officer. It is known that both
these relationships developed through previous longstanding relationships with Bill
Kelleher, Morgan's uncle, dating back to the 70's and 80's.
Recruitment of Corrupted Officers
The ability to recruit corrupted officers is the most difficult aspect of organised crime
corruption to proof against. The places and situations in which officers can come into
contact with conduits and corrupters are innumerable. Examples are:
• Informant/handler
• Fellow officers
• Former officers
• Football/rugby/golf clubs
• Gyms
• Freemasonry and other organisations
• MPS sports clubs
• Social functions
• Sexual partners
Whatever the situation it is impossible for IIC to be everywhere, however some of the
suggested disruption strategies detailed below could help proof against some
recruitment.
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The Depth of Infiltration
The Tiberius team believes that organised crime is currently able to infiltrate the MPS
at will, within North East and East London. A number of factors contribute to this
assertion:
• Clustering of corrupt networks of officers within SO 1(3) and other organised
crime investigative units
• Networks of former MPS officers, who still network among serving officers in
North East and East London
• Long standing relationships between these networks and organised criminals
• Lack of proactive intelligence gathering against organised crime corruption
• Lack of effective investigation of existing organised crime corruption intelligence
The ease with which existing murder investigations have been compromised and
sensitive intelligence regarding other organised crime investigations has been leaked
are both examples of this infiltration.
The Current Investigative Approach
Firstly it should be admitted that little or no proactive intelligence gathering has been
conducted against organised crime corruption. The intelligence contained in the above
profiles has, invariably, been supplied by the non-IIC operational teams investigating
the syndicates' criminality.
There will be some non-IIC investigative teams who will not have disseminated
corruption intelligence to IIC, because they think:
• IIC must know about it already, or
• their team will come under scrutiny by TIC if they do, or
• they are simply not supportive of IIC's work
For whatever reason, the current approach is simply to wait for the corruption
intelligence to surface and to then react to it. The customary reaction is to investigate
the alleged corrupt police officer in isolation from the main investigation. The Tiberius
team believe this to be a fatally flawed approach
These syndicates are organised and all working towards the common goals of making
profit, laundering their money, evading prosecution and preventing the forfeiture of
their assets. The achievement of these goals is focussed and determined, the law
enforcement investigation should follow this lead.
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Public Perception of the Problem
The public's perception is formed through the media, especially through newspapers
and television. Numerous examples exist of documentaries, dramas and films
depicting organised crime using corrupt links within law enforcement to achieve their
ends.
A more powerful example is an article written by a freelance journalist, Jo-Anne
Goodwin, in August 2000 entitled 'The Untouchables'. The reader will remember
Miss Goodwin from the profile on the Adams Family and her contact 'the corrupt
police officer'. It is worth reproducing here extracts of that article, which exemplify
the mystique surrounding organised crime and the public's hunger for stories
involving police corruption.
`THE CURSE OF THE UNTOUCHABLES'
WHY DO SO MANY TOP GANGSTERS END UP BEING
ACQUITTED IN COURT? A DISTURBING MAIL INQUIRY
REVEALS HOW JURIES CAN BE BRIBED AND VITAL
WITNESSES SCARED INTO SILENCE BY THE RUTHLESS
BARONS OF CRIME…
`This month, the National Criminal Intelligence Service – Scotland Yard's elite
strategic unit – took the unprecedented step of publishing its annual 'threat
assessment'. The briefing, a review of national criminal activity normally restricted to
ministers and senior detectives, made alarming reading. It showed that organised
crime in Britain is booming as never before.
Gangland murders or 'hits' have risen by more than 30pc. Kidnappings – previously a
rarity in this country – show a 75pc rise. This is due to the practice of 'selling' drug
debts to so-called enforcers. In effect, the enforcer buys the right to kidnap and torture
the debtor until he pays up – with interest of say 25pc.
The 'threat assessment' was published because senior police officers wanted to
highlight the enormous task facing them.
With incomes running to millions of pounds, top-line technology and an arsenal of
weapons at their disposal, today's crime bosses are formidable opponents. To arrest
and charge just one such man demands a dedicated team of top-class detectives
working for many months.
But catching the criminal is only the beginning. The real problem is making the
charges stick – and the problem is getting bigger day by day.
The police can spend many hours gathering evidence; the barrister for the Crown may
present what appears to be a watertight case. But when cross-examined the accused is
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sarcastic and mocking. There are titters from supporters in the public gallery, a
muffled cheer when the accused gives a wave.
And the reason is simple: despite all the evidence ranged against him, he is going to
get off – and he knows it……… ………..
……………. The legal triumphs of the notorious ADAMS family illustrate the
problems that the authorities face. Based in Islington, North London and thought to be
worth between £80 and £200 million, the 'A Team', as they are known are the most
successful and most feared of the London firms'.
The family business is run by three brothers – Terry, the eldest, Patrick and Tommy.
Their history of 'surprise acquittals' is unsurpassed. In none of the cases is it claimed
jurors had been suborned. Juries can reach their decisions for a host of entirely
proper reasons. But, in each instance, the results caused deep concern to the police.
Back in 1985, 25 year old Tommy ADAMS was acquitted of involvement in the £26
million Brink's-Mat gold bullion theft.
Later, there was a similar escape for Patrick ADAMS, known as Patsy, after he was
arrested in connection with the importation of 3.5 tons of cannabis estimated to be
worth £25 million. Whilst Patsy's partner was sentenced to 11 years in 1993, ADAMS
himself 'walked'.
Patsy doesn't even feel obliged to come up with a good story for the police. When he
was arrested for a further drugs offence, officers found a gun and a complete set of
bullet-proof body armour. Patsy claimed they belonged to his wife. They jury believed
him.
This apparent untouchability is generally thought to be enhanced by corruption within
the Metropolitan Police. The family possesses an uncanny ability to second-guess
police surveillance. 'Listening devices go dead, their plans are mysteriously changed
and word drifts back that they know what we're doing' said one Scotland Yard source.
A close contact of the family confirmed such suspicions, and suggests rogue police
officers are just a part of the ADAMS network of influence. The family started in the
late Seventies he says and they've kept up with the young coppers they knew at that
time. But the young coppers are senior detectives now ……… ………
Then, in September 1998, police made what appeared to be a breakthrough.
Tommy ADAMS was sentenced to 7 1/2 years for cannabis importation. The
ADAMS family, it seemed, were no longer beyond the law.
DCI Philip BURROWS of the National Crime Squad said as much. This gets rid of the
myth that some people are untouchables he announced after ADAMS – chewing gum
and laughing – was taken down to begin his sentence.
Privately, the police were less ebullient. Although ADAMS had to forfeit £1 million of
estimated drug profits, officers had hoped for around £6 million. They had also failed
to find a single British bank account held by him.
I
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L , FRET
Most disturbingly of all, it appeared that the only reason the ADAMS family had
allowed the prosecution to succeed and had not resorted to bribery or intimidation to
thwart it, was because the other brothers wanted to teach Tommy a lesson for getting
involved in crimes they had not authorised.
The brothers went to see Tommy in Belmarsh Prison said an ADAMS associate. They
told him they were dumping him. It was because he'd gone behind their backs.
He's been caught freelancing and he was going to pay for it. They could have gone in
and bribed the jury – £1 million cash is not a problem… or a bullet……… …………
……………….. But it's not only the aristocrats of crime and their immediate
entourage who benefit from the corruption eating away at the justice system. Criminal
sources I spoke to say that as little as £50,000 will buy what they call a 'get-out-ofjail-free
card'
This involves obtaining the services of a 'bent lawyer' who, after taking his cut, will
convey what remains of the £50,000 to a chosen detective.
The detective will then ensure evidence is 'lost' or that 'bureaucratic errors' are made
that invalidate important documents. Perhaps the wrong date or the wrong name,
apparently insignificant, but enough to get the case thrown out…………………….
……… witnesses terrified into silence, dodgy jurors, bent lawyers, bent
policemen and bent CPS clerks – all are part of the same cancer eating away at
justice. A cure for the malady will not be easy to come by. Perhaps we should begin by
acknowledging that the patient is sick.'
Goodwin's final words are prophetic and strikingly relevant to the investigation of
organised crime corruption. Hopefully the Operation Tiberius strategic analysis report
provides an accurate and timely diagnosis and as well as some suggested cures.
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The Damage Caused
To
The Criminal Justice System
The true assessment of the damage caused by these corrupt networks is impossible to
make at this stage, until further proactive scoping has been undertaken. However a
statement by an experienced SIO currently attached to SO 1(3) gives some indication
of the depth of the problem in East and North East London:
"I feel that at the current time I cannot carry out an ethical murder investigation
without the fear of it being compromised."
The ramifications of this statement are serious and disturbing and provide a snapshot
of the current threat to the criminal justice system. Additionally the fact that none of
these syndicates have been seriously disrupted over the last five years provides an
insight into the effectiveness of their networks.
The Tiberius team believes that organised crime corruption has infiltrated:
• The Metropolitan Police Service
• The City of London Police
• The National Crime Squad
• The National Criminal Intelligence Service
• Her Majesty's Customs and Excise
• The Crown Prosecution Service
• The Prison Service
• The Jury System, and
• The Legal Profession
Quite how much more damage could be done is difficult to imagine.
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Suggested Strategies
The Operation Tiberius team has identified a number of strategies, which will provide
an effective counter to the threat of organised crime in East and North East London
infiltrating the MPS.
Suggested Proactive Strategies
Option 1
Continue to investigate corruption associated with organised crime as it appears and
in isolation from the investigation of the organised crime network and its
criminality.
This option is effectively the 'do nothing different' option. The Tiberius team believe
that this option is unacceptable and would lead to the formation of a scoping team in
the future to reassess the same problems. By waiting for intelligence about organised
crime corruption to surface, the extent of the true problem can never be truly assessed.
The corruption associated with organised crime is not reported to police, there are no
crime figures to measure it and traditional policing responses, such as 'fire brigade'
policing, will not address it. The accepted practice is to investigate individual police
officers as allegations of corruption against them come to light. Investigating
corruption controlled by organised crime is unique and as such requires a unique
approach. The Tiberius team believes that the answer is to target the organisation's
criminality and corruption together, the following strategies provide that approach.
Option 2
The formation of a specialist, corruption-proofed, organised crime taskforce to carry
out proactive operations against organised crime syndicates, which utilise corrupt
MPS staff. The concept is one of a single unit investigating both the syndicates'
criminality and use of corruption at the same time.
Operation Zloty has highlighted the disparate use of law enforcement to achieve a
single goal. The following units are all involved and have separate operation titles for
different aspects of the same operation:
• Metropolitan Police Service
• Internal Investigations Command
• Intelligence Development Group — Operation Zloty
• Anti-Corruption Group — Operation Pyramus
• National Criminal Intelligence Service — Operation Radial
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• Special Liaison Unit
• Operational Source Unit
• RIO Teams
• National Crime Squad — Operation Summer
• Newmarket Branch Office
• Security Services & Secret Intelligence Service
Those who are realistic would agree that the liaison between these units thus far has
not been wholly successful. One dedicated operational task force, with control of the
full intelligence picture, would be able to make strategic and logical time imperative
decisions, that would not only impact on the criminality but would take into account
any corruption issues.
The taskforce would:
• answer to a Gold Group to monitor ethical and strategic issues
• have unprecedented levels of operational security
• have a dedicated OPSEC officer to manage the systems needed to maintain
operational security
• be drawn from both the Internal Investigations Command and SO units,
specifically the Special Intelligence Section
• be staffed with vetted staff, experienced in the investigation of organised crime
and/or corruption
• have access to all IIC assets, including the ability to undertake covert checks,
utilise covert surveillance teams and utilise covert technical deployments
• have access to all SO assets, such as S011 surveillance teams and technical
support
• have the ability to 'launder' the tasking of operational arrest teams, so as to
maintain its operational security
• be able to handle their own sources under strict audit and integrity scrutiny
• have access to the Crown Prosecution Service Visa Team for legal advice
The taskforce would have to be given realistic time constraints, patience has never
been a strong point in the MPS. The subjects being investigated are sophisticated and
sensible enough to employ the assistance of law enforcement to assist them, there will
be no quick fix. However, with effective use of disclosure, a number of operational
opportunities should be able to be regularly disseminated, while the long-term goal is
relentlessly pursued.
Tactically the taskforce would utilise all the investigative techniques and best practice
developed over the years by both Commands, especially with regard to financial
attack, after all, money is the driver in both their criminality and corruption.
Disadvantages
• Resource intensive, especially in the light of current MPS budgetary constraints
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• Perception of elitism amongst staff of both Commands towards those selected for
the taskforce
• Long term nature of the task
• Lack of prosecution capability, therefore burdening other MPS units with arrest
and prosecution charges
• Some outside assistance still necessary i.e. NCIS OSU
• Where would the task force sit within the MPS?
Option 3
IDG Intelligence officers permanently attached to law enforcement units, which are
already carrying out targeting operations against organised crime syndicates,
identified as utilising corrupt MPS staff.
This option still follows the single investigative unit ethos by permanently attaching
IDG intelligence officers to the operational team. The injection of anti-corruption
knowledge and operational security experience would greatly enhance the operational
team's effectiveness. The IDG officers would be able to conduct all the covert checks
required and would, subject to availability, be able to utilise other IIC covert
resources.
This approach would only be successful if the IIC officers were fully integrated into
the operational team and allowed unlimited access to all the intelligence and evidence
gathered by the team. The officers would also have to take an active role in the team's
decision making processes.
Whilst being more cost effective, as the bulk of the resource commitment would be
borne by the operational team, the following disadvantages have been identified:
• Lack of corruption proofing on the operational team
• Resentment towards IDG staff from the operational team
• Competing priorities between the IDG strategies and Op team strategies
• Revelation of IIC techniques to potentially untrustworthy officers
• Lack of corruption experience in the SIO
• What if known corrupt or suspected corrupt officers are already on the Op team?
• Ensuring the long-term commitment of the Op team to the full dismantling of a
network.
The current RIO system in place within the IDG has revealed some of these problems
and has led to the continued separation of corruption investigations from the criminal
investigations, which initially identified the corruption. Obviously all of these
disadvantages could be overcome through negotiation and education by TIC senior
management with operational SIO's and their senior managers.
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Suggested Disruption Strategies
Option 1
A campaign of disinformation against both the organised crime syndicate and the
suspected corrupt MPS staff they utilise.
The aim of this option is to discredit the MPS staff in the eyes of the organised crime
syndicate to such an extent that they will no longer trust them and therefore will stop
using them.
There are a number of ways that this can be achieved:
• Covert feeding of false information to the suspected corrupt member of staff,
which relates to the organised crime syndicate, causing the syndicate to take
unnecessary action. For example information regarding an imminent search of
syndicate controlled premises.
• Overt contrived contacts by known BC staff with suspected corrupt officers,
witnessed by other officers
• Overt contrived contacts by known IIC staff with key members of the organised
crime groups, informing them of IIC's knowledge of their corrupt MPS contacts
Disadvantages
• High risk strategies
• Danger of retribution against corrupt MPS staff by the organised crime syndicates
• Can only be used against subjects who are not being actively investigated by other
units
• Possible Human Rights issues
• Risks to IIC staff approaching organised crime groups
• Only deals with the isolated cases where the corrupt officer is identified
• Will not stop the syndicate attempting to corrupt other MPS staff
• May encourage the syndicate to corrupt further MPS staff
• The implementation of such a strategy is labour intensive
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Option 2
The naming of identified corrupters within Police Orders, including a lawful order
that no member of MPS staff may have undeclared and unauthorised direct or
indirect contact with the individuals named. Any undeclared and unauthorised
contact would be considered a discipline offence, carrying an automatic sanction of
dismissal from the Service.
The Operation Tiberius team believes that the current Service Confidence policy is not
an effective disruption technique. However it is probably the best policy that could be
achieved given the complexities and restrictive legislation involved. Therefore the
Tiberius team has sought to design a Service Confidence policy from the criminals'
perspective.
It is envisaged that full research and consultation with MPS Solicitors would be
required to ensure legality, Human Rights compliance and a defendable position for
any civil actions brought against the MPS. The entry in Police Orders could also
include exclusion from premises controlled by corrupters, i.e. night-clubs, restaurants
and pubs. (Precedent in exclusion of CO 14 Clubs & Vice staff from licensed premises
in Westminster)
This strategy would require an appeals system to cater for serving MPS staff, who are
innocent relatives of corrupters, etc. and policy would have to be formulated to cover
such eventualities.
This option could provide the following advantages:
• Notification of previously unidentified contact between MPS staff and corrupt
nominals
• An effective sanction to deal with MPS staff who wish to continue undeclared and
unauthorised associations with the named individuals
• Gives the staff member a simple choice between continuing such associations and
remaining as a member of the Service. Where do their true loyalties lie?
• Makes itemised billing a far more effective investigative tool, by making simple
contact with a named individual a discipline offence, rather than having to prove
the content of any conversation
• Provides further scope for the prosecution of discipline offences resulting from
proactive investigations into the named individuals
• Makes contact between corrupt MPS staff and their corrupters more difficult
• Lessens the potential for the corrupters to corrupt further MPS staff after they
have been 'named and shamed'
• Cost effective method of disruption
• Could be used when proactivity has failed against a corrupter
However this option could lead to the following disadvantages:
• Legal action against the Service by those named for libel/defamation
• Potential breach of named individuals' Human Rights
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• The same legal actions and breaches could be brought by/identified against MPS
staff
• MPS policy would have to be written in the light of BRA 2000 and other relevant
legislation
• Could only be used where the corrupter is not the subject of other pro-activity by
any MPS unit
• Who would administer the policy and carry out regular dip sampling of itemised
billing
The Tiberius team feel that this is a viable option, if fully researched and ratified by
Solicitors Department.
Option 3
Existing dispersal and clustering techniques, either moving suspected corrupt MPS
staff or banding them together.
For a number of years, management within the MPS has attempted to deal with
suspected corruption at a local level. So called, management intervention has taken the
form of:
• removing alleged corrupt officers from specialist departments back to borough
postings across the MPS to disrupt networks
• placing alleged corrupt officers together on one particular unit to enable a strong
manager to deal with them
• placing alleged corrupt officers together on a unit to 'keep an eye on them'
The following disadvantages have been identified with these interventions:
• Spreading corruption networks throughout the MPS (dispersal)
• Exposing vulnerable staff to suspected corrupters (dispersal)
• Making central monitoring of staff difficult (dispersal)
• Making corrupt networks associations stronger and easier (clustering)
• `Stockholming' of previously respected management figures (clustering)
• Making proactivity against strengthened networks more difficult (clustering)
To an extent, the Service Confidence Procedure has achieved some success, by giving
a structure to the removal of suspected staff from sensitive posts. However the
disadvantages detailed above in relation to dispersal apply equally to Service
Confidence.
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Suggested Organisational Strategies
The Operation Tiberius team has identified a number of organisational strategies that
could be implemented to help proof existing operations against infiltration by
organised crime:
1. Implementation of the MPS Integrity Strengthening Programme
2. Implementation of Operational Security policy across the MPS, to include:
• Introduction of training to accreditation level of dedicated Operational Security
(OPSEC) Officers
• Vetting of all prospective OPSEC officers prior to training
• OPSEC officers to be appointed on all operations involving organised crime
• Introduction of OPSEC training on the SIO's course
• Overall responsibility for OPSEC to be placed with the SIO and included in all
risk assessments and decision making processes
• Regular quality assurance checks of OPSEC on relevant units with constructive
feedback to SIO's
3. Inclusion Logs to be developed for all operations involving organised crime,
along the lines of a standard decision log, to include:
• The reasons for an individual's inclusion
• Their level of inclusion
• A section to be signed by both the person included and the person including
them, so avoiding any future disagreement as to levels and dates of inclusion.
It is felt that all these strategies would encourage a focused, innovative, professional
and, above all, effective approach to the investigation of organised crime and
corruption.
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Conclusion
The Metropolitan Police Service has, since 1997, waged a successful war against most
forms of police corruption. Notable prosecutions have been achieved, in the most
demanding and difficult circumstances, against some of the most corrupt officers ever
identified.
However there has been only one success against corrupt officers directly assisting an
organised crime network, Operation Greyhound. The other successful operations have
dismantled networks of corrupt officers engaged in serious criminality, but purely for
their own gain.
The scoping exercise carried out by the Operation Tiberius team has identified a
wealth of intelligence identifying organised crimes infiltration of the MPS and other
law enforcement agencies. However much of this intelligence has failed to provide
evidential opportunities against corrupt officers. Operation Tiberius has identified the
following reasons for this:
• corruption investigations carried out in isolation from the ongoing criminal
investigation
• resultant lost evidential opportunities through lack of inclusion and liaison
• distrust of an operational team
• investigations focused purely on the MPS officer and not the syndicate he is
assisting
• lack of resources to react to all the intelligence received
• lack of resources to proactively investigate organised crime syndicates and their
corruption together
• lack of experience and skills to investigate organised crime
Some of these reasons can be considered as organisational failings, whilst some have
been driven by organisational necessity, for example, finite resources.
It is the view of the Operation Tiberius team that these organisational failings can be
addressed through a change of mind set and the adoption of the organised crime task
force ethos (see proactive strategy option 2). This strategy will not work in isolation
but will require secondments to existing teams (see proactive strategies option 3) and
the adoption of lawfully audacious disruption strategies as detailed above.
The MPS has a serious problem with organised crime infiltrating its databases and
compromising its operations, only a holistic approach to this problem will result in
success. In addition to the proactive and disruption strategies, the MPS must be
proofed against further infiltration, through the implementation of the Integrity
Strengthening Programme and Operational Security and Inclusion policies.
Most importantly the Internal Investigations Command should not fall into the same
trap again of waiting for organised crime corruption intelligence to come to it. It
should proactively seek the intelligence by regularly scoping, 'up and coming'
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organisations and working in partnership with other units engaged in their
investigation.
In conclusion, Operation Tiberius has identified the serious threat posed to the MPS by
organised crime, this is not the first time this threat has been identified, but now new
innovative, far reaching and audacious strategies are ready to be implemented to
neutralise that threat.
Simon Crane
Detective Sergeant
Operation Tiberius
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